

ARMY

JUNE 1956
50¢



*... Resolved, that the Association of the United States Army
go on record as favoring the adoption of an Army Flag . . .*

Adopted, 21 October 1955



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AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



FOURTEEN SEAMEN, five from the bridge, eight from the fantail, and one from the water were saved by an Air Force rescue helicopter when the grounded Japanese freighter *Handa Maru* broke up in 40-foot waves off Honshu, Japan. The Sikorsky H-19 lifted men to safety despite high winds. Note man in rescue sling, circled.



LIFEGUARD FOR TEST PILOTS, Sikorsky S-55 recently purchased by Grumman Aircraft arrives at company's Bethpage, L. I., airfield. Grumman will use the S-55 as a stand-by rescue aircraft while testing its Navy jet fighters off the Atlantic coast. Grumman's S-55 has a 600-pound rescue hoist and flotation gear.



HELICOPTER HISTORY



FIRST HELICOPTER AIRMAIL

On May 16, 1943, at the Capitol, U. S. mail was carried by a helicopter for the first time, commemorating the 25th anniversary of airmail. The Sikorsky R-4B was flown by Capt. (now Brig. Gen.) H. Franklin Gregory. Sikorsky helicopters now carry not only mail but freight, express, and passengers in regular daily service.

ANTI-SUB SQUADRON HS-5 is first Navy unit being completely equipped with 14 large Sikorsky HSS helicopters. Based at Key West Naval Air Station, the new squadron is first of a number still to be formed which will fly the HSS. Eight pilots and eight crewmen are shown above at Sikorsky Aircraft in Bridgeport, where they were checked out in their new aircraft. The HSS tracks submarines with sonar gear and can launch torpedoes or lay mines. The high-performance helicopter also serves with other armed forces and, in commercial versions, is scheduled for airline passenger service this year in the U. S. and Europe.



SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

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ARMY

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EDITORIAL POLICY

ARMY is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. ARMY strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adapted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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The Month's Cover

Seven months after the Association of the U. S. Army adopted a resolution recommending that the Army should have a flag it became a reality. The blue design on the white field is the seal of the Department of the Army (and old War Department). The 145 streamers attached to the staff commemorate every campaign fought by the U. S. Army in its 181 years. The idea for an Army flag was suggested to the editor of this magazine in the early summer of 1955 by Lt. Col. John B. B. Trussell, Artillery. The editor passed the suggestion to Col. Robert F. Cocklin, AUSA's business manager and project officer for the 1st annual meeting. He passed it on to the chairman of the Resolutions Committee, Col. Charles W. McCarthy. The AUSA adopted the resolution on 21 October 1955. Photo in full color by the Army Signal Corps.

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"Mr. Helicopter"

When Capt. William E. Brake evacuated 900 wounded men in Korea, grateful soldiers inspired a very appropriate nickname for this U. S. Army pilot—"Mr. Helicopter."

Capt. Brake flew 587 missions in his Bell H-13 helicopter, often under direct fire from the enemy front lines, to bring his injured charges safely and quickly back to Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals. Some were so seriously hurt that evacuation by any other means of transportation would have been fatal.

A native of Lansing, Mich., Capt. Brake's present assignment is as a helicopter instructor at the Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala., where he shares his vast combat and rotary wing experience with the Army's newest flying recruits.



Capt. William E. Brake
...Shares his experience




The U. S. Army has to fight wars but it is also dedicated to providing the world's best care for its injured combat troops. The helicopter, as Capt. Brake demonstrates above, guarantees the fastest and most comfortable "mercy missions." More than 25,000 men were "saved" by helicopters in Korea and the Army is relying more and more on rotary wing aircraft for this and other purposes.

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

Glad to Have Photorecord

● Thanks to you for again printing the current "Department of the Army Command Post" in the April issue.

Hope you will continue to do so.

CAPT. R. L. HILLMAN

Hq Fifth Army
Chicago 15, Ill.

Our Own Traditions

● I was much interested in Colonel Schmierer's proposal (May) for permanent, nontactical regiments. But I was surprised that he said so little about the precedents for such a system. He barely mentions the British Cardwell system (perhaps this was politic on his part) but says nothing at all about the old U. S. artillery regiments, which from the founding of the Army down to the Spanish-American War exemplified this concept.

Henry Knox designated his embryonic artillery as a "regiment," after the Royal Regiment of Artillery, which then as now was a nontactical "home" for the scattered tactical units. In 1821, when Congress, after the excitements of the Napoleonic era, was shaking the Army down to a permanent peacetime organization, it established four regiments of artillery with eight companies of fortress troops and one of light (field) artillery. From then until 1907 the battery (or seacoast company) remained the tactical unit, and the artillery regiments, though they survived until 1901, had little more tactical reality than the British infantry regiments after the Cardwell reforms. In 1907 we regrouped our field artillery batteries into six tactical regiments, but when after World War II these were broken down again into battalions it was not so much an innovation as a return to the past.

Actually, the distinction between the tactical battalion (or even company) and the nontactical regiment long antedates Cardwell. The British raised four battalions of the Royal Americans for the French and Indian War; these were used as independent tactical units. In the Napoleonic era it was common practice to detach the specialist "flank" companies from the line battalions and form them into independent tactical battalions for combat purposes without their losing their association with the parent bodies. While the regiment has been our traditional tactical unit through all our wars (with the exception of the artillery) the habit of breaking it down to battalion or company units for the purposes of police and Indian fighting during most of our "peacetime" history really produced a situation not unlike that in the British service.

Colonel Schmierer might have cited the old artillery regiments as precedents for his proposal for nontactical regimental organizations capable of taking any number of tactical battalion units under their battle-honored flags. It seems a good idea, and it has American as well as British experience behind it.

WALTER MILLIS

1 West 77 St
New York 23, N. Y.

● Colonel Schmierer's article presents a workable solution for a confusing and perplexing problem that has often reared its head. He presents a lucid and articulate account of a plan which overcomes the age-old question of how to perpetuate the lineage and traditions of our old and revered regiments.

In addition, I believe that such a system would also provide the Army another vehicle for gaining public support: let each regiment appoint an honorary "colonel" from the list of retired officers who had served with one of the subordinate battalions. This officer, with a selected "staff" of other retired officers and enlisted men, could maintain liaison with the subordinate battalions and also "sell" the regiment, and hence the Army, to the public. This, obviously, is patterned after the British system which has proved a workable solution in their army. The Tommy has achieved stature in the eyes of the citizens of the United Kingdom; perhaps by incorporating such a system in our own service we might succeed in giving the soldier the position he deserves.

When queried as to his outfit, the soldier would proudly say, "I'm from the 1st Battalion of the 3d Infantry," rather than "the 5993d Battle Group."

LT. DAVID H. RUMBROUGH

Hq TIS

Fort Benning, Ga.

Realism and Survival

● Congratulations for SFC Lloyd C. Pate's powerful article, "Survival Lies in Training" in the April issue.

Since the Korea cease-fire, I have read numerous articles dealing with the basic theme of Sergeant Pate's discussion. However, none seemed to so clearly and vividly express the necessity for continuing to base our training program upon the experiences of soldiers who have learned the positive correlation between realism and survival.

LT. JOHN E. DONALDSON

9th QM Co
APO 111, NYC

Wearing of the Blue

● Although I bade farewell to Cadet Gray fifteen years ago, I didn't don the

ARMY

Army Blue until last Christmas. Until then, blues was just music.

The occasion was our daughter's eighth-grade Christmas Ball, at which my wife and I chaperoned. I had bought the new blues with the idea that since they would eventually become mandatory, I might as well realize the extra dividend of satisfaction in wearing them voluntarily for a while.

Once the kids wearied of quips like, "Doorman, call me a cab," they had to admit the uniform was handsome. The highest accolade came from a TV addict who exclaimed, "It's just like the guy wears on the Rin-Tin-Tin show." I'm Armor, so he wasn't too far wrong.

The next wearing was when I escorted my Cub Pack to a Military Mass. I bear no malice toward a parent who very seriously asked whether I was wearing the new Cubmaster uniform.

Having worn blues to military and small-fry functions, I'm thinking of discarding my tux and wearing the new threads to a civilian affair. I'll doubtless be one of the few males not bedecked in a gold lamé dinner jacket and plaid cummerbund. Army blues are neat, not gaudy, and I'm proud to wear them. I wish more of my fellow officers felt the same way.

LT. COL. ROBERT J. COAKLEY
Washington 25, D. C.

Moving Base of Fire

• After reading "Marching Fire" (April) all I can say is, shades of our cadet days at The Citadel (1924-28) when Capt. Paul B. ("Pablo") Robinson taught infantry tactics as they were then known! He was a strong believer in what he (and our manuals) called assault fire. When I next became exposed to official infantry doctrine, at TIS in 1942, assault fire had been discredited, and the fashion there was the principle of a "base of fire" to cover individual or squad rushes into the objective. I think that Colonel Crabill's article is worthy of a long look by the people who enunciate the tactical doctrine of the Army's vital combat branch.

Assault fire is a base of fire on the move, ever closing and ever increasing in effectiveness until the enemy is overrun in his cover. There is one booby trap for the assault leader to look for: the enemy fire unit, even a lone rifleman, far off to a flank, who does not get a share of the assaulting musketry, and in consequence does not get the word to stay under cover and out of action. He can surely make trouble for the program with enfilade fire.

LT. COL. EDWARD L. BLACK
1111 Jefferson Ave
Falls Church, Va.

We Know the Difference Now

• By now you have no doubt received many letters concerning the very obvious error in the captioning of the photographs on page 27 of the May issue. The article on Training by TV was excellent but Doctors Kanner and Runyon should know the difference between a radio capacitor and a firing device for mines and booby traps.


MSGT. GEORGE E. OMEN
ROTC, Ohio State Univ
Columbus 10, Ohio

• Sergeant Omen's letter was the first of a host of letters, telephone messages, and acquaintances stopping us in the corridors of the Pentagon to call our attention to what was an error by the editors and not by the authors. We're chagrined and sorry—and afraid to turn on our TV for fear George Gobel will be telling us that mistakes like that shouldn't hardly ever happen anymore.

We're Rebuked

• I believe you were unduly harsh in your editorial note to Captain Reactionary's "B-Bag letter" (May). Rather than exaggerated, I find the anonymous captain's letter almost restrained.

Surely you are aware that our Army is being slowly demilitarized by the do-gooders of the management systems. How



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does one remain calm in the face of it? How does one, trained to the clear-cut disciplines of the soldier, retain his good humor under the welter of improvement programs by which we are being smothered today?

This thing has reached unbelievable proportions. Military leadership is being sold over to "modern management practices"; sound military planning is being subverted by the cult of "program review and analysis"; the principle of command is being replaced by the "principle of council." One by one our traditional military values are being pulled down by management and administrative fads. In the Pentagon the trend is rampant; and no little part of it is being felt at troop levels.

There's a simple way to measure this. And though I'm normally not a betting man, I'll wager a dollar to a dime for every time you can find the words "infantry," "armor," or "artillery" in the current Defense Department telephone directory, as against a thousand "program coordinators"; and a dollar will get you ten for every "squad tactics" in current training programs as against a hundred improvement lectures.

You can't lose money on understatements.

CAPT. AVERY E. KOLB
7618 Nancemond St
Springfield, Va.

• I take exception to the footnote you inserted under Captain Reactionary's letter in the May issue.

If Captain Reactionary is "bad humored," he is but one of many who feel the same way every time they run across untrained, undisciplined and improperly oriented soldiers; soldiers whose unit commanders have neither the time nor the prerogatives to instruct in those fundamentals that always seem to be left out, as there is only time for the "mandatory" TI&E, Character Guidance, Military Justice and Supply Economy classes.

I also think he has a point on the misuse of dayrooms by their overemployment as TI&E centers. Likewise all this dollar stencilling and supply economy displays are usually recognized in the field as penny-saving-pound-foolish eyewash and little else. Can you find a single major corporation, whose primary objective is monetary profit, that follows this sort of procedure?

Rather than justify Captain Reactionary's "bad humor" I want to protest your standards of editing letters from subscribers. I feel that subject to space availability you should publish all letters except those that demonstrate lack of courtesy to our leaders, traditions, or country. I further protest any standards that judge objectively on the standard of "good" or "bad" humor.

Personally I believe the letter in ques-

tion was objective, and I feel that "good humor" over bad situations, while desirable as a morale builder on the battlefield, is not the only key to improvement of our Army.

SUBSCRIBER

Magnetic Membership

• I found an interesting item in your March "Report from Your AUSA CP": "The more members, the more we can do with the magazine and the Association." I re-read the entire magazine with a constant thought: Would this magazine appeal to the average individual, regardless of rank, in the Army? In my opinion, it would not, because the level of obvious appeal of the subjects published was directed at the uniformed intelligentsia. In the fields of guided missiles, atomic weapons, air defense and such, the importance of their low-level need-to-know saturation cannot be overemphasized. However, at what level is this "unrestricted information" really important or required for detailed consumption? Small doses are prescribed, but as in any new concept, don't get the cart before the horse.

My suggestion for our magazine's content is to compose it to appeal to the present or anticipated mass of membership. Add the necessary complex or advance doctrines as dessert.

Perhaps fellow members can expand on that by a voting method used by some magazines, which indicates readers' likes, dislikes, or take-it-as-it-comes attitude on the articles published in each issue.

AUSA MEMBER

Pipe Bands and Kilts

• In "Don't Tread on Tradition" in the March issue, Major Baird was courteous and even-tempered in his rebuke of those he feels have usurped his traditions. But I am afraid not all of his remarks hit the mark.

It is true that the clan and family tartans have sentimental and historic associations almost sacred to many Scots. For that reason, the wearing of the Royal Stuart tartan (awarded by the sovereign of Britain only to pipers of units of very long and honorable service) by U. S. military and civilian pipe bands is out of order. That Americans are not the only offenders is amply illustrated by my own pipe teacher. A very fine piper, now a U. S. soldier, he was formerly a member of a civilian pipe band in Edinburgh. His band wore (he still does) the same Cameron of Erracht tartan which is the particular property of Major Baird's famous regiment.

Facts presented by the major concerning the history of the bagpipe and the kilt may be inaccurate. Bagpipes are generally considered as having come to Britain with the Romans. Although Ireland



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MERCY MISSION...

Kaman's HOK-1 general utility helicopter, now in volume production, is designed to carry personnel, litter evacuees or cargo internally. Fitted out as a "flying crane" it can carry cargo slung externally. Equipped with a power hoist it can be used for search and rescue operations.

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and Scotland are the only nations that traditionally associate the pipes with their fighting forces, bagpipes of somewhat different types are made in Brittany, Central Europe, and Italy. There is nothing exclusive about bagpipes.

Neither is there anything particularly exclusive about the kilt. To reduce the kilt to its essentials, it is a wrap-around skirt with pleats sewn in back. The basic garment, less Scottish refinements, is similar to a long series of garments that began with ancient Egypt and arrived at the Greek *evzone's* very ornate ballet-dancer type kilt, a grand and modern example. I refer Major Baird to the Irish regiment of Canada, noted as the only Irish regiment in the British Commonwealth in which all ranks wear the kilt. So much for Scotland's exclusive claim to the kilt.

Pipe bands among U. S. armed forces may, in my opinion, quite justifiably dress their pipers in kilts. However, I agree with Major Baird that our bands should never wear a tartan which is the property of any Scottish unit or clan without obtaining permission to do so. Considering that there are in existence certain "authentic" Scottish tartans which are not the property of any family or military unit, the effort to design new ones for U. S. bands might not be necessary.

CAPT. SHERWOOD S. STUTZ
Co E, 4th Inf
APO 937, Seattle

New Anthology

• After reading "Faithful to Our Trust" [December 1954] and "The American Professional Soldier" [February 1956], it seemed a pity to me that such gems can't be retained in more enduring fashion than a magazine that is soon lost, mislaid, or thrown away during housecleaning.

Of course, we can keep in binders our copies of **ARMY** and its predecessors (I've still got some around), but there are only a few articles that have lasting value.

In my personal library is such a collection, selected and annotated by Colonel Joseph I. Greene in 1944 and titled *The Infantry Journal Reader*. (Not surprisingly, the second article is "The American Professional Soldier.") I still get a kick from re-reading the articles by Invictus, Brig. Gen. E. D. Cooke, Sergeant Terry Bull, and many others, and I'm sure others do too. I've even been tempted to ask you to reprint such classics as "The Dead Hand," "Over, Short and Damaged," and "Think it Over" for your newer readers.

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
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CAPT. JOHN R. BYERS
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APO 114, NYC

Communication or Communications?

• I take exception to one statement in "The Caudal Appendage, etc." [March], which wrongly blames the Army. SR 320-50-1 (Dictionary of United States Army Terms) does not authorize *communications* chief or officer, and permits either *communication* or *communications* center. Further, the Army uses *communication* with intelligence, intelligence analysis, means (of), officer, procedure, and trench.

At the AA&GMS the editors are instructed to consult SR 320-50-1 unless they are sure how the D/A wants terms defined and spelled. The dictionary has some errors (like misspelling *acoustic*, *aliquot* and *isogonic*) but it is not fair to accuse the Army of misusing *communication*, especially when one could have assured himself by consulting this SR. No writer at Fort Bliss would use *communications* officer. Some examples are found in FM 44-4. On page 71 *train area* appears, which is not listed in SR 320-5-1. But since FM 44-4 was printed by the D/A it is not fair to say the Army "always" writes *trains area*. On page 74 it is *communication equipment*; on page 75 *wire communication system* and *communication nets*; on page 76, *unit wire communication* and *communication lines*.

There are manuals, FM 101-5 for one, that use *communications* officer. Perhaps those writers are not bound by SR 320-5-1!

MAJOR B. G. OBERLIN
1517 Honeysuckle Drive
El Paso, Texas

Toth Case (cont'd.)

• I agree with Lieutenant Lewyn's statement in the March issue, to the effect that military due process accords an accused substantive and procedural safeguards as much as, if not more, practically speaking, than does civil due process.

The paramount issue in the Toth case was not the question of who accords more rights and privileges, but the philosophy and basic theory of judicial supremacy over civilian rights. When the Toth case first presented itself, my opinion was to condemn the holding as an infringement upon the military. Being a regular officer, I have a natural distaste for individuals interloping into our domain, especially if they are not acquainted with the intricacies involved in the military. Examining closely the Toth decision, particularly the citations quoted, I immediately

changed my position. The issue was not who and what affords more protection to an accused, but the division of the civil versus the military, a division which the military, in the American concept, has itself settled in favor of the civil. The function of the U. S. Army is to preserve and protect our democratic way of life, and not to govern it, as is the case in many foreign lands.

Historically, so far as this issue is concerned, the military has always shied from conferred powers which smacked of autocracy. For example, in 1912 TJAG stated that a statute authorizing court-martial of inmates of the Soldiers Home was unconstitutional, and that "such inmates are not a part of the Army of the U. S., but are civilians." The clinching argument, and one that certainly should show the public the military position of Article 3 (a) of UCMJ, is the statement against that Article by the Army during hearings before Congress. There it was urged upon Congress to grant this jurisdiction to the federal courts. Concerning it TJAG said: "If you expressly confer jurisdiction on the Federal Courts to try such cases, you preserve the Constitutional separation of Military and Civil Courts, you save the military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide for a clear constitutional method of disposing of such cases." Hence, one can readily see that the majority opinion was based on sound reasoning supported by accepted Army concepts, and obviously was correct.

But there is more that should be brought out. For example, the Toth decision should certainly not be extended and taken out of context so as to preclude the military from having jurisdiction over "camp followers" and civilian employees. This has been inherently a necessary right and is not something repugnant to the American way of thinking.

Further, a great lesson, as well as a problem, presents itself. Should Congress legislate on purely military matters without consulting the military? If consultation is had, how much weight should be given military advice? Of course, the answer is nebulous. I feel the very fact that Justice Black discussed TJAG's stand on Article 3 (a), and the subsequent refusal by Congress to adopt this advice, tend to substantiate my contention that more weight and reliance should be placed on military advice by Congress, when military matters are concerned.

In his decision Justice Black did not condemn the military. Rather, he bore out the fact, through implication, that the military have been and always will be the greatest exponents of American democracy, and not its detractors.

LT. ROBERT S. POYDASHEFF
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THE ARMY'S MONTH

Unwitting progress report and fine compliment

APPARENTLY the editors of *Air Force* magazine have been flying so high and so fast the last few years that they have lost all contact with what is going on. Otherwise how could they, at this late date, declaim that the Army is in an "atomic dilemma"? Some years ago, at the beginning of the atomic age, some superficial evidence of this might have been marshalled, but to miss the significant forward strides the U. S. Army has made in the last few years reveals an astonishing lack of perceptivity.

We'll be candid with the editors of *Air Force*. The Army has plenty of problems. But no insurmountable dilemmas. Apparently those editors haven't heard of the progress of the Army in creating new tactical organizations that have power, speed and endurance, and the capability of fighting in all kinds of wars, anywhere in the world, and under any known conditions of weather. Apparently they aren't aware that the Army is developing a family of weapons that are more advanced in their field than the manned B-52 bomber is in its. Finally, they seem completely unaware of the vision, intellect and energy the Army is bringing to bear in its determination to master the technological revolution of this era. They seem unable to grasp the simple but significant idea that the U. S. Army has never been the captive of a single strategy, tactic or weapon, but has always mastered conditions rather than let conditions master it.

Perhaps we misjudge the editors and they are aware of and disturbed by the progress of the Army. This seems to be the most likely explanation for the few-holds-barred attacks on the Army by the editors of *Air Force* magazine in their May issue and by Mr. Charles J. V. Murphy in the May issue of *For-*

tune. The two articles can be considered as a single double-pronged assault and we are inclined to so consider them, remembering that Mr. Murphy, who is a *Fortune* editor, was once facetiously identified by a faithful *Fortune* reader as the uptown or Rockefeller Center representative of air power.

A careful reader of the *Air Force* magazine article showed us how with a few editorial shifts the article could have been called "The Air Force's Technological Dilemma" instead of "The Army's Atomic Dilemma." Our guess is that the piece was known around the Air Force shop before pub-

lication as that "the Army's got us worried" piece.

In any event the simultaneous appearance of the two articles is a significant progress report on what the Army is accomplishing. The two magazines should be thanked for the fine compliment to the Army.

Dilemmas—doctrinal and technological

THE dilemma of the Air Force is both doctrinal and technological and the former has a powerful effect on the latter. An example is its insistence on concentrating on the kind of war that isn't going to be fought. Air power seems not to have got the word (spoken by President Eisenhower among others) that there is little likelihood of thermonuclear war so long as two or more powers have the capability of destroying each other. Note that air power disregards the existence of a thermonuclear stalemate, though most of the rest of the world accepts it. Thus air power cries for ever more bombers (or ballistic missiles) to match or exceed the numbers the Russians have or may get. This numbers game disregards the possibilities that an effective deterrent need not necessarily be massive and that it may be wise to offset the enemy with some other kind of force. Thus Great Britain for generations countered the land power of Europe's armies, not with armies of similar size, but with sea power. And not always massive sea power either. The appearance of the British flag by a token force had a powerful deterrent effect whenever it appeared in troubled waters. NATO has never had more than a token of the force the Communists have maintained in European Russia but the Foreign Ministers at their recent meeting spoke of the deterrent effect NATO forces have had in keeping the Communists from further

NEW COMMANDANT OF THE INFANTRY SCHOOL



Major General Herbert B. Powell will replace Major General Joseph H. Harper as Commandant of The Infantry School at Fort Benning in August. A regimental commander (17th Infantry, 7th Division) in Korea, General Powell was Chief of Staff of the 75th Infantry Division in Europe in World War II. General Harper has been assigned as Chief of the Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines.

excursions into Europe.

The dilemma posed to the Air Force by its concentration on a kind of warfare that isn't likely to be fought is but one face of the troubles that now face it by reason of its long adherence to a single theory of war and to a single weapon, the big bomber. As General Gavin has said, in the thermonuclear age Douhet is for the birds, and yet the air power people seem not to have awakened to this.

They have, it is true, occasionally taken note of the existence of forms of warfare not suitable to heavy bombers, but always in the face of strong protests by the big bomber barons. When the full history of the recent Air Force enthusiasm for continental air defense can be told, it will be interesting to find out how closely the birth of this enthusiasm coincided with the sudden realization by SAC that its continental air bases were undefended.

Occasionally air power makes sweeping assertions of its ability to control or seal off land areas. This despite the plain evidence of Korea that it is unable to do so. Some months ago the Air University made a study of air power's ability to control land areas and investigated the experiments of the British in using air power to control unruly elements on the Northwest frontier of India and elsewhere. The theory had been that air patrols and the threat of bombing of villages that were centers of political unrest would keep the inhabitants peaceful. But the British found that it didn't work—unless and until mobile armed forces appeared on the ground. The combination of the two: the mobile eye of air power and the presence of Army power on the ground was the most effective kind of police force. The two complemented each other. But American air power doesn't like to play that way. To prove an old, always fallacious theory, it wants to do it alone.

COOPERATIVE air power—air power that supports and sustains army power and is in turn supported and sustained by it—is, of course, the kind of air power the Army has always sought and is desperately trying to create in the face of constant opposition. The Army was forced to develop its own aviation because the Air Force would not furnish it. In 1946 one of the Army divisions in the U. S. had a few helicopters that it was using in some tests that later paid off in Korea. One of the



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senior officers of that division was upbraided for this by an Air general who told him that the Army shouldn't have aircraft of any kind. Sometime later that division lost its helicopters. Later when the grim facts of Korea forced the Air Force's hand, the Army was able to go all out in its development of the helicopter for combat support. However, the opposition of the Air Force continues: the incident that marred the Sagebrush maneuvers last fall is evidence enough.

How not to be a team player

THE we-want-to-do-it-all-ourself attitude of the Air Force is plainly revealed and documented in our examination of the ballistic missile controversy (page 16), in Dr. Atkinson's documentation of the fallacy of depending upon one weapon or one strategy (page 23), and in Colonel Wermuth's brief description of how the Air Force has in the name of strategic bombing led a vast public to infer that only the Air Force is capable of performing strategic operations.

It is curious to note that Mr. Murphy of *Fortune* seems to be a little startled that the Army might think that the depth of its "battlefield jurisdiction" might be more than "50 or 100 miles". In our innocence we had always assumed that the interests of the Army—its "jurisdiction"—extended as far as it had to go to achieve whatever aims the government had given it. We had supposed that Sherman's battle "jurisdic-

tion" when he left Tennessee for Atlanta and the sea was Georgia and the Carolinas. But apparently that is wrong and his "jurisdiction" extended only as far as the range of his ordnance. But, of course, there was no "strategic" power in those days and no necessity for inter-service agreements and divisions of "jurisdiction." The river Navy in the Civil War was content to support the Army without worrying over whether the Army was invading its precincts.

Mr. Murphy believes with us (page 20) that the age of ballistic missiles is going to revive "the whole unification question again." He sees this as becoming necessary because "through-the-air" offenses and defenses "lie outside the present roles and missions of the Army and Navy." This, of course, is the standard Air Force position that refuses to face up to the growing obsolescence of the manned bomber or that ballistic missiles are more a province of ordnance than of aerodynamics and that both the Army and Navy have been fighting offensively and defensively for 180 years with "through-the-air" missiles.

This Air Force position is such a calculated drive for arbitrary power that it can be of no help to the cause of service unification or to the stature of the public's opinion of the armed forces. If the air power people believe more unification is desirable, the best way to advance it is to get back on the team and begin to ask the Army and Navy "What can we do to help you?" and "Can't you do this for us?" instead of decrying and belittling the efforts and capabilities of the Army and Navy.

What You Should Know About Birds and Bullets



In ballistics, Army has the know-how

ONCE upon a time man warred with rocks and clubs; then came spears and arrows. All of this was a very long time ago. Then for many years man warred with bullets and then came birds. Both have now been around long enough for most of us to know the difference between them. It wasn't any problem until guided missiles came along. Unfortunately this weapon was accompanied by a furor that kicked up so much dust that today there are confused people who can't tell a bird from a bullet. Incredible, but true.

IT'S very simple really. Birds are flying wings, controlled during flight either by a pilot or by a robot device; birds are governed by the laws of the science of aerodynamics. Bullets are wingless missiles, controlled either by aiming them before they're fired or by electronic guidance during flight; bullets are governed by the laws of the science of ballistics.

Ballistics and ballistic missiles are of utmost concern to armies and always have been. From today's missile-soldiers down through the ages to tribesmen-armors who made bows and arrows and blowguns, soldiers have been intimately concerned with wingless missiles: arrows, darts, slingshot stones, spears, bullets, artillery shells, old-fashioned black powder rockets (like those you see on the Fourth of July), bazooka rockets, and now guided missile rockets like the Nike, the Corporal and the Redstones. (It's worth noting that the feathers on primitive arrows gave the same sort of in-flight stability that fins give the Redstones rockets.)

Take note too that the ordnance organizations of the Army and Navy have always worked closely together, just as they now are doing on the IRBM No. 2. During the days of seacoast artillery, for instance, the Navy supplied the 14-inch guns for the Army's "island battleship," El Fraile (Fort Drum) that guarded Manila's harbor. Similar 14-inch Navy guns were railway-mounted to support General Pershing's AEF in France

in World War I. Later the Navy used the Army's caliber .50 Browning machine guns for shipboard light anti-aircraft.

It was natural, of course, that Army Ordnance should have performed the ballistics work for the pre-unification Army air corps. Over the years Army ordnance developed and furnished the air arm all of its armament in the ballistic field: guns and their propellants and projectiles; rockets, bombs and related explosives. Army ordnance is still doing this for the independent Air Force.


This made for the fullest possible efficiency and economy. The same know-how and even the same basic weapons could be adapted to air and ground use, often with identical components and ammunition. It was thus with the Browning machine gun, with which USAF Saberjets scored such a high rate of kills on Red MIGs in the air over North Korea; thus with P-51s against German Messerschmitts and Japanese Zeros. Identical Brownings were used by the Army as anti-aircraft and antipersonnel weapons.

WHILE progress in aerodynamics has just recently enabled aviation to go supersonic, far faster speeds are everyday stuff to Army-type ballistic missiles. You hear a lot these days about aircraft able to fly faster than sound. There's the F-104 Starfire fighter, reported in the press to be able to fly twice the speed of sound, or roughly 1,400 miles an hour. But the week-end hunter's common caliber .30 '06 bullet travels 1,800 miles an hour as it leaves the rifle's muzzle and such ammunition has been performing that way ever since the U. S. Army standardized it back in 1906.

The German Army with its famous 75-mile range Paris gun demonstrated back in 1917 that army-type ballistics could solve problems involving missile speeds of 5,500 feet per second or more than 3,700 miles an hour. The ballisticians involved in the Paris gun also had to solve other problems pertinent to missiles today, such as travel in the thin outer atmosphere and reentry into the denser atmosphere closer to the earth's surface.

The Army's long ballistic experience gives it the unique know-how necessary to meet the problems of research and development in ballistic guided missiles. In particular the Army is seasoned in appreciating how to weigh theory and laboratory work and relate it to

ARMY magazine staff report



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how things will work out in actual practice. Compared to Army ballistics experience, Aviation is a Johnny-come-lately and there is evidence that aviation engineers and scientists are now going through the evolution of experience that the Army passed through long ago?

LET'S now look at the services' records in the ballistic field. At the end of World War II the Air Force was content to have the Army take over the Germans' long-range ballistic rocket (V-2) scientists. Dr. Werner von Braun, originator of the V-2 idea, was brought to America by the Army, direct from his position as team leader of the German V-2 development project. During the subsequent years while the USAF was working on "birds" in the missiles field, Von Braun was helping the Army with its "bullet" missiles, without any objection being raised as to the impropriety of the Army's work in ballistic rockets. When in 1955 Herr Oberth, the real founder of long-range rocketry, was brought to America, again it was the Army—not the USAF—which recognized the need for his services. In cooperation with the Navy, and in particular the Office of Naval Research, the Army keeps tab on those European basic researchers still overseas, scientists whose thinking has so often been turned to good commercial and military use in America. In contrast there is evidence that our air power people pay little heed to some of the highly competent work in aerodynamics being done in Europe today.

Until 1953 the Air Force was indifferent to the ballistic long-range missile, preferring "birds"—flying missiles of subsonic speed. It has had operational the Martin Matador short-range missile, which is actually a subsonic pilotless jet plane; and it is testing the Snark, a long-range pilotless subsonic jet plane. The Navaho, a ramjet-powered pilotless long-range plane, also is in development.

According to a December 1955 *Fortune* article on missiles by Edmund L. Van Deusen, the Air Force became "ballistic-minded" only in 1953. "Much of the credit for this change," the article claimed, "has been given one man, Trevor Gardner." The *Fortune* article also asserted that "only one organization, the Convair Division of General Dynamics (formerly Consolidated Vultee), has had a continuous research program in ICBM technology since the end of World War II. And during part of that 10-year period Convair had to carry its ICBM research without a penny of government aid or support."

ALTHOUGH air power spokesmen claim long-range guided missiles on the grounds that these have the same mission as present strategic bombers, this claim ignores established divisions of service responsibility according to science and technology. Moreover, any air power claim to monopoly of long-range missiles is fur-

ther weakened by what the record reveals as to the relative experience and capability in the ballistics field of the Air Force and the Army.

The record and simple ABCs of ballistic missiles show that, in continuing its ballistic missile work into the field of guided missiles, the Army has been doing "what comes natchery", cooperating with its sister services and minding its own business.

The one marked fault the Army has made is in failing, in this era of high-pressure sales promotion, to thump the tub and shout and beat its breast about what it has been doing. Not, and mark this closely, what it is going to do, but what it has done and is doing. Failure to report on its performance.


In claiming long-range missiles, air power is the lazy, boastful hare of the fable. After dawdling for eight years, during which time it gave its attention to long-range flying-winged robots (which are its proper province), the hare was finally awakened by Mr. Gardner. Crash programs erupted accompanied by flap and furor. Air power spokesmen trumpeted loudly of the importance of ICBMs and asserted that attainment of operational ICBMs will be delayed unless all ballistic-missile efforts are concentrated in the Air Force.

Long before this furor began the Army was moving ahead in the steady gait of a hard-working tortoise. Thus the Army made measurable progress in the ballistic missiles field. It put into service such missiles as the unguided Honest John, the longer-ranged guided Corporal, and the still longer-ranged guided Redstone. It has also put into operational service one model of Nike ballistic anti-aircraft rocket with another soon to appear. Still other advanced missiles are in the Army's portfolio of plans.

The record will show that if there has been any delay in ballistic missile development it has been delay on the part of air power.

IN its drive for dominance, air power moved into still another field. After a long whispering campaign against the Nike ballistic missile, the USAF reported it was going to develop the Navy's Talos rocket and take over some ground-to-air missions. Here is additional evidence of air power's disregard of experience and proven capabilities.

The Nike is an operating weapon with a solid backlog of operational use (although not in combat) and it guards our cities today. Talos is still under development. A little reflection on the well established fact that the gap between a test weapon and final acceptance is years of bug-hunting, suggests that the move towards Talos was hardly in keeping with either long-accepted practice or good defense economy. It could also be disastrous. Weapons lacking "experience time" have failed on the battlefield. A Captain Stuart of World War II's Special Service Force could give a vivid briefing on that. Carry-



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ing a newly developed light machine gun for the first time, Stuart came within range of an unsuspecting German. As he began to squeeze off a burst, the mainspring flew from the rear with a zing that awakened the countryside. The cause of the defect was easily factory-fixed, but Stuart would have been surely done in had not the German, shocked at such weapon malfunction, instantly surrendered. What that new machine gun had lacked was adequate time for thorough testing. Defects in unproven ballistic missiles defending our cities might cost us thousands of lives. That flaws and serious ones, show up regularly in new weapons and machines is documented in the history of technology. Only recently the USAF refused all but two of seventeen B-52s.

WHAT this suggests and very persuasively is that air power, instead of moving in on missions and func-

tions long and ably performed by the Army and Navy, ought to devote its energies in its recognized field of aerodynamics. Certainly the just cited record of the B-52s, plus the many recent revelations of advanced Soviet aircraft (the Badger, Bear and Bison bombers; Flashlight and Farmer fighters; and jet engines which are said to have as much as twice the thrust of operational jets in the B-52) suggests that air power has its hands full if it is to keep America ahead in piloted birds.

ONCE upon a time there was a very rich and resourceful nation that had the good sense (we hope) to see that reliance on one weapon or strategy was foolhardy and to insist on the division of military tasks according to military logic and the proven competence of the several services. That nation then lived peacefully and securely ever after.

The Promise of Ballistic Missiles

More Unification in sight

FOR more than forty years the role of the airplane in war has occupied the attention of both the theorists and practitioners of war. But today warfare stands on the threshold of a new age. The ballistic guided missile promises to be a carrier of such great flexibility and numerous uses that it will propel the armed forces into a new alignment. This is what Secretary of Defense Wilson was talking about when he said that it is a "fair assumption that when you get some new weapons you have to review" roles and missions.

That such a revolution should create controversy isn't surprising. Thus we are already deep in the discussion of what this new development will mean. The important thing is not to shut off the discussion in the hope of dampening the controversy, but to turn the controversy into constructive channels. Honest professional opinion openly expressed cannot but bring fair-minded men to sound decisions.

There are still too many unknowns about these weapons for any exaggerated claims to be justified, but it is evident that many varieties of missiles will be necessary in the successful operations of land, sea, and air forces.

In some cases, missiles may be suited to unique characteristics of a particular type of military operation. In other cases, the same missile may be suitable for more than one purpose. This is probably the most likely situation.

Ballistic missiles epitomize the tremendous improvements which modern technology has brought about in the fundamental military capabilities of fire power, mobility, and communications. The advent of these radically advanced means for extending military power heightens the drive for integrated military forces. The transitory changes wrought in military organization and doctrine by the development of aircraft are well known. In turn, as piloted armed aircraft are supplemented and eventually supplanted by guided missiles, prevailing distinctions between land, sea, and air warfare will diminish. While piloted aircraft as an indispensable means of transportation may never be replaced, guided missiles will modify to a major extent the airplane's functions in military operations. Primarily because of the potentialities of guided missiles, commonly accepted roles and missions of land, sea, and air forces will no longer be susceptible of clear distinction.

Arbitrary limitations on the range and control of weapons are illogical in an age when a wide variety of

guided missiles will be able to deliver fire power and cargo almost without restriction in time and space. As guided missiles become increasingly dominant, the difficulty of delimiting a battle area, a type of campaign, or a theater of operations makes the fullest possible flexibility imperative. Rigid rules defining the roles and missions of the several armed services must not be permitted to interfere with the most effective use of guided missiles.

In terms of the over-all military strength of the United States, ballistic missiles impose an unprecedented need for more unification and less separation of the armed forces. Vested interests will have to give way to national survival. To deny the use of a guided missile to a service which needs it to safeguard the nation would be stupid and could be treasonous. These weapons transcend "service prerogatives."

THE effectiveness of land and naval forces has been greatly multiplied by the fire power and mobility of aircraft. For a while, the novel peculiarities and the limitations of military aircraft made it appropriate to concentrate the control of certain types of aircraft into "air forces." Advances in modern technology have introduced weapons of such magnitude and violence that traditional methods of organization, control, and employment of armed force must now be revised.

Soon it will be unnecessary and unsound to use large numbers of piloted aircraft in separate "air forces." Guided missiles organic to land and sea forces will eliminate the differentials of time, space, and fire power that gave rise to the doctrines of tactical and strategic operations followed by the USAF, doctrines which have dangerously compartmentalized the military strength and strategy of the United States. Indeed, guided missiles promise to eliminate the need for a separate air arm. This will not be soon, but it can be foreseen. This can be inferred from the recent testimony of such an air power apostle as General Curtis LeMay.

THERE is nothing immutable about the structure of military forces, but there is a timeless reality that must underlie all military considerations. That is: a nation's ability to succeed depends in the last analysis on the abilities of its armies to deter or win a war of any dimension. It has not always been necessary to exercise this capability, but behind every successful military power, the capability has existed in fact, or at least so it has been believed by the enemy, which had the same effect. Other factors apart, a nation's ability to win in a showdown has generally rested upon the capability to move land forces to, and support them in, a threatened area. This was shown to be true when the bombing airplane was at its peak. It remains true in the age of guided missiles, but in a different perspective.

An enemy equipped with accurate ballistic missiles of

short, medium, and very long range, and able to move by land and air to a critical area and move rapidly within it, must be countered by comparable or superior capabilities on the part of our own forces.

Future strategic and tactical operations will tend to merge into mutually supporting campaigns and battles that may be separated by great distances. The combat area may be extended hundreds or thousands of miles in width and depth. There often will be no clear line of contact. As never before Army forces will have to be capable of (1) rapid concentration from dispersed positions; (2) delivery of superior fire power; (3) rapid exploitation, as well as subsequent dispersion to frustrate enemy countermeasures. To possess these capabilities, Army units must attain, to a degree far greater than ever before, effective air defenses, increased mobility, extended range and effectiveness of fire support. Guided missiles will play a major part in attaining these capabilities.

IN addition to tactical and strategic operations against enemy armed forces, the Army requires guided missiles capable of attacking "strategic" enemy targets at considerable distances beyond those required for operations within what has heretofore been known as the combat zone. The geographical limits of Army operations including intercontinental warfare may be better described by such terms as a "combat area" or "combat region." Long-range guided missiles may be required to fire across large expanses of land and sea in support of Army operations and to destroy an enemy's war-making resources and will to resist. Guided missiles unlimited in range and integrated with organic Army air transport are essential to strategic army operations.

The Army cannot be dependent upon sources beyond its control for the type of support previously associated with air forces and prospectively to be afforded by guided missiles. Under any conceivable circumstances of war, the Army has a primary requirement for guided missiles of varying degrees of mobility, speed, range, and purpose. Arbitrary limitations on range and control of weapons and means of transport have no logical basis in an age when a wide variety of guided missiles will be able to deliver fire power and cargo almost without restriction of range and speed.

BRIEFLY, this is the Army position. If it suggests that the independent air force must face up to technological obsolescence insofar as its principal interests—the long-range bomber and tactical forces—are concerned, that is because logic so testifies.

More significant is the promise in this revolution by ballistic missile of greater unification and less triplification and quadruplication. This certainly the nation would welcome. A "great debate" at this level could be most fruitful in results.



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The Single-Weapon Fallacy

From Porus and his elephants in the fourth century B.C. to Hitler and his "intuition," defeat has been the lot of those who became obsessed of a single weapon or strategy

JAMES D. ATKINSON

IN every crisis at arms since the dawn of time, nostrums guaranteed to solve the most complex problems of military security have found anxious buyers, looking for a cheap way out. The artlessness Barnum found in all of us comes out at such times; perplexed people faced with massive complexities are easy targets for slogans that discourage thought and provide an emotional escape hatch. Whether the slogan is "the Maginot Line begins where it is required and ends where it is no longer needed" (1929) or "security through air power" (1956), rational inquiry and discussion are shut off.

We may be sure that in the fourth century before Christ the Indian general, Porus, believed that his elephants would defeat Alexander's Greco-Macedonian army. Yet the battle at the Hydaspes River was decided by the teamwork of Alexander's infantry and cavalry.

The introduction of gunpowder in the fifteenth century gave the single-idea prophets another chance, and they so convinced even their opponents, that Ariosto wrote:

"O! curs'd device! base implement of death!
... By Beelzebub's malicious art design'd
To ruin all the race of human kind."

Not until our own times introduced nuclear weapons was there such a ferment in man's contemplation of war. But as we know, gunpowder did not prove to be the one simple answer to victory.

By the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 the candidate for the one big solution was artillery, and we find the Russian General Oukeneff writing that "artillery will become the scourge of mankind." We are to see this repeated during the First World War in terms of a massive weight of shells as a simplified way to win the war.

The fixed idea of a super-Cannae

Count von Schlieffen dominated German planning in the years before World War I. Unfortunately for Germany and fortunately for her enemies, Schlieffen was himself dominated by a fixed idea. He had found the one simple answer that *guaranteed* victory. Like Douhet, Mitchell, "Bomber" Harris and other fixed-idea airmen of a later period, Schlieffen believed that one big battle—a super-Cannae—would decide the future war. In fact, the parallel between Schlieffen and the air extremists is even greater since the German held that a battle which annihilated the bulk of the enemy forces in the opening phase of the war would paralyze the will of the enemy and, correspondingly, the will of his allies, and victory would be quick and relatively cheap. Schlieffen's belief in a super-Cannae battle of annihilation was reinforced by his conviction that industrial organization would force wars to be violent but short. Just as the air extremists of 1956 speak of a future war in terms of days, so Schlieffen in the years before 1914 ruled out a long war as being impossible in the modern age.

The fixed-idea people, whether soldiers, sailors, airmen, or statesmen, are, however, always running into unforeseen circumstances—which is a part of war itself. As Major General J. F. C. Fuller has written: "It is absolutely true in war, were other things equal, that numbers—whether men, shells, bombs, etc.—would be supreme. Yet it is also absolutely true that *other things are never equal and can never be equal*. [My italics] There is always a difference, and it is the differences which by begging to differ so frequently throw all calculations to the winds."

THE dangerous and tragic truth was, however, that Schlieffen's simplification and the younger Moltke's acceptance of it so permeated the thinking of the German General Staff that few even questioned it and none seriously challenged it. Germany went down the road to war committed to a fixed strategy—a one-shot proposition which, if anything should go wrong, would lead not to victory but to defeat. And something did go wrong. As Dr. Gordon A. Craig states in his penetrating analysis, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, Schlieffen's single-mindedness "disregarded not only the demographic, technological, and industrial factors which affect the war effort of Great Powers . . . but also the political and psychological forces which are apt to make peoples fight even against hopeless odds."

Dr. Craig's significant point regarding those forces "which are apt to make people fight even against hopeless odds" should be required reading for those air extremists who glibly assure us that a future war will be decided within a matter of days and who supply such convincing "evidence" that x number of nuclear bombs plus x number of aircraft equals either victory in war or real deterrence for peace.

The single idea of shells and more shells

The German commitment to a single idea in planning for the war was matched by the Allied belief after the war had dragged on that victory could be achieved by the accumulation of a massive weight of explosives that would literally batter the Western Front into rubble. The cry was for shells, shells, ever more shells. General Fuller cites the case of the distinguished British general who "proved" mathematically that ending the war was only a matter of dividing the front into sectors fifteen miles long by two miles deep and then firing one shell per yard into the tidy little subdivisions! Unfortunately this kind of thinking differs little from that of 1956 air extremists who equate war with total destruction and forget that the great military leaders of history from the Duke of Wellington to Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur always knew that war destruction was incidental (and to be avoided as much as possible) to the object of achieving a more perfect and enduring peace.

BEFORE the Second World War German military planners took notice of the lessons of the First World War and developed close cooperation among all ground arms and services and excellent air-ground cooperation. General von Mellenthin, for example, in his careful study, *Panzer Battles*, points out that German success in the Battle of France was due to the reintroduction "into warfare [of] the decisive factor of mobility" and that this was possible because of the close cooperation of all arms, especially the "expert handling of the latest modern arms—*Luftwaffe*, parachutists and armour."

Partly because of Hitler's lack of appreciation of sea power and partly because his military advisers were likewise too Continental-minded, German planning did not include sea power. Thus, the *Wehrmacht* arrived at the English Channel in June 1940 with tremendous ground-air capabilities, but with extremely limited naval capabilities. Hermann Goering had assured *Der Führer* that the *Luftwaffe* would eliminate the need for naval power, but the single-idea strategy failed again, and Hitler turned on the Soviet Union. Even there, however, effective sea power would have been of great advantage to Hitler. Admiral Friedrich Ruge's *Der Seekrieg, 1939-1945* suggests that an understanding of sea power would have dictated the capture of Leningrad and the creation of a Baltic Sea supply route that would have relieved the Army's transportation and communication difficulties along the far-flung Eastern Front.

The single idea of racial superiority

If, as Dr. Craig has indicated, Schlieffen's strategy had failed to appreciate the political factors in warfare, Hitler

was completely blinded to the political-psychological elements of warfare by his almost pathological belief that the world was roughly divided into *Herrenvolk* and *Untermenschen* with, perhaps, some races occupying a rather gray shade in between. Somewhat as mass bombings hardened the resistance of the German people, so did the Hitlerian racial concepts fix the pattern of resistance in the occupied countries, especially in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus the Germans tossed away the opportunity to bring about the collapse of the multi-national Soviet state. Since 1945 we have learned that Soviet leaders themselves feared appeals to their oppressed minority peoples more than German bombs, and now that Stalin is being toppled from his pedestal, the unwillingness of millions of Soviet minorities to fight for Communism is being attributed to Stalin's "preparedness" failures.

ON the Allied side, the World War II successors of Douhet and Mitchell were ready with an undated version of the old "shells, more shells and still more shells" of World War I. The new version was "bombs, more bombs and still more bombs" and the argument again hinged on a statistical basis which "proved" that Germany could be easily and quickly knocked out of the war. The most amazing of the many arguments presented is that cited in Flight Lieutenant Blunt's *The Use of Air Power*, in which he states that "the C-in-C, Bomber Command, is said to have made the statement that if we could send 1,000 bombers a night over Germany, the war would be over in six months; whilst, with 20,000 aircraft, he would finish it in one night." [My italics.]

The single idea of bombs and more bombs

The 1956 air extremists have really added nothing new to this now old "shells, shells and more shells" argument. In essence, this is the argument of mass destruction, and whether it is 20,000 aircraft with high-explosive bombs or 1,000 or 100 aircraft with hydrogen and atomic bombs, the concept is quick victory through pulverization of so many square feet of enemy land and buildings and the atomization of so many hundreds of thousands or millions of people. Unconsidered is the possibility that if each side completes this neat mathematical formula there might be other factors and other forces which would have a final effect.

Fortunately, the pulverization concept was only partially accepted by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. These great wartime leaders not only proved that a coalition could coordinate its efforts and wage war successfully, but they also understood the necessary interrelation of economic, political and psychological factors

with elements of ground-sea-air warfare. It was the teamwork of ground-sea-air forces which made possible the successful invasion of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the Channel crossing and the sweep through France and into Germany. The very efficiency of this teamwork obscured its successes. And so after the war the advocates of the one-service solution found they could totally disregard such truly outstanding work as that of the Tactical Air Force in isolating the battlefield and functioning as an integral part of a winning air-ground team, and promote the thunderous explosions of the two atomic bombs dropped at the end of the war. One of the few voices raised in the analysis of what might have been done with greater tactical air power was that of General Sir Giffard Martel who wrote that "it can be argued with much reason, however, that we would have won the European war more quickly and efficiently if we had put rather more weight on cooperation between the Army and the Air Force from the start, instead of depending so much on the power of air bombardment alone."

THE introduction of the atomic bomb into warfare at the close of World War II launched a debate on military policy which is still going on. The atomic bomb was, of course, a most spectacular development, and its use in warfare left an impression on men's minds as no previous weapons, even gunpowder, had done. Thus Sir William Beveridge expressed the immediate reaction of many when he wrote in *The London Times*, 14 August 1945, that "the atomic bomb has almost certainly relegated all other weapons of modern war—tanks, battleships, guns, rifles, and trained conscript masses—to the museum." This line was quickly taken up by the air extremists and has, with little change, been reiterated ever since. Perhaps the mere repetition over so long a period of time has had much to do with its success, since it has depended but little on historical analysis or proven fact.

The atomic destruction nostrum did not go completely unchallenged, however, and in 1947 Milton Shulman, in *Defeat in the West*, seriously questioned the theory that "given enough atom bombs, any power could guarantee for itself ultimate victory in a future war." The record of "Germany's defeat in World War II convincingly destroys such theories," he asserted.

The single idea of victory through atomization

This military policy debate came to one climax in the United States in 1949 with the controversy over the B-36 bomber. This occasioned a reexamination of the entire question of United States strategy. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in October 1949, Admiral Arthur W. Radford struck at the heart of the matter when he said: "The plane itself is not so important as the acceptance or rejection of the theory of atom blitz warfare which it symbolizes. It is fortunate that honest doubts as to the adequacy of the B-36 have served to bring this more vital issue before the country. I do not believe that the threat of atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent to a war, or that it will win a war. [My italics.] Admiral Radford then went on in terms which indicated that he saw the entire picture rather than the one-service eye view. He pointed out that the atom blitz was a "fallacious concept" which promised a "short-cut to victory" but that

Dr. James D. Atkinson, Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University, was Moderator of the panel discussion during AUSA's meeting at Fort Benning last October. He was Director of a special course in psywar at Georgetown's Graduate School from 1950 to 1954. During World War II he served in ETO as an MI officer in the 28th Division. He has written extensively on international policy and military defense for a number of magazines. **ARMY** published his "Pearl Harbor: America's Maginot Line?" in January 1956.

Halt, Or We Will Both Die!

One cannot conceal the fact that progressive equalization of atomic capabilities tends to create a new risk. As long as the West enjoyed an uncontested superiority in weapons and means of their delivery, it could say: "Halt, or you will be sorry." From the moment the Soviet Union possessed means of destruction and transportation equal to those of the West, the latter proclaimed, in fact: "Halt, or I will precipitate us both into mutual suicide!" The formula is not absurd, one *can* stop a bandit by yelling at him: "Halt, or we will both die!" Let us confess, however, that the threat: "I will kill you" has a better chance of being taken seriously than the threat: "We will kill one another simultaneously."

* * *

What concrete results will there be? It is naturally impossible to say in advance. One can and one should, however, grasp the guiding idea: the threat of nuclear war will not be effective except when the importance of the stake is commensurate. And it will be impossible to convince an eventual adversary of the importance of the stake except by reinforcing the local defenses. No one would consider replying to the infringement of the demarcation line in Germany by a few soldiers of the Soviet Army by a bombardment of Soviet cities. One will have to reply to local military actions by counteractions of the same type. There will result from this the necessity of maintaining permanently armies sufficient to prevent the sudden creation of local "faits accomplis," which no one would be willing to change by risk of mutual suicide.

RAYMOND ARON
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
April 1956

there were grave dangers in the panacea way to win a war. "We must realize that we cannot gamble that the atomic blitz of annihilation will even win a war," he said. "We must realize if war is forced upon us, we must win it, and win it in such a way that it can be followed by a stable, livable peace."

The Korean conflict temporarily interrupted the great debate over military policy. It also came as a cold shower to the air extremists for, contrary to the theories which had seemed so logical, "unforeseen circumstances" intervened, upsetting their previous theses as to what kind of war would occur.

To begin with, the deterrent power of the world's greatest air force, possessing as it did the only significant nuclear weapons at the time (June 1950), did not deter the Communists one iota. Far more shocking to the air extremists was the fact that the real deterrent had obviously been army forces, for these, to the Soviet mentality, were a

measure of American intent, of American will. Thus, when the U.S. 7th Infantry Division was withdrawn from Korea, the interpretation of this event by the Soviets was that the United States had no firm commitment to the defense of the area and hence a "liberating" army of North Koreans could simply walk in. (A thought-provoking article on this which I earnestly recommend to all readers appeared in the April 1956 issue of *Military Review* by Lt. Col. Wallace C. Magathan, Jr.) No amount of air gymnastics or bomb rattling was sufficient to prevent the launching of the kind of war which the United States was, because of a weakened Army, unprepared to fight. True, the mighty Strategic Air Command did serve the role of a force in being, and no fair-minded observer would denigrate this fact. But, as so often in the history of warfare, the best-sounding theories of the air extremists proved the wrong kind of practice when a concrete situation arose.

The conclusions drawn from the Korean War are equally worthy of attention. Thus, General Van Fleet has stated that "after the battle for White Horse Mountain during which American artillery had reduced a Chinese Communist division of 30,000 men to 15,000 and the crack 15th Army of the Chinese Communists had failed to rout the ROK 4th Division, we could have accomplished just about any mission we chose." The General then went on to say that our forces could "have sent an armored column through the weakened part of the Red lines and enveloped their entire front-line army."

A Navy leader has gone farther. Admiral C. Turner Joy has stated that military victory in Korea "was not impossible, nor even unusually difficult." In this instance, Admiral Joy viewed war in its entirety—as an effort which required the cooperation of all contributors in achieving, in terms of human life, an economical victory.

A distinguished Air Force officer has indicated that mass destruction was not really necessary to win in Korea. General George Stratemeyer has said that "when MacArthur launched his attack to gain the Yalu River, I had enough air strength to stop the Chinese and prevent their troops being supplied."

Controversy is preferable to inadequate security

As the United States faces an uncertain future in which a plentitude of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery will be in the hands of the Soviet Union, it becomes the urgent duty of every American to reexamine the past and peer into the future. Neither propaganda smoke screens nor sincere assurances that all is well should deflect us from the duty of examining not only the kinds of war which we may be called upon to fight, but also the kind of deterrence most likely to prevent wars—total and limited. The former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Denfeld, expressed the military man's point of view plainly seven years ago during the "B-36" hearings: "Public airing of service differences, while regrettable, is preferable to inadequate national security." Those who strongly believe that the Army has a commanding role to play not merely in winning a war, but even more in preventing one, have, in the national interest, a right and a duty to speak up.

Professor Arnold Wolfers, writing in the Winter 1956 issue of *The Yale Review*, helped to clear the atmosphere

on the entire problem of deterrence by questioning whether the suppositions that we must fight an all-out war are tenable. "If [these suppositions] are correct, military preparations for anything but total war in Europe would be meaningless and wasteful; if they are erroneous, exclusive concern for unlimited warfare might prove disastrous."

AN interesting facet of the thinking which is so preoccupied with this single-idea warfare is laid bare in the May 1956 issue of the magazine *Air Force*. In a "Staff Study" called "The Army's Atomic Dilemma," the statement is made with reference to air power that "as long as it is broken into bits and pieces, and parcelled out among three individual services with one mission, it will not be used effectively." The "staff students" go on, however, to reveal their actual trend of thought by stating that "as long as there are three individual services, it is difficult to see how overlapping, duplication, and waste in manpower, money and facilities—can be prevented." The allegation that there are duplication and waste is incidental to the implication that not "three individual services" but only one (obviously the Air Force) is necessary.

We have here once more the one-big-answer technique. Before World War I it appeared in the guise of the super-Cannae, the one big land battle which would end the war. Before World War II, it appeared under the Douhet doctrine as when Major Al Williams wrote, "If the issues between England and France on one side, and Germany on the other are destined to be settled by force, the decision, win or lose, will be reached in a matter of 72 hours—in short, via a true air war." Now, in 1956, it seems that our defense troubles can be settled by putting all our eggs in one basket—the all-out air basket. And wonderful to relate, we can save money! But can we save human lives? Can we save our world? Will not our commitment to a single course of action and to one weapon deny us freedom of action?

Air-minded or war-minded?

Is it not time that the air extremists should, to use General Fuller's apt expression, "cease to be air-minded and become war-minded"? Then they will view warfare not in the Ludendorff and Douhet concepts of total war and total destruction, but rather in the sense that war is the servant, not the master, of policy. From such a base effective deterrent forces can be established and war, should it come, can be limited.

Air power has men who are war-minded. Asher Lee, the author of works on the German and Soviet air forces, is one. In his 1955 book, *Air Power*, he devotes several sections to "Parachute and Airborne Troops," "Supporting the Army," "Naval Air Power," and the like. Even more significantly, he attempts to examine the future without any dogmatic presumptions that ground and sea forces will not have a major role. Thus he states: "To what extent will guided missiles used in defence and offence affect future air operations? They will clearly impose much greater coordination between the services. They will mean that *the army must have greater control over tactical offensive operations* [my italics] than in World War II. They will call for a unified air defence system in which inter-service differences are completely sunk in a supra-national interest." Here speaks an authority on air power who is

war-minded rather than single-service-minded. Asher Lee examines the job to be done. He is unwilling to permit the weapons or the delivery system to dictate what should be done. The distinguished naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, reveals the U. S. Navy's adherence to the same position. "The commander of an operation or mission uses any necessary weapons or forces, whether they be ground troops, ships, tanks or planes," Morison wrote in his latest volume on U. S. naval operations in World War II.

The constant reexamination of our military policy is not an academic exercise. Soviet power and Soviet policy are never static. Even before it was emphasized at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 that Communism might triumph in some areas through "parliamentary" means, Khrushchev had hinted at the way in which Soviet tactics might deal with an American one-solution air policy. For, on 4 November 1955, Mr. Khrushchev reportedly told the Turkish Ambassador that "Turkey was foolish to remain in NATO since, if there is any difficulty, Turkey will be the first to be eaten up and your friends will not be able to help you." As Soviet policy has unfolded, we can see that Mr. Khrushchev was hinting to Turkey that she was in grave danger by remaining in NATO while the United States, committed to the one-big-war-or-none military policy, was gradually losing both the means and the will to engage in either limited or unconventional (cold) warfare.

American armed forces are more and more being tailored for fighting one big war. Yet Secretary of Defense Wilson, testifying before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on 24 January 1956, stated that "actually, *there is no way of knowing exactly what Russia will do; how she will attack.*" [My italics.] It is no secret that the U. S. Army, as presently constituted, lacks the capabilities for limited operations, although land forces would be the key to success in all types of warfare. Further, the concentration on one big war or none raises grave doubts as to whether the Air Force could give any support to the Army. The story of Korea and the many failures of air support are too well known to bear repetition, but have we learned anything about air-support and airlift requirements from Korea? Must we be the victims of Soviet freedom of action because we are the prisoners of a one-big-war-or-none idea?

FORTUNATELY, a master of coordinated warfare has shown how the United States can regain freedom of action and do so with the least risk of an all-out war of mutual destruction. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower wisely wrote in *Crusade in Europe*: "Our Mediterranean experience had reaffirmed the truth that unity, coordination, and cooperation are the keys to successful operations. *War is waged in three elements but there is no separate land, air, or naval war* [my italics]. Unless all assets are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be realized."

General Eisenhower's view of warfare looks toward the future rather than the past. It holds that the United States must have a reasonable degree of readiness for fighting the one big war, but that the United States can and must afford a readiness for all the likely types of war. Such a military policy offers America the freedom of action necessary to meet the tactical changes for world conquest instituted by the Soviet leaders with the liquidation of the Stalin myth.

BETTER THAN BEST
WHITER THAN WHITE!
SAY BLUE PINK CLEANER THAN CLEAN



Strategy,

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY L. WERMUTH

SPORTSWRITERS, always alert for another expressive term to borrow (often returned in damaged condition), speak of Casey Stengel's "strategic" manipulation of his Yankee line-up. The general staff of an advertising agency plots the major "strategy" of persuading the public that a particular brand of soap washes whiter than white.

These usages are not harmful, except perhaps to the language, and they do indicate that the non-military definition of "strategy" is broad and quite flexible. In public discussions of military matters the trend is otherwise. Here the tendency seems to be toward considering "strategic matters" largely, if not wholly, the concern of the Air Force, specifically the Strategic Air Command. Even the Tactical Air Command, when it discovered that its new fighter-bombers had the range and the capability of bombing distant targets with nuclear weapons, began to speak of its "strategic capability" instead of speaking more precisely of a "long-range bombardment capability."

This misdefinition of strategy probably stems from the wording of the Key West agreement and its subsequent revisions, which assigned "strategic air warfare"—though not strategy, nor strategic warfare, nor strategic weapons—to the Air Force. There is some danger that the growing trend toward narrowing the definition of "strategy" may harden into accepted dogma and thus deprive us of the power to choose from a wide range of strategic opportunities. It ought to be reaffirmed strongly and often that the strategic interests of the United States require the full participation of all the armed forces of the United States—and other agencies of the United States government.

SOME of the current meanings of "strategic" necessarily overlap, depending upon the context in which they are used. Thus "strategic targets" is often used to mean targets which are merely far away or are elements of a nation's war-sustaining industry. It would be more logical to call the Air Force's mission of strategic air warfare "long-range bombing"—logical because it is only the bombing of distant targets that is a unique capability of SAC. The idea that there is an exclusive affinity between "distance" and "strategy" is false. If "distance" is the criterion, it would have to be said that a movement by the Russians against the Suez Canal would be a tactical move whereas an attack on the Panama Canal would be strategic. Furthermore, the idea that operations at long range are exclusively Air Force operations is insupportable. World War II included a succession of long-range operations by land and sea forces, separately and in combination. The German invasion of the Soviet Union was of tremendous strategic scope over great distances. The land invasion of North Africa was largely launched from the continent of North America—from take-off to landing, some 5,000 miles. Many Pacific campaigns were launched over thousands of miles by combined Army (including Army Air Forces) and Navy forces.

The idea that "strategic" targets are major elements of a nation's war effort and are, *per se*, for some reason, of primary interest to the Air Force, breeds more confusion and weakens us militarily. These are sometimes called "heartland" targets, though they are by no means all located in the hearts of nations. Many of our own important industrial centers are located

ARMY



Anyone?

WHAT DOES "STRATEGIC" MEAN?

within a few hundred miles of our coasts. Many of the Soviet Union's are located within a few hundred miles of its western border. While bombers can reach some targets which are presently unapproachable by any other means, the targets attacked are of equal interest to the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

THERE is no truly strategic interest of the United States that is not also an interest of the Army. Any resource that helps an enemy make war against us is of strategic interest to the Army. Among the supremely important elements of a nation's ability to make and sustain war are its armed forces. The final capitulation of nations comes about only when army forces move in to physically control the enemy land.

Historical examples are sometimes cited to show that it is nothing unusual for a new weapon or type of military force, such as air power, to supplant the role of older weapons, such as armies. The examples cited are typified by references to the longbowmen at Crécy, who were supposed to have rendered cavalry obsolescent (it still took horse cavalry a long time to become obsolete).

However, what is seldom realized in such historical comparisons is that, while the examples cited are of undeniable changes in the forms of warfare, both old and new forms were still forms of *land* warfare. It is doubtful that similarly useful comparisons can be made between operational capabilities in two or three different media. It is doubtful that operations in air replace operations on land. The capabilities of aircraft, tremendous as they are at the present time, cannot hope to do more than extend or complement the capabilities of armies, and can never supplant them.


THE advent of missiles will inevitably adjust even current relationships and capabilities. Long-range bombing is logically assigned to the Air Force at the present time; but a missile is not a bomb. And while long-range land-launched offensive missiles will undoubtedly be weapons of "strategic" warfare, they will be more nearly related to land warfare than to air warfare, strategic or otherwise. There seems little logic in assigning a land-launched, unmanned weapon to any other force than the Army, no matter what the range of the weapon may be. As pointed out earlier, the Air Force has no logical monopoly of either distant or "heartland" targets—only the monopoly of operational means to deliver bombs to targets that can be reached in no other way. If and when bombs are no longer needed because they have been superseded by missiles, it would seem like an exercise in illogic to assign such missiles to an air force. The airman will have to abandon his aircraft and re-establish himself on the ground in order to operate such missiles; he will become a land soldier. Yet, a force of land soldiers already exists—the Army—the basic armed force of this or any other nation, with experience as old as war in the firing of unmanned projectiles to the farthest range of which they are capable.

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JUNE 1956



National Policy



OSCILLATING CONCEPTS OF MILITARY POWER

THE physical means of producing widespread destruction at great distances have developed so rapidly that U. S. national policy, as well as the Army, have been hard put to keep up. The thermonuclear weapon (TN for short) delivered by long-range jet bombers may not be the ultimate in this development, but it is sufficiently different from weapons of even the most recent past that military thinkers feel it will change drastically our concepts and practice of war. On the civilian side, officials of the U. S. Government who are concerned over the heavy costs of maintaining military forces see in these new developments a possible means of reducing expenditures for arms, and a large section of the public has been led to believe that our action in future wars will be limited to pushing buttons on intercontinental guided missiles.

In this turmoil of uncertainties and changing concepts, it is not surprising that there is more murk than light, and few agree on precisely what, if anything, has changed in the traditional Army mission. A brief ex-

amination of past military thinking, and particularly the factors that have been considered most vital to victory, will help clarify the present situation.

Through most of the long history of warfare (up to World War I, at least) it was commonly held that *force-in-being* was of paramount importance. True, there were other contributing factors such as geographical position, the will to win, leadership, strategy, field tactics, improved weapons and the like, but the main idea in winning a war—as in a campaign or a battle—was to “git thar fustest with the mostest.”

During these many centuries there were changes in military concepts which arose from technical improvements in weapons and defenses. (As used here, *force-in-being* includes fortifications and armor as well as trained archers and musketeers or an air force or a navy.) Undoubtedly there were oscillations in prevailing military opinion on the relative effectiveness of defensive and offensive forces; the maxim that “offense is the best defense” was not generally held to be true in medi-

and the Army

eval times. The point is that, from earliest times until quite recently, all military thinking was based on a "force in being" theory.

The outcome of World War I—the defeat of an admittedly superior army by a superior coalition of industrial economies—gave rise to an alternate view that may be called the *industrial potential theory*. According to its proponents, the really decisive factor in winning modern wars is the productive capacity of heavy industry, rather than military force in being, and the outcome of World War II is cited as proof. As we shall see, this represents but one of several oscillations in prevailing military thought.

The industrial potential theory was in fact accepted by Americans well before 1940, and may even be claimed as the basis of U. S. military policy dating back a century or more. In our generally isolated position we could rely upon our ability to build a fighting force from a small, well-trained cadre *after* a threat developed, rather than maintaining a full-scale force in being all along. The rapid development of American industrial capability gave us more confidence in this policy, so that in 1941 the industrial potential theory prevailed even though many well-meaning persons, including some well-informed military experts, advised U. S. neutrality because of Germany's superior military forces in being. The inherent strength of industrial power was demonstrated in World War II by statistics that showed increases in military production during some of the heaviest air raids on industrial centers of both sides.

Then came Hiroshima, and the needle of military philosophy promptly veered in a different direction—back to a modified force-in-being theory. First the atomic bomb and then TN weapons were considered so devastating that the nation with the larger stockpile

and a suitable means of delivery could consider itself secure from attack simply by the deterrent effect of retaliation with these weapons on its enemy's homeland. Thus the *atomic force-in-being theory* of deterrence. This was a fine idea—while it lasted—and it served an important purpose in U. S. diplomacy during the critical postwar years. But now the needle of prevailing military thought is moving again; nuclear warfare has become *two sided*, and we see that the deterrent of atomic force-in-being can work both ways. We are in the temporary stalemate that Sir Winston Churchill has aptly named "the balance of terror."

RATHER than a trend in these matters of recognized military strength we seem to be going through a series of oscillations with increasing tempo: from over a thousand years' acceptance of the conventional force-in-being theory, to less than a hundred years of the industrial potential theory and to about ten years of the atomic force-in-being deterrent. Just which way the needle will swing next—and how long it will hold its new direction—is yet to be determined. It seems unlikely that it will return to the simple industrial potential theory since in some cases industrial potential may now have negative value; the side with the larger industrial complex may have more to lose in an exchange of TN attacks.

Innovations in a Time of Transition

Fortunately, we are not at present faced with the full extent of the new means of destruction, and the uncertainty in just what new developments in offense and defense will eventually become decisive is of itself a strong deterrent to hot war. For the good of mankind




Dr. Thornton Page is an astrophysicist (Ph.D., Oxford, 1938) who turned to operations research (for the Navy) at the start of World War II. He joined the Army's Operations Research Office staff in 1951 and has been Director of the ORO Field Team at USAREUR Headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany, since 1954. In 1952 he founded the *Journal of the Operations Research Society of America* and served as its editor until 1954. His work at ORO, representing the varied studies of that organization, ranges over artillery problems, combat intelligence, communications, guerrilla warfare and training problems.

it is to be hoped that such technological warfare will continue for a few years, with frequent innovations in attack and defense to be evaluated before either side feels confident of its military capability. In fact, these conditions point to a new theory of military power based on *scientific and technological potential* rather than military force in being or industrial potential; the ability to produce military innovations (new weapons, new tactics, new equipment, new organization, or combinations of these)—to produce them rapidly and keep the enemy guessing—may now be the dominant factor in military strength.

But the old order changes slowly; in our Western tradition national policies do not change overnight. Our present policy, and the public opinion that shapes it, is too firmly based on the belief that all we need to keep the peace—or to win a war—is overwhelming superiority in our stockpile of nuclear weapons and our

The Instability of the Balance of



strategic air force. It is surely essential to examine this policy and its consequences carefully before we are further committed to it, particularly in view of the rapidly changing circumstances and the advent of two-sided nuclear warfare.

The Nature of the Balance of Terror

CHURCHILL'S concept rests on two widely touted (though somewhat oversimplified) facts: first, that both the United States and the USSR have TN weapons and means of delivery sufficient to do major damage to the other's culture (destruction, possibly, of all major cities, with up to fifty per cent casualties, in spite of all defenses); and secondly, that the delivery of such a blow cannot prevent delivery of the counterblow. It is held likely that these broad aspects of the balance of terror will continue unchanged for many years.

The United States presently seeks to tip the balance in our favor by two main efforts: first, by maintaining

an appreciable lead over the USSR in the size of retaliatory blow that can be delivered by our strategic air force; and secondly, by rushing completion of adequate home defenses. The first of these measures is patently of limited effectiveness because of saturation (after the threat reaches such proportions that ninety per cent of a nation's industry can be destroyed in a short series of blows, it is scarcely increased by raising that proportion to ninety-five per cent); the second may be practically unsound because of the very high cost. Even partial defense of the United States against attacking piloted bombers runs to billions of dollars a year, and the cost of defenses effective against supersonic long-range missiles will undoubtedly be greater. More significantly, the requirement for unflagging alertness may well be beyond organized human endurance after a few years. It takes a patient group of men to watch a radar screen fruitlessly month in and month out, and stick to it; failures of elaborate defenses waiting for an attack have been all too recently demonstrated at Pearl Harbor and on the Maginot Line.

The balance of terror is, moreover, far from stable, and its instability will very probably work out to Soviet advantage. Even though the men in the Kremlin may fear our retaliation now, while there is still uncertainty as to their own delivery capability and as to the effectiveness of defenses, they will soon see that we have good reason to fear theirs as much or more. After the United States shows it is not willing to risk TN warfare on a small issue in Asia, what is to prevent the Communists from testing us on a somewhat larger issue? This can go on until, by the probing policy they have followed frequently in the past, they are able to make us back down on every issue with the threat of the very deterrent we are counting on to prevent war. It is more than likely that the possibilities of such atomic blackmail are now in the minds of the Communist rulers in the USSR.

All this suggests that the development of TN warfare will shortly eliminate that type of warfare as an instrument of U. S. national policy. Although we must maintain our TN capability—and improve it in step with foreign powers—as an expensive form of insurance, it is by itself negative, and ineffective for positive action. In the final analysis the deterrent may deter us rather than the enemy. General Ridgway, in his open letter to the Secretary of Defense on the occasion of his retirement, voiced this opinion: "... it is at least debatable whether the United States really has the freedom to rely preponderantly on nuclear weapons to exert its military power."

ALTERNATIVES TO TOTAL WAR

Such elimination of total war as an instrument of national policy—this neutralization of our elaborate and expensive strategic air force—should lead to active consideration of alternatives. Here is a partial list:

- ¶ Disarmament, with reliance on a world court or other supra-national sovereign power to settle international disputes.
- ¶ Economic warfare by embargo or by naval blockade.

ALTERNATIVES TO TOTAL WAR



DISARMAMENT

Ideal but presently ineffective



ECONOMIC WARFARE

Not to be relied upon exclusively



PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Not to be relied upon exclusively



C-B-R WARFARE

Has same liabilities as thermonuclear warfare



SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Not to be relied upon exclusively; most effective when used in conjunction with operations by army units



CONVENTIONAL ARMY FORCES

Only reliable instrument for stopping aggression and upholding our national interests

¶ Strategic psychological warfare (propagandizing the Soviet peoples).

¶ Developing other effective means of decisive attack such as bacteriological warfare.

¶ Subversive activities behind the Iron Curtain, including the incitement of revolutions, resistance movements, and guerrilla warfare.

¶ Use of modern army forces to control peoples and hold ground.

The first of these is certainly the ideal, but cannot be said to offer immediate promise of a lasting solution. Its success must await political developments of a most complex nature, and it seems, paradoxically, that armaments must be *maintained* in the interim if a lasting disarmament is ever to be achieved. Moreover, disarmament (like strong defenses) requires unflagging attention or a more rapidly responding control system than was apparent during the late 1930s when Hitler re-armed Germany before his disarmed opponents could take preventive action. The four-power "summit" talks at Geneva last year and the President's previous appointment of Harold Stassen as Special Assistant on Disarmament were encouraging, it is true, but it will be a long time before they can have a major effect in a practical way. Moreover, if disarmament is to last, effective provisions must be made for settling disputes between major nations—probably requiring surrender of sovereign rights to an international authority, a political move of great rarity. The main source of hope on this score is a growing desire on the part of all peoples to avoid total warfare and devastation by TN weapons.

ECONOMIC and psychological warfare are also of promise, but as presently understood they appear too general and too nebulous for a major nation to rely on solely or specifically. In general slow-acting, they can scarcely be used to counter sudden, surprise moves by a determined and hostile nation. From another point of view, these two possibilities have already been quite fully developed and implemented against the Communist bloc, and methods of increasing their effectiveness to an appreciable degree cannot now be foreseen.

The fourth possibility—bacteriological warfare, or any other decisive form of attack on a nation's people—is not only as distasteful to civilized peoples as devastation by TN weapons; it also suffers from the balance-of-terror difficulty: the enemy can probably retaliate in kind. Therefore, we cannot count on such "horror-weapon" possibilities any more than on total TN warfare as practical instruments of U. S. policy, although we must, unfortunately, study and develop them as insurance against the possibility of enemy use.

"Unconventional warfare," the fifth possibility, includes everything subversive from "clean" guerrilla fighting to the nastiest fulminations of agents in enemy territory. (The term was coined before the Atomic Age and does not refer to the unconventionality of nuclear weapons, although such weapons might be used by sub-

(Continued on page 57)



WHAT ABOUT THESE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS?

*A man, Sir, should keep his
friendship in constant repair.*

Samuel Johnson

Lt. Col. Robert F. Grabb

WHEN you, your wife and two heirs arrive at your new station, Camp Broody, Maine, you discover, with no surprise, that there is a housing shortage. At the housing information center you run into Captain Jones, whose situation is similar to yours, except that he is one up on you in the way of offspring. The housing center tells you about a lovely 19th century mansion: "ten big rooms, a veranda across the front, and a spacious lawn." The rent is steep and the cost of heating it through a Maine winter is guaranteed to be staggering. You and your new friend, Captain Jones, decide to drive out and see it together. While inspecting it you are spontaneously hit by the same idea: It's big enough for two families, so why not share it? You drive back to the motel to pick up your wives and sell them on the idea. Being persons of reasonable perceptiveness and forethought, the four of you realize that some inter- and intra-family frictions are bound to develop and so you then and there work out

rules and understandings for the future.

You decide on a fair and equitable division of the rent, utilities and heat. You agree on how such important areas as the kitchen, bathrooms and television room will be shared. You are even smart enough to work out the responsibility for broken windows and uprooted shrubbery.

What you have when you get through is a status of forces agreement.

THIS homely example is the best way to understand the Status of Forces (SOF) agreements that presently exist between the United States and many other nations. In this article I shall attempt to describe the practical effect of these agreements, all too unfamiliar to the average officer. I will not try to deal with the inherent wisdom of the agreements, nor will I consider, except in passing, the thorny legal problems which have arisen in the courts and in Congress from the question of what international law does

or does not provide with respect to status of forces agreements.

Today, with members of the forces scattered throughout the world in seventy-odd countries, it is doubtful if anyone would take issue with the constantly reiterated exhortation to military personnel abroad to "be an ambassador." The wisdom of developing a reservoir of good will in our allies is unassailable. Moreover, this call to diplomatic arms is not something totally strange to men in uniform.

Since 1952 every commander, from platoon to army, every adjutant, every judge advocate—indeed, every serviceman who receives an overseas assignment—must be prepared for official dealings with civil authorities of the country to which he is shipped. No MOS for "diplomat—pants, striped" has actually been formulated, but the Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army recently revealed that judge advocates in Europe, as one sample group, devote approximately fifty per cent of their man-hours to activities

stemming from the NATO SOF Agreement.

It is this agreement, or treaty, and the several similar arrangements dealing with our rights and obligations abroad which have brought about the present inescapable emphasis in military circles on day-to-day international relations.

WHEN the foundation for the NATO house was laid it was obvious that its military concept required that troops of one nation be stationed on the territory of another member and that these troops be shifted about as the military situation might dictate. Since each in-

novel simply because troops of one sovereign nation had never before been stationed semi-permanently on the territory of another friendly power in peacetime. It was imperative that the principal agreements be reciprocal. That is, your position if assigned to the United Kingdom must be identical with that of a British soldier sent to France or to the United States.

THE agreements are principally peacetime affairs. Most contain provisions that many of their operative clauses will lapse in time of war. The niceties of frictionless relations are relatively unimportant when the basic question

our point of view) would try criminal offenders from the forces. It was ironed out with the somewhat obvious solution of developing a split or concurrent jurisdiction—each state taking cognizance of certain categories of offenses.

In a few rare cases the sending state—that is, the United States in the case of our forces abroad—has exclusive criminal jurisdiction. For example, where an act is a violation of United States law but not of the laws of the host country (military offenses like AWOL), the United States has exclusive jurisdiction. Conversely, the receiving state has exclusive jurisdic-



dependent sovereign nation was a full partner, the solution to civil house-keeping chores had to be one that was acceptable to all.

So, in this framework was born NATO's SOF, as well as arrangements with other countries, such as Japan with its Administrative Agreement. It was unthinkable to the United States that, simply because of our comparative strength, we should quarter troops on our allies in the manner of victor on vanquished as the USSR had done on the satellites. This was exactly what we were preparing to defend against.

The problem of deciding what the rights of visiting forces would be was

is life or death. The common effort of all-out war provides a sufficiently adhesive bond.

To go back to your joint housing venture. If, under the conditions we have assumed, you see Sally Jones pull the community cat's tail when her parents are at the commissary, do your rules permit *you* to dust her fanny? This is one aspect of the question of jurisdiction, perhaps the most thorny and certainly the most publicized of all problems faced by the drafters of the NATO SOF. The basic question was whether the civil courts of the host state or the military courts of the sending state (the United States, from

tion in some rare instances—over acts which are offenses under its law but not ours. These are generally security and espionage offenses.

Mostly, however, the agreement provides a system of concurrent jurisdiction. This is the nub of the SOF agreement. If the offense is committed by a member of the visiting forces and is solely against the property or security of the sending state, or if the offense is solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component or of a dependent of that state, or if the offense arises out of the performance of official duty, then the jurisdiction of the sending

The NATO Status of Forces Agreement has numerous provisions. Among them, are these:

Exemption from visa and passport requirements
Drivers' licenses
Wearing of civilian dress
Carrying of arms
Concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offense

Settlement of official and private claims
Duty free importation of personal items
Establishment of Post Exchanges
Tax benefits
Activities of military police

THESE AGREEMENTS are in force in Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, The United Kingdom, Turkey, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and the United States.

state is deemed primary. In such cases our courts-martial have the first right to try.

In all other cases the host or receiving state has the first right to try, and this category includes the ubiquitous breach of peace and traffic offense.

Once the accused is tried by one state he cannot be tried in the same country for the same offense by the other state. Very important in practice is the requirement that even though one state has primary jurisdiction, it must, in important cases, give "sympathetic consideration" to requests for a waiver of jurisdiction by the other state.

IN the event an American soldier finds himself facing a foreign bar of justice, certain rights are guaranteed him by the treaty, regardless of what the normal rules of law of the country may be. He is entitled to a prompt and speedy trial; he must be informed in advance of the charges against him; he has the right to confront witnesses; he has the right to a competent interpreter and to legal counsel, and to communicate with his government. In every case so far in which a person subject to our military law has been tried in a foreign court, an observer from our armed forces—usually a JAG—has been present to note the proceedings and render a report. If, despite these elaborate precautions, it is nevertheless considered that a criminal proceeding has resulted in a denial of justice, or that a member of our forces has not received proper procedural treatment, diplomatic overtures can be made.

Many words have been spoken on one underlying facet of this jurisdiction question. Certain legislators and individuals vehemently oppose any trial of American servicemen in foreign courts and have taken the position that when the troops of one nation are permitted to enter the territory of an

other state, international law provides that criminal offenses may be tried only by the courts-martial of the nation which has sent the troops. The agreements which provide for such trials have been called un-American; they have been said to make "American soldiers second-class citizens . . . martyrs to internationalism."

The Attorney General of the United States and principal legal officers in the military departments do not subscribe to this point of view, indicating that the situation is new and controlled not by customary international law but by agreement.

ARGUMENTS in this area, however, have little practical bearing upon the man in the field. The various treaties and agreements are on the books, and it is our duty, as always, to do our best to make them work. That we have been able to do so in the controversial field of criminal jurisdiction is to be gathered from the annual statistics recently presented by the Department of Defense to the Senate Armed Services Committee. During the one-year period ending 30 November 1955, a total of 10,249 cases arose throughout the world in which persons subject to U. S. military law were accused of offenses subject to the primary jurisdiction of foreign courts. Sixty-three per cent of these offenses (6,448) were traffic violations. Foreign governments waived their jurisdiction in 66 per cent (6,769), and tried 30 per cent (3,142), of these cases. Of the cases tried, for-

foreign courts acquitted 225 individuals, reprimanded 50, imposed fines upon 2,595, and imposed confinement in 266 cases. Confinement was suspended in all but 120 cases. Thus, actual confinement was imposed in only one per cent of all the cases arising subject to foreign jurisdiction.

As of 30 November 1955, 81 individuals were serving sentences in confinement in foreign prisons. Of these, the highest sentence was 15 years imposed for murder and robbery.

It was on the basis of these figures, plus the practically unanimous *personal* evaluation by field commanders throughout the world that the jurisdictional arrangements had had no adverse effect on morale or the assigned mission, that DOD representatives advised the Senate on 9 February 1956 that the arrangements ". . . are working very satisfactorily. Indeed one may reasonably go farther and say that they are working for the most part extremely well."

LOOMING large as it does in the public eye, and probably obscuring the over-all picture of these arrangements, criminal jurisdiction is nevertheless but one of many items in status of forces arrangements.

Do you have to take, for example, a French driving test in order to operate your own car on French roads? No, says the SOF Agreement in Article IV. Your Stateside license must be accepted or the officials of the country in which you are stationed must issue



Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Grabb was commissioned in the Army Air Corps in 1942, returned to civilian life after the war, and in 1949 was commissioned in the JAGC. During 1950-53 he was Assistant Legal Adviser to the Zone Commander, AMG, in Trieste. He is a graduate of Brown University and Harvard Law School, and is a member of the New York bar. He is now on duty in the Office of The Judge Advocate General.

a local license on the basis of the one you have from your home state.

What taxes do you pay? The SOF Agreement again is fairly specific. You pay no income tax to the host state. You pay no personal property tax on the household goods you have brought with you. This is not to say that all problems have been successfully anticipated. Is a dog exempt as personal property? Do you pay foreign dog taxes? Must you pay the local charge on radios, the revenue from which supports the programs and is not precisely a tax? These are minor but sometimes irritating questions which are constantly monitored. It is in these slightly clouded areas that members of the forces overseas find themselves engaged in practicing diplomacy.

You will remember that you and Captain Jones anticipated the problem of the broken windows. By analogy, this is the *claims* provision of the status of forces arrangements. These deal with the problems of claims arising out of official duty acts such as the tank driven through a field of wheat or your personal problem when, in a momentary lapse in the UK, you forget that the left hand is the right hand and run down a drove of pigs. Who pays? This question, again, is spelled out in a share-and-share alike arrangement in Article VIII of the SOF, one article that functions with practically no problems.

THE question of the confinement of those soldiers who are found guilty

of an offense against the laws of the receiving state has received more than its share of newspaper publicity, and yet it has, in general, been handled smoothly. It is not infrequently redemned to five years, more or less, in ported in the press that some unfortunate, wayward youth has been con-



on bread and water. In truth, foreign penal authorities have been most cooperative. A leading penologist from OTPMG recently inspected the prisons in Europe where American personnel are confined and has reported that their treatment, while perhaps lacking in some niceties, is favorable. The Japanese have gone so far as to provide a special prison for our forces with central heating and all-around special treatment.

But, again, this is only one aspect of the agreements. Status of forces arrangements in addition must consider customs and duties. The host country is anxious to prevent so-called luxury goods from falling into the local economy, where they are likely to disrupt trade and encourage black-market operations. Controls are therefore necessary, as well as exemptions. Article XI of the NATO SOF meets some of these difficulties by providing an exemption upon personal effects, private vehicles, and other goods imported for the use of members of the forces and their dependents. These goods can be imported free of customs, but they cannot be disposed of on the local market. Of course, equipment, provisions and ordinary supplies for the use of the armed services themselves are imported free of duty.

Jurisdictional agreements must also contemplate many questions surrounding the use and employment of local labor, the extent to which the forces must comply with local labor legislation, processing of employment claims, status of employment of non-appropriated fund activities (are they members of the civilian component?)—all these are ever-present questions.


Other problems include the status of the non-appropriated funds activities themselves, non-governmental agencies such as the Red Cross, United States universities with troop educational programs, and like institutions. The agreements touch visas and currency control laws as well.

THESE agreements are working and with them our international house stands a better chance of remaining orderly. They are the basic charter under which we carry out our global strategy. Without them, our overseas bases could not exist. They are of utmost importance to the strategic and tactical programs which we must devise and implement. They are the law. We might wish they contained certain provisions which would appear more favorable to us, but they represent joint action by allies. It is in our interest, as military men, to see that they work—that they provide an effective bridge with our allies, not a wall against them. To make them work is the task of our rapidly growing group of practicing experts in international relations—an assignment that may fall to anyone in uniform.

The record of what happened to servicemen (all services) under NATO Status of Forces agreements and similar arrangements, who were tried in foreign courts between 1 December 1954 and 30 November 1955

Criminal offense subject to foreign jurisdiction	10,249
(including 6,448 traffic offenses)	
Jurisdiction voluntarily passed to U. S.	6,769
Actually tried in foreign courts	3,142
Acquitted	225
Sentence to confinement not suspended	120
(Six sentences of more than five years)	
In foreign prisons on 30 Nov. 55	81

DIG THAT ATOMIC FOXHOLE



... Better yet, get a
machine to dig it

COLONEL HENRY E. KELLY

THE existing foxhole has been essentially unchanged since it became popular late in World War I. Both the shallow "hasty" position and the traditional one-man foxhole have been in constant use since. The two-man foxhole, which gained popularity late in

World War II and again in Korea, has, of late, tended to replace the one-man hole. Modern use of timed fire and the proximity fuze have increased the need for early construction of overhead cover.

The triple threat of the blast, heat and radiation of tactical atomic weapons forces us to consider whether the foxhole actually constitutes the best individual field fortification. Basically, the requirement is for approximately four feet of defilade in the shortest possible time. It is also essential that the defensive fighting ability of the user be unimpeded and that the hole itself be as small as can be efficiently fought from.

Overhead cover has become an essential, not only as a protection against shell fragments, but also against the atomic threat. This overhead protection must likewise not restrict defensive use of the foxhole.

Under these conditions the shallow hole appears completely unsuitable. It

may have to be used when digging in under fire but even then there is an urgent need to deepen and improve this emergency cover as fast as possible. In all other instances, including positions organized deliberately, bivouacs, assembly areas, and other rear-area uses where the shallow hole was formerly often used, better protection will be required. Moreover, the dictates of dispersed war involve frequent movement which in turn will require more frequent "digging in" under conditions where both time and labor are critical.

If a rifleman's circular pit some 28 inches to 30 inches is substituted for the current rectangular foxhole, nearly a hundred per cent reduction in digging results, while the protection afforded is markedly increased. The smaller the hole the less the possibility of interception of blast, flame, radiation, and other lethal agencies possessing line-of-site limitation upon their casualty-producing effectiveness. The circular hole eliminates the use of a

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prone position reducing the target presented by a crouching rifleman by one half. Overhead cover requirements are also greatly simplified. In fact, such overhead cover might well be provided by a shield of reinforced lightweight, fireproof fabric armor designed to also serve as packboard or battlefield shield.

It is true that far heavier overhead cover is required for complete protection. Time and materials permitting, such cover may still be used over the sleeping holes of individuals. Complete overhead protection of actual firing positions, however, can rarely be achieved without unacceptable impairment of the combat use of the hole. A shield corresponding to fireproof body-armor material would protect against all shell fragments, flash burns, blast and, to a degree, against radiation. Such overhead cover could be arranged without impairing the fighting capabilities of the user.

AS FOR the combat efficiency of the circular hole, it will be recalled how popular such riflemen's pits were with the Germans and how difficult it was to eliminate the occupants of such

holes, particularly when sited on steep forward or side slope positions to cover an approach. The moral support of the double foxhole can still be retained with reduced chance of casualties by siting such holes in pairs.

The circular hole is a bit more difficult to dig by hand, but mass production of such atomic foxholes seems feasible except by troops digging in under direct fire. The present commercial telegraph-pole digger, working as an earth screw, can be redesigned to produce a 28-inch diameter hole four feet deep, in less than a minute. Such a device, trailer-mounted in pairs and powered by a light generator, could provide those numerous rearward and supplemental positions we read about so often but so seldom see except in a static situation or on an operations map. Man-portable models of such pole-diggers are also available and could be helicopter-lifted for use on inaccessible positions.

IT MAY be argued that a 28-inch to 30-inch diameter is too restrictive for comfort. It is visualized that this constitutes merely the initial shell designed

to furnish minimum early protection. Each hole will naturally be progressively improved, first by burrowing out on a selected side of the hole without disturbing the top opening. This will furnish more overhead protection when crouching and also space for grenades and ammunition. Next, a sleeping hole for each pair, with overhead cover and camouflage, then, finally, time permitting, shallow connecting trenches for crawling between fighting holes and the sleeping holes. These would also be covered and camouflaged. The final setup, as visualized, would be as shown in the accompanying sketch.

The proposed setup may well fall short of what can be achieved if effort is concentrated on the task. The problem is pressing and requires solution. The use of explosives to expedite individual digging in has long been under consideration, but nothing has come of it. Mechanical diggers are probably already under consideration by some agencies. What is needed is a device in the hands of troops which can be improved with use until all the bugs have been eliminated. Let's have a solution.



Indiana's famous Steel City shows the way in neighborliness

EDITORIAL FROM THE GARY POST-TRIBUNE

WE'RE GLAD OF THE NIKES

Gary residents have shown much more good sense than the residents of some communities in regard to Nike installations. We note the Army has undertaken a "sales program" in some areas to convince doubters that they are better off with guided missile launching stations on hand. No sales program is needed here.

Some communities have been resistant to the Nike program. They haven't liked the idea of defense installations in their back yards or the stationing of troops in their areas.

Frankly, we don't understand such attitudes. The Nike stations are being placed in possible target

areas. We don't see why anyone living in a danger zone should not want whatever is available in the way of defense installations.


Jet airfields are unpopular with some cities because of their noise, but there won't be any commotion at the Nike stations unless they are sent in action against a foe.

Further, we have no patience with any who would protest the quartering of troops in "residential areas." The young men in our armed forces are young men from the cities, towns and farmlands of America and we are happy to have some of them living temporarily among us. We hope they remain long enough to become identified with the community life.



How Gary Loves Those Missilemen!

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL G. DUERR



"Mitch" Nowakowski

This is the story of how one community opened its doors and its heart to a Nike missile battalion. It is the story of "Mitch" Nowakowski, genial tavern operator and unofficial ambassador, the story of the men and management of Gary's big steel industry, the city government, the civic and women's clubs, the churches and schools—all of the 134,000 good citizen of Gary. It is also the story of the development of good community relations by a battalion commander and his outfit.

WHEN the 79th AAA Missile Battalion moved into Gary in February 1955, it found itself in a busy, industrial city that produces five per cent of the nation's steel. As part of the industrial complex of Chicago's Calumet Region, Gary's smokestacks run into the smokestacks of East Chicago, Indiana Harbor, and Whiting, which themselves continue uninterrupted around the shore of Lake Michigan and into Chicago.

The whole Calumet Region is one of the fastest-growing, as well as one of the largest, industrial areas in the

world. Gary itself is booming. Real estate is high; housing is tight. Utilities are heavily burdened. An antiaircraft battalion, which uses forty acres of land itself, and sometimes tends to depreciate real estate, could not have expected to be greeted with open arms. But when the 79th AAA Missile Battalion moved in, the city welcomed it cordially.

The Red Cross invited all commanders to its annual "Kick Off" luncheon and asked them for a few words. The Fire Department added all the battalion's sites to its fire plan, even though

two were outside the city limits, and one was not even in the same county. On one of these sites there was no drinking water, and the Fire Department offered to truck it in. They have been doing it ever since.

The battalion did its part. The editors of the *Gary Post-Tribune* were invited to one of the sites and briefed on the unclassified aspects of the unit before the battalion had been in position a month. Their editorial (reproduced here) is eloquent proof of Gary's attitude. Then, in May, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel David



*All photos on this page
are by courtesy of The
Gary Post-Tribune*

"Mary for Gary" participated in Gary's
big Armed Forces Day parade

The Chamber of Commerce invites the
79th to tell its story. *From left to right:*
Chamber President Robert Dering and
Lewis O. Long greet Lt. Col. David G.
Gauvreau, the battalion commander, and
Maj. Richard E. Campbell, executive of-
ficer



Cub Scouts line up for chow in the mess hall of Battery C, 79th AA Missile Battalion



ARMY

G. Gauvreau, spoke at the annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce.

THE members of the Chamber of Commerce knew the industrial capacity of the Calumet Region better than anyone else, Colonel Gauvreau began. They realized what a lucrative target Gary would present to an enemy bombardier, and that the Army had to set up units like the 79th AAA Battalion to protect such vital areas. He pointed out that the battalion, already on-site in Gary, was a small cog in the over-all air defense of the United States, and went on to explain the organization of the Continental Air Defense Command, its early-warning radar lines, alert squadrons of interceptors, and close-in defense batteries ringing the cities which probably ranked highest on the priority lists of the Soviet Air Force. He described the chain of command, step by step, through the Army Antiaircraft Command and the regional commands to the defense of the Calumet Region, and showed how the 79th tied into it, with the mission of intercepting hostile bombers bearing down on Gary. Next he spoke of the Nike system itself, telling how the system was developed, and as much about how it worked as possible within the limits of security.

There were hazards inherent in a Nike installation, the speech went on, but the battalion did much to reduce them. Missiles were never moved off site until the warhead and fuel had been removed. All fueling and warheading were done behind earth revetments. All explosive materials were normally stored underground. And no missile would ever be fired from an on-site position unless Gary was under threat of attack. Actually, the Nike was about as safe as a gas station.

The program concluded with an unclassified film on the firing of a Nike missile. It showed the launchers elevate and the missile *whoosh* up from the rail, accelerating as it gained altitude. A voice counted off the seconds to intercept: "four . . . three . . . two . . . one . . . intercept!" and then came a slow-motion sequence of a B-17 drone, intercepted by the missile, exploding in the air and disintegrating as it fell

out of the sky. As the plane broke up, the lights went on in the dining room. The members of the Chamber of Commerce were sitting on the edges of their chairs.

Next day the secretary of the Chamber of Commerce sent the battalion a letter of thanks for "one of the finest and best received programs that we have ever had." "Actually," the letter went on, "your presentation yielded a good deal more information about the Nike missile than I had dared hope for. The film showing the missile performing its ultimate function was, for me and many others, a thrilling and sobering experience."

Before the week was over, another invitation came in. Curiosity about new weapons is strong, and when word got around that so much information on the Nike was available, invitations to speak began to flow in from all over the Calumet region.

These speaking engagements were not evaded. They were recognized as insurance against possible attacks by ill-informed citizens' committees. Since May, officers of the 79th AAA Battalion have made more than thirty speeches in northwestern Indiana and northeastern Illinois. They have talked to PTAs, men's clubs, women's clubs, Altar and Rosary societies, supervisors of the Gary Screw and Bolt Company and of the Gary Works of United States Steel, Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs, and the Boy Scouts. With its foot in the door, the battalion proceeded to arrange for as many social and official contacts with the people of Gary as it could. Soldier teams joined bowling and basketball leagues, and invited civilians to parties on the sites. Missiles were exhibited at the Gary Armed Forces Day dis-

play, and at the Lake County Fair. A Nike on a trailer participated in Gary's Armed Forces Day and Memorial Day parades—and the battalion also marched. One of the 79th's sites held an open house on 18 August which was attended by civic and industrial leaders. A more concrete contribution to the welfare of the community was the use of the battalion's trucks to haul dirt for the East Gary Little League baseball diamond.

THESE gestures were rewarded. In May, when the sites were established and beginning to dress up, the National Tube Division of U.S. Steel in Gary presented the battalion with a flagpole for each. Less spectacular, but no less



His Honor, Mayor Peter Mandich dedicates a flagpole presented the battalion by the U. S. Steel plant in Gary

appreciated, has been the cooperation of the Police and Fire Departments. The Police Department reports all minor infractions of city laws directly to battalion headquarters, and only in the more serious offenses have soldiers appeared before civil judges. The Fire Department is completely cooperative. In one instance an entire station declared itself out of action for a day while it reconnoitered the 79th's sites in force. They brought their equipment and ran it all over the sites, checking to see if they could get around all the corners and reach all areas.

Lieutenant Michael G. Duerr, Artillery, is a member of Hq & Hq Battery, 79th AAA Missile Battalion and a 1952 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy. Our latest intelligence of him is that he has been proudly heralding the addition to his family of Miss Gary of 1974.

Gary is going all-out with her limited recreational resources to make the soldiers feel at home. The American Legion, its 40-and-8, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars extend free membership privileges to the troops at the Nike site. Servicemen are admitted free to weekly dances at the YWCA. The Public Library sends books to the day-rooms of all batteries on-site within the city limits every week. The YMCA grants free membership, and the Gary Community Chest's USO Committee has donated balls and bats, model airplanes and table tennis equipment. A downtown Service Club for the battalion was opened. Many men of the 79th have become active in the local churches. Moreover, the people of Gary are glad to take soldiers into their homes.

PERHAPS the most notable example of out-and-out neighborliness in Gary is a formidable bartender named Mitchell Nowakowski, who runs a tavern and restaurant called Mitchell's Pleasant Inn. "Mitch," as he prefers to be called, is the recognized liaison officer between the city and the battalion. He is also something of a Santa Claus. He has outfitted a post exchange on one of the sites with furniture, provided trophy cases and beverage coolers for the battalion, and arranged a banquet for the battalion's Soldier and NCO

of the Month. He keeps his finger on the pulse of Gary, and works vigorously and effectively to scotch rumors which might hurt the battalion's reputation.

Another guardian of the battalion's honor is the *Gary Post-Tribune*. The *Post-Tribune* consistently prints material favorable to the Army and has never capitalized on the bungling and soldier-crime stories which sometimes seem to be the sole fare of some papers in other towns in which Army troops are stationed. It is a happy situation.

LIKE a happy marriage, the relationship between the 79th AAA Missile Battalion and the city of Gary is the result of effort by both parties. The city's leaders stepped out halfway first. The battalion's part has been to go the other half, and to keep the initial enthusiasm from dying out. Their success is indicated by the fine relations with the city which are still flourishing, even though the honeymoon is over and the novelty has worn off.

Keeping the community informed of the battalion's place in the nation's security, and telling what you can do for it and how you propose to do it, insures against a unit's being thought of as a parasite on the community. This is not difficult, for the antiaircraft defense of the United States is not a program that needs much selling. What

is difficult is the hostility that lurks just under the surface of a community which has just had forty acres of its land snatched away and made into an Army post. After a decade of jittery peace, most Americans will listen to sense if it is presented to them. Too often the professional Army officer is so used to the necessity for military preparedness that he assumes everyone else thinks about it as much as he does. But if you can show a civilian how you are helping his community, how you are protecting him and his family, he will forget about the depreciation of real estate. The speeches made by the 79th, the invitations to civilians to visit the site, the displays of the Nike, are steps in establishing and maintaining good community relations.

Impressive though speeches and displays and participation in community events are, the most important part of any community relations program is in the mind. The battalion and battery commanders must take the problem seriously. In the 79th we have pushed it. The battalion has gone out of its way to immerse itself into the life of Gary. Today it has numerous friends. Every man knows that the battalion has been well treated in Gary, and that a slip by one soldier could ruin everything. Getting along with Gary has become a battalion project.

Gary women donated irons, ironing boards and other equipment to make the battalion's day rooms more livable and useful





Death is something remote that happens to old people and not to the young, carefree and careless—so two soldiers died beside a wild flower

HOT WAR ON THE HIGHWAYS



MAJ. JOHN E. MURRAY
and
LT. NORMAN L. DOBYNS

SUMMER morning. The Western plains. A speeding six-by-six kicks up a cloud of dust as its big wheels spin over the gravel road. Ahead there is a range guard posted near a cattle gate. Beyond the guard is a ninety-degree right turn.

Two young soldiers are in the cab. Only a few days earlier the young driver had been cautioned about speeding. The possibility of death was far from the minds of these carefree soldiers. Death doesn't come to youth. It happens in old age—and to other people.

Is two and a half tons of hurtling steel with six great wheels spinning on a loose, hard-pebbled base a plaything? Want a thrill? Apply the brake, and two and a half tons will crazily slew about like a blob of water on a window pane.

The truck roared toward the cattle gate. The range guard signalled it to slow down. But there was no response. Too late to slow down, the driver tried to take the turn. But the turn took the truck. For some thirty yards the three wheels on its port side churned in the lumpy off-road ruts. It careened on the road again for another thirty, then veered off—off the road on the right, hit a rise, and all two and a half tons of it went into a fatal flip.

Two soldiers were dead beside a wild flower.

MOST of us are safety-blinded instead of safety-minded. We light our cigarettes with safety matches, shave with safety razors, put our bonds in a safe deposit box, even hold our clothes up with safety pins. But how many of us drive our cars with safety belts?

We are apparently interested in protecting our fingers from burns, our faces from nicks, our bonds from being stolen, and our clothes from falling

down. But we don't give a damn about living into retirement.

From some queer shortsightedness our stress on the trivia overrides the tremendous. We are like the criminal with a headache who walks to the guillotine, and as his last wish asks for an aspirin.

In the Army it is part of our training to be uncommonly concerned with safeguards. Whether it's the safety on an M1, three-inch armorplate, fragment-proof vests, needles against smallpox, lockjaw and diphtheria, or a reserve parachute.

Our machines give us mobility, but they are also the making of a serious disability which blunts the point and takes the lightning from our thrust. For it takes men to master these machines. But in a devastating way the machines are Frankensteins turning on their masters.

For each of the thousand-odd days that the sun rose in Korea during 1950-53, it set upon a bloody statistic. Daily average Americans killed: twenty-three.

Enemy fire no longer kills in the Korean hills, but in our own land there is gory highway havoc that tolls out death which is currently carousing at a daily statistic which is horrendously four times over the Korean combat average: one hundred and one!

During World War II, the Army for the first time in history totalled more deaths due to accident than disease. For four men killed in battle one man was killed by accident. In three recent non-war years, 1947-49, more than half of all military deaths were due to motor vehicles.

Half of the injured men hospitalized during the Korean fracas were there not because of the enemy, but because of accident!

Of the twenty-five men who lost their lives as a result of accidents in Exercise Sagebrush, how many were due to the automotive vehicles? All but six. Of these six, two were due to machines. A tank and a forklift each tallied a life. How ironic! A soldier expects that he may perish by bayonet, bullet or bomb. But to be done in by a forklift . . .

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 APRIL 1956

First Army Bans Night Driving on Leave To Check 'Appalling' Auto Accident Rate

To check the "appalling automobile accident rate involving troops," the First Army has ordered that all driving to and from posts by soldiers on leave must be done in daylight hours.

The newly revised policy was made known yesterday at the second day of a safety seminar on Governors Island. The seminar heard addresses by officers and civilian safety experts for the Army and discussed methods of reducing accidents in the armed forces.

Raymond B. Koozer, safety director at Fort Dix, N. J., said the object of the new safety measure was "to eliminate the dawn-dash driving that has killed and maimed so many of our soldiers."

"Leaves are now scheduled," he said, "so that soldiers are not fatigued when they begin their leaves. They start their leaves and driving during daylight hours. Their return to posts are also scheduled to permit a

full quota of sleep and driving during daylight hours."

Requests for leave that involve driving long distances at "rates of speed which must be excessive" are denied under the new policy, Mr. Koozer said.

John Grimaldi, state coordinator of a Slow Down and Live safety campaign, said of the American soldier:

"He is the best driver in the world on duty. But when he drives his own car he tries to crowd a whole lifetime in twenty-four hours. He stays up all hours and at dawn dashes back to duty. It often ends up tragically, or seriously."

The First Army is believed to be the first unit in the Armed forces to adopt such a safety measure. The problem of automobile accidents involving Army personnel at Fort Dix became a serious problem soon after the opening of the New Jersey Turnpike, which has higher speed limits than other highways in the state.

ANNUALLY, about 2,000 servicemen die in traffic accidents. About half of these are soldiers! Annually, 42,000 soldiers are disabled (one every 12 minutes); there are 60,000 accidents (one every 8.5 minutes). Annual direct cost to the Army for accidents: \$90 per minute (\$1.50 per second). In the time it takes you to read this article, accidents will have cost the Army over \$1,000. Revealingly, more servicemen have been killed on the highways than have died in combat over the past forty years!

And so on, *ad nauseam*. We could give the enormous number of man-days lost, the treasure doled out to settle claims, detail the four billion dollars wasted nationwide yearly, and try to weigh in tons of adjectives the imponderable effect of x number of chain-re-

active heartaches. But such successive statements have the cumulative effect of an opiate.

Still there is one last set of related statistics to be targeted. The big killer is the motor vehicle, and almost nine out of ten Army personnel in car accidents nowadays are on leave or pass. In fact, 80 per cent of fatal injury accidents occur off duty. About 70 per cent involve privately owned vehicles. About three fourths of the accidents occur en route back to the post. Most are one-car accidents. A disproportionate percentage occur during the four hours following midnight. And—unbelievable as it may seem—about one in every eight soldier-drivers involved in an accident lacks a driver's license!

The key fact is this: the great loss of life and depletion of ranks due to disabilities occur when the soldier is off-post.

THE commander is directly responsible for the health, safety and welfare of his men. This responsibility does not have the geographical limitations of the military reservation. It goes wherever

Major John E. Murray, Transportation Corps, is special assistant to the Chief of Transportation. A Reserve officer, he has been on active duty since 1941. This is his third appearance. Lieutenant Norman L. Dobyns is assistant to the Executive Officer in the Office of the Chief of Transportation. He entered the Army in 1954 after graduating magna cum laude and as Distinguished Military Graduate from Washington and Lee University.

the soldier goes. If he goes riding down the highway to hereafter, the commander's responsibility goes with him. Does that mean the commander can do little but warn, admonish and caution his men? Can he do more than adopt a nag-and-needle, I-told-you-so fatalism? He can.

He can do much more. For here, as elsewhere, leadership is paramount. Researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health declare "several recent studies indicate that high traffic accident rates tend to follow some supervisors wherever they are located, even if they are transferred from one place to another."

The commander can use the strategy of fear. It is certainly a valued deterrent. Gory photographs will give the heaviest-footed hotrod at least momentary pause. He can also use the deterrent of punishment which affects a man's pocketbook and his freedom. He can discourse on experiments to induce insomnia such as the toothpick antidote to highway hypnosis—that modern stupor caused in a long-distance driver by prolonged concentration on the road. A toothpick stuck between the teeth just enough to pain a little has the same helpful effect as a "jiggle bar"—the bump that is now being deliberately placed on supersmooth superhighways to surmount the twin sleep-seducing sirens of Monotony and Motion.

IF the commander can do much, the Army can do more. For the Army, which in order to prevent contagion, would not permit its men with mere measles or mumps to roam the cities, might well reflect upon a quarantine of its inept drivers! Those with a mild pox are protectively segregated. But those with a killing bent are free to indulge their murderous and maiming proclivities.

The Army will not permit the men who fail its driver aptitude tests to wheel its own vehicles even when they are under close command control. But these tested failures—the driver rejects—are let loose on the highways in their own vehicles. And it is precisely these men who suffer and cause the loss of life, limb and property. It is their loss that depletes our ranks. And it is against such future loss that the Army should assume the initiative.

We know the kind of men who are potential killers in cars. We know—to such an extent that insurance companies bet money on it. Nationwide, the

unmarried male driver under twenty-five is the least desirable risk. His premium is high. As for the Army—the soldier in the lower three grades is the high risk and his insurance cost (paradoxically he who can least afford it) is higher.

Of course, the security of insurance is financial, not physical. Insurance is nothing to be smug about. For it doesn't prevent accidents; it only helps to pay for them.

But accidents are an affliction of inexperienced youth. Half of all accidents happen to people under twenty-five and are most likely to occur in the Army's most valued item, the young soldier. The fatal high curve starts at seventeen, peaks at twenty-one, and declines and ends at twenty-eight.

Running through caution lights can be just as dangerous a practice as playing Russian roulette, but is still not so statistically fatal as the practice of following too closely.

And alcohol? If you are the average 150-pound person and you've had two bottles of beer, you've had too much to drive. If you do, and you're involved in an accident, your blood alcohol will register at .05 per cent, which means you're ripe for prosecution.

CIVILIAN experts tackle the traffic toll problem by the standard three-E recipe: Engineering, Education, Enforcement.

For the Army, we favor the Epitome formula. The word EPITOME itself stands for a brief statement of the entire whole. It's a seven-point summing up:

- Enforcement
- Pass and leave control
- Inspection
- Training
- Orientation
- Motivation
- Enthusiasm

THE EPITOME formula can teach many nuggets of wisdom such as a simple method of determining the distance you should keep between your car and the one in front of you. Double speedometer reading and put the answer in yards. If you're doing fifty, then you should keep the length of a football field between you and the car in front. The safety business will teach you the soldierly virtue of "expecting the unexpected." There was the commander proudly congratulating his command for winning its second successive safety plaque, when the first plaque fell off the wall and hit him on the head. In the dispensary he ruefully realized that the incident nailed down the point of being always alert to safety a lot better than the plaque was nailed down.

If you expect the unexpected to happen on the highway, "Your driving permit will expire before you do." And what more do you want?



FOR PRACTICAL IDEAS FOR WAGING THE HOT WAR ON THE HIGHWAYS TURN THE PAGE . . .

HELPFUL IDEAS FOR THE PROMOTION OF SAFE DRIVING

SOME ARE NEW, SOME ARE OLD—ALL ARE WORTH TRYING

Enforcement

The exercise of police power to punish and deter is the sphere of provost marshal and judge advocate.



■ Many installations use traffic advisory courts, organized under the direction of the provost marshal. These courts specialize in traffic cases. Confirmation of sentences is handled personally by the senior commander.

■ In one continental army, the provost marshal developed a courtesy report which enables local policemen to inform commanding officers of violations by members of their commands on the public highways. In three copies, these courtesy reports go to the offender, the CO, and the provost marshal.

■ At one training center, MPs give a "safety summons" to soldiers drinking at roadside taverns. The safety summons courteously advises the recipient that he may—without jeopardy—call the provost marshal for assistance in driving his vehicle back to the post.

■ One installation's provost marshal checked the many privately owned vehicles parked off-post in various hiding spots. Selecting registration plates of one state for a sample test, he listed the numbers. This listing was sent to the commissioner of motor vehicles of that state, who advised the provost marshal that a large number of the plates were issued to vehicles on which various official action or restraint had been taken. State police apprehended many of the offenders.

■ Some installation commanders maintain close liaison with local civil authorities. When a soldier is involved in an off-post accident or serious violation, the post is notified. Such notification results in varied action. The vehicle may be impounded until the individual has completed a driver training course. Or the permit to bring the vehicle on the post is revoked for a limited period—or permanently. At some posts a traffic advisory court metes out appropriate judgment. The importance of close liaison between military and civil authorities is obvious. State or local police will often cooperate in military training programs. At many posts, police representatives have conducted valuable accident prevention training programs and briefings.

References. ¶ Handling of Military Violations of Traffic Laws (AR 385-156). ¶ Revocation of Permits (par. 47, AR 385-55). ¶ Art. 134, UCMJ.

Pass and Leave Control

Commanders have wide latitude in this area



■ One continental army authorized the converting of a 72-hour pass into a 4-day leave, where the individual recognizes that he does not have sufficient time for a safe return and notifies his CO. Military police recognize a 24-hour grace period of those who have notified their home station, requesting conversion of a 72-hour pass to a 4-day leave.

■ Some commanders find success in ordering passes to become effective at noon or earlier and terminating at noon or before nightfall. This precludes the necessity for driving after dark.

■ Military police at many posts recognize the possession of commercial carrier round-trip tickets as a waiver on the distance limitations assigned to passes.

■ One commander set an "accident quota." When the quota was exceeded, no one was allowed to drive a privately owned vehicle during a three-day ban. This was intended to make individuals recognize the seriousness of the problem and their responsibility in it. Although this method was effective in reducing accidents, mass punishment can affect morale adversely.

Reference. ¶ Authorized Absence (par. 46, AR 385-55).

Inspection

Post authorization and cooperation with state inspection requirements.

■ Most posts inspect vehicles prior to authorizing their use on the post. Stickers or plates are normally displayed on the front of the vehicle for identification at the gate. However, frontal identification does not enable vehicle identification during a moving traffic violation.

■ Some states require a semiannual inspection of vehicles. Commanders should cooperate with civil authorities and assure themselves that all military-operated vehicles comply with local inspection requirements.

References. ¶ Maintenance and Repair of Vehicles (par. 10, AR 385-55). ¶ Vehicle and Equipment Operational Record (DD Form 110).

Driver Training

This most important factor must not be overlooked.



■ Many commanders are making the Army Driver Testing Program available to drivers of non-official vehicles. Some commanders have made this program compulsory. For experienced guidance on testing drivers, write to the Transportation Training Command, Fort Eustis, Va.

■ The 10-hour driver training course developed by the Department of the Army is used extensively on a voluntary basis or by decision of traffic advisory courts for the operators of privately owned vehicles. For information on the Department of the Army's training course, write to Safety Branch, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.

■ Representatives from insurance companies and other organizations have conducted safety demonstrations at many posts.

■ One post actively polices the overloading of vehicles.

Reference. ¶ Driver Selection and Training (TM 21-300).

Orientation

A wide variety of programs is available.



■ A number of installations print a billfold-insert card dealing with the responsibility of the individual while off-post. This card is given to all persons going on leave or pass. Rules of the road are printed on one side of the card; on the other, instructions are given with reference to accident reporting.

■ Promotional overprinting or stamping of liberty passes is proving successful at many installations.

■ One installation periodically uses photo handouts of accidents which have involved military personnel off-post. This method emphasizes the "It Could Be You!" theme.

■ The commanding general of one division sends a letter to the family of each soldier assigned to his command. One of the items covered in this letter is an appeal to the soldier's family to help make the soldier's off-post travel and visits as safe as possible.

■ Billboards, mounted at entrances and exits of some posts, warn drivers of off-post traffic situations.

■ Many commanders personally orient members of their commands before permitting them to depart on leave or pass.

■ Some installations conduct safety conferences for unit commanders.

■ At some installations, periodical briefings are held at which all members are informed of fatal accidents which have occurred, with the causes and possible corrective actions.

References. ¶ Department of the Army has developed a wealth of orientation material for use by commanders. For training films, consult your nearest military film library. For publications, write to the Chief of Information and Education, Department of the Army. ¶ Promotional materials are made available at no cost by insurance companies and other organized groups dealing with the national traffic-safety problem.

Motivation

The goal is to have the reckless driver decide that it pays to drive carefully.



■ The headquarters of one army area wrote a command letter to all stations, requesting a brief report of corrective measures. The letter outlined predominant causes and made suggestions as to possible improvement.

■ Two installations have asked funeral directors' associations to write letters to errant drivers. These letters express the funeral director's appreciation for the recklessness and thank the addressee for the potential business.

■ Some posts have initiated an accident prevention contest, including aspects of both on- and off-post operation.

■ Two insurance companies have indicated a willingness to offer advantageous premium rates to trained personnel who, because of age, are in high-risk (expensive rate) categories. This means that a soldier between ages 19 and 26 may obtain a substantial reduction in the insurance premium for his vehicle, provided he can show evidence of successful completion of a recognized driver training course. Such courses normally cost about \$28 for 40 hours of instruction. However, the individual who spends \$28 for such training stands to reclaim \$50 in reduced insurance premiums in the first two years alone!

■ The magnitude of the accident prevention problem varies among installations. Using the same approach at two different installations may not have the same results. Accident prevention is successful only if enterprise and inventiveness are rigorously pursued. Efforts of the Department of the Army help, but effective accident prevention depends almost entirely on local commander's efforts.

Targets of Opportunity

LT. COL. WILLARD L. JONES

TROOPS win battles by using the weapons in their hands against targets that present themselves.

Three men in three wars, Rosser, Armstrong, and Marquat, found unusual situations and directed their troops to "Targets of Opportunity" to win battles. Nowhere in the Army has this ability to use available weapons to overcome the enemy been more clearly demonstrated than in Antiaircraft Artillery from 1861 to 1953.

What do you mean, AAA in 1861?

Washington was sweating in 1861; more from fear of the Confederate Army, so recently successful at Bull Run, than from the August heat. Professor T. S. C. Lowe, with his balloon *Union*, was sent out to observe the disposition of the Confederates threatening the city.

Lowe furnished the target. He arrived at Ball's Cross Roads and his ascent stirred up the Confederate troops who were to use the means at hand to shoot the first antiaircraft artillery action in war.

Artillerymen object to unfriendly observation of their carefully selected positions. The men Lowe observed were the 2d Company of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans. They were located on Munson's Hill, less than two miles southwest of Ball's Cross Roads.

The 1861 company was under the command of young Tom Rosser. A short time before he had been a cadet

Three who shot at what was offered



Maj. Gen. T. L. Rosser, CSA
Prof. Lowe's balloon



Brig. Gen. C. H. Armstrong
V-1's and ground targets



Maj. Gen. W. F. Marquat
Weapons emplacements and caves

at the Military Academy. Before the Civil War was over he wore the stars and wreath of a major general. On this day, 30 August 1861, he was a lieutenant.

Rosser, according to Adjutant Owens' account of the famous battalion's service with Lee, modestly reported the incident thusly: "A few days previously the enemy sent up a large balloon, and our boys fired at it with a rifle-gun. The ball must have passed unpleasantly close, as the balloon was immediately drawn down."

Lowe had a slightly different account, saying in his 1863 report, "The enemy opened their batteries [the Professor was excited and overcounted] on the balloon and several shots passed by it and struck the ground beyond. These shots were the nearest to the U. S. capital that had been fired by the enemy, or have yet been during the war."

Rosser's rifle-gun was a 3-inch piece, sometimes called a six-pounder. His partial failure (he failed to hit the balloon, but Lowe withdrew to Washington) may have been due to his fuzes. He complained, "The inefficiency of the . . . projectiles furnished me a few days since for the rifled guns was again exemplified . . . not one of them exploding."

In World War I American AAA officially came into being, using borrowed French equipment and instructors. The successful American batteries outshot their mentors, getting enemy planes with an average expenditure of 604 rounds.

BY the time World War II came along antiaircraft fire was pretty good. And then a new target appeared, the German V-1, capable of 300 to 450 miles per hour. It flew low, day and night, in all kinds of weather. There was no mortal, vulnerable pilot in the small plane. The very shells fired at it rained scrap metal on the firers, and the downed bird carried a lethal ton of high explosive in its nose. In "Chaotic Command," in the April issue of

Lieutenant Colonel Willard L. Jones, Artillery, who contributed "Minute Men: Placed to Shoot," in the April issue, is on duty in the Office of the Chief of Military History, where he is preparing the AAA volume in the *Army Lineage Book* series after completing one for Field Artillery. He was commissioned in the Infantry from ROTC in 1928, transferred to AAA in 1940, and during World War II served in England and Africa with the 107th AAA Battalion.

**Artillerymen who win shoot
with what they have
at what ever target
presents itself**


ARMY, Colonel Helfers states that the Germans launched 8,696 V-1s against Antwerp, of which 2,183 were knocked down by British and American batteries commanded by Brigadier General Clare H. Armstrong, placed in bands to protect Antwerp. The first V-1 fell to Captain Ring Kleinhesselink's Battery D, 126th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion.

A wing of General Armstrong's "Antwerp X" defense was placed to protect Liege, a defense that was varied by turning the guns on ground targets when the Germans advancing in the Bulge presented a greater threat.

This ground role was prophetic of things to come in Korea. There the Commies, knowing that their ground fire was knocking out more UN planes than their MIGs, rarely ever sent Red planes in range to test American AAA.

The riders on Major General William F. Marquat's "flak wagons," dual 40mm guns and quad .50 machine guns on tracked mounts, and the gunners with his flat-trajectory 90mm guns found other targets. General Marquat wrote: "During one single march . . . elements of the 3d AAA AW Battalion were engaged on sixty-two occasions; fired 5,168 rounds of 40mm ammunition and 29,144 rounds of caliber .50 ammunition, destroyed or neutralized nine machine gun emplacements, two trench mortars, one 45mm antitank gun, two boats and killed 238 enemy soldiers." The flat-trajectory weapons proved especially good for firing into the tunnels and caves the Reds were fond of digging.

THE one thing the gunners of Rosser, Armstrong, and Marquat had in common was that they shot at the targets presented. They built history to kindle the *esprit* of artillerymen who may be shooting at intercontinental ballistic missiles or at skirmishers on the ground. Artillerymen, armed with muzzle loading brass six-pounders or with Nike missiles, shoot at "Targets of Opportunity." Troops win battles with what they have.



Professor Lowe's famous balloon ascending. Young Lieutenant Rosser reported that the balloonist descended hurriedly when shells from his six-pounders came uncomfortably close

Top Soldiers See Weapons of Future

In Closing Session of Association of Army Meeting at Fort Benning

By RAY JENNINGS

Weapons and equipment development will be accelerated on the part of the Army, Gen. James M. Gavin, chief of the Army Staff, said today in the closing session of the annual meeting of the Association of Army Officers at Fort Benning, Ga.

Gen. Gavin, who was accompanied by his wife and two children, said that the Army was now in a position to meet the challenges of the future.

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Will be back in the

FOR NEW IDEAS

BY LLOYD NORMAN

President Eisenhower told his associates in the Army that he was looking for new ideas to meet the challenges of the future.

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Fantastic Weapons Predicted

By Lloyd Norman

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ARMY NEAR ITS AIR GOAL

New Anti-Tank Gun Brings Objective Step Closer

By MARK A. WATSON

The Army is now within reach of its goal of having a new anti-tank gun in the field by the end of the year.

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At its Second Annual Meeting

WASHINGTON

October 25-26-27, 1956

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ARMY 'DOMINANT' BRUCKER ASSERTS

Secretary Initiates Attempt to Stress His Service's Importance in War

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

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Army Discloses Missiles 'Staggering Imagination'

By JOHN A. GILLES

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They Will Bear War's Brunt, Be Ultimate Force For Victory, Says Sec'y Brucker

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

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Army Plans 'Fabulous' New A-Missile Defenses

By DARRELL GARWOOD

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Taylor Hails 7th Army as NATO 'Backbone'

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 (INS).—The 7th Army in Germany today was hailed as the backbone of NATO by Gen. James M. Gavin, chief of the Army Staff.

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A few of the headlines—AUSA made of Its First Annual Meeting at Fort Benning

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THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONS

Decide to Decide

A SQUAD leader thought the names of his men should be painted on their wall lockers. Playing it safe, he consulted his platoon sergeant, who talked it over with the platoon leader, who sought the company commander's approval. The CO, an earnest and cautious soul, made a quick check of regulations. Satisfied that it was not illegal, he asked the permission of his battalion commander.

The battalion commander, who used his staff on important matters, outlined the problem at a staff meeting later in the day.

S4 thought the lockers should show the men's names, and that the squad leader should be commended on his initiative. However, he recommended putting in a work order (to cover ourselves) for the needed materials. Better check with regiment on the size of lettering. A big inspection is coming up, and battalion might be gigged for lack of uniformity.

S3 was equally free in his praise of the squad leader. However, there was the problem of classifying the project. It wasn't on-the-job training, nor maintenance of equipment. The work couldn't be done during duty hours because of classes in leadership, where initiative, decisiveness and other matters would be discussed. Perhaps decontamination training would provide the cover for the job of painting. Just to keep regiment happy, he thought regimental S3 should be asked, so that division could OK.

S1 was sour on the idea. The work would certainly knock the duty roster out of kilter, and no first sergeant would assign men to such work except on an equal basis. Besides, other commanders might copy the idea, and then the entire regiment would follow suit. He thought everyone was aware of the regimental commander's stress on uniformity. Look at what happened to Easy Company when they changed the seating arrangement in their mess hall. Give the squad leader a three-day pass

and tell him to forget it.

S2 jumped to his feet and declared the idea a fine one. Names on lockers will tell us who is in each company, and we can check more closely at inspections. His section needed training in order-of-battle, and this would provide an opportunity to check his rosters with those of the companies. S1 silenced him by tugging at his sleeve, and held a short conference, after which S2 informed the battalion commander that possibly the display of names would violate security. He'd have to check with regiment. He liked the idea, but security is security, you know.

The battalion commander pulled at his silver leaf, reflected, and decided to pass the buck to regiment. At least battalion had looked into the matter; now it was up to higher headquarters.

The battalion commander informed the company commander, who informed the platoon leader, who passed the word down to the platoon sergeant, who told the squad leader to wait until regiment OK'd the project. The squad leader showed signs of having read the leadership manual. "To hell with it. My men can't wait that long for a decision. Forget it." Next month, while being interviewed about reenlistments, the company commander became depressed by the squad leader's lack of interest in the benefits accruing from an Army career. He was baffled by the sergeant's gripe: "If you guys can't decide now what's good for us, what in hell do we have to look for in the future?" Soon after, the sergeant made another decision, and departed into civilian life.

We have spent vast sums to make the Army attractive. Pay increases, better housing, stabilized tours, and many other attractions have come our way. But it is the intangibles that cause our soldiers to leave for jobs that offer neither the future nor the security the Army provides. Pride and prerogative are being taken away while frills are being added. How can a man have pride in himself or his unit, if initiative is being denied him? The split between specialists and noncoms has

placed the NCO in a position where according to the book he has the initiative, but in practice has no authority to make decisions.

Let's restore the noncom's prestige. All our training should be pointed toward the time when we are faced by an enemy who might not give us time to consult among ourselves before acting.

Pride and initiative must go together. Deny them and you have an army incapable of making mistakes because it was never allowed the opportunity.

LT. EDWIN F. O'BRIEN

Keep G4 in the Field

IN these days of rapid change, it has been asserted that the major unit commander's burden would be lightened if the logistics member of his general staff were replaced by a subordinate commander over all logistical elements. The idea is to let the field commander concentrate on tactical problems. A brief look at this proposal will show that it needs a great deal more scrutiny before acceptance.

Logistical decisions—the allotment of ammunition, fuel and transportation—are a continuing part of an army commander's task. So too is his vigorous representation to higher authority for necessary logistical support. The senior commander sees little of the tactical action and makes few immediate decisions. His principal means of influencing the outcome of the battle is by the allocation of means to his units.

Tactics depend more than ever on logistics. Today an army commander in action is like the manager of a giant corporation. He can be really expert in only a few specialized fields, with a general knowledge of most (but probably not all) of the rest. He must have a well-balanced group of loyal assistants, intimately familiar with his personality and methods—men who see problems through his eyes, as extensions of his brain—who help integrate the planning and direction of vast operations. If his G4 is able, the command-

er can better control and use his fighting units and the elements that support them. Frequently sound allocations of means are made because the commander understands and is able to state logistical needs to higher authority.

Are senior commanders derelict if they delegate undue authority in logistics? Proponents of the "support command concept" will say that the logistical commander can also be a staff officer who can still advise and inform. But their solution overlooks the human element.

The conservative estimate by Colonel Burnbrush, the G4, of the ability of a tech service outfit to support a forthcoming attack differs widely from the enthusiastic appraisal of Colonel Fireball, its commander. Burnbrush rates the outfit's capability from the staff officer's viewpoint, while Fireball's views are parochial. What the high commander needs is *objective* staff advice, and G4 is better situated to report clearly and effectively on conditions among subordinate units. If he becomes a commander, his outlook changes.

We saw this in the gulf between ComZ and army group and army commanders in ETO. Technical and administrative service officers of the theater army headquarters were also the special staff of ComZ, a subordinate headquarters. This weakened their effectiveness as staff officers to the theater commander. The "support command concept" was exemplified in ComZ headquarters, which often thought in terms quite different from the tactical headquarters it supported and the supreme headquarters it served. It is conceivable that similar conditions will develop in any command where administrative support operations are separated from tactics, even at division level.

Viewing the problem from another angle, the commander can function without a G4 as easily as he can do without G1, G2 or G3. If the logistician is competent enough to double as a commander, why shouldn't the same arrangement work in the tactical field? Let regimental commanders function as G3 in addition to commanding. Perhaps the recon company commander can be G2. Or we can promote division G3 and make him a tactical commander on the same level as the logistical commander.

One answer might be that because a commander's job is to fight his unit, such matters as supply of ammunition,

fuel and food can be left to a "logistician." Proponents of this solution, however, should remember Field Marshal Montgomery's statement that four fifths of the business of modern war for top-level commanders is in logistics. Much of Montgomery's time and effort were spent in analyzing, considering, deciding, and then acting to meet various logistical ends.

Logistical ineptness led to critical situations on both sides during World War II. The support command concept won't improve the situation.

THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONISTS

Lt. Edwin F. O'Brien, Infantry, was with the AAF in WWII. A 1951 graduate of University of Kansas, he was commissioned that year. Recently he returned from tours in Trieste and Berlin, and is assigned to XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters at Fort Bragg.

Major Thomas J. McDonald, Ordnance Representative at CGSC, has held various positions in research, production and procurement, and from 1942 to 1945 commanded ordnance companies of First and Seventh Armies. He contributed "Outpost on Freedom's Frontier" to the February issue.

Lt. Jack E. Schoonover enlisted in 1947, and served in Japan as a public information specialist. He earned a B.A. in Journalism at Kent (Ohio) State University in 1953, was commissioned in the Infantry as a DMG that year, and transferred to the AGC in 1955. He served as a PIO at Fort Kobbé and Fort Gulick and is now with the USARCIB School at the latter post.

Major Ralph B. Vote, Jr., MPC, has served with the headquarters of four corps and three divisions, in addition to other MP assignments. He is provost marshal of the 3d Armored Division in Germany. His "Command Discipline" was published in the October 1955 issue.

Capt. Preston H. Hibbard, Artillery, entered West Point from the Army and was graduated in 1946. He has been working with guided missiles since 1951 and is currently commanding the firing battery of the 246th FA Missile Battalion at Fort Bliss.

Despite these arguments, and many more which can be projected, strong influences favor adopting the support command concept, with indications that changes should be based on evaluation reports of various exercises. I contend that none of the recent maneuvers constitutes a valid feasibility test of large-scale logistical needs in a future war, for they are not set up to test logistics feasibility.

Let's retain G4, even if we have to make him a deputy chief of staff. Only be sure he is the best man we can find for the job. Keep clear-cut channels between all tech service echelons, and an open channel between the technical staff and *all* of the general staff. The smooth flow of accurate, first-hand information up and down, and its ready availability, are vital to any commander. To a major commander in tomorrow's war they will be incalculably important.

MAJOR THOMAS J. McDONALD

The Freshly-Plucked Word Is More Fragrant

THE press today overflows with glowing accounts of technological advances all indicating the Armed Forces are advancing like never before in history. Our military writing, however, hasn't changed much from that used by our forefathers, particularly in the use of clichés. We professionals cling to our own well-worn vocabulary—a group of words that make for dull, uninteresting reading. Indeed, overuse has resulted in much misuse of words we ought to be more careful about.

I'll give just one good example. We see citations for commendable performance, commendable units, commendable attitudes, and even commendable appearance. Countless substitutes for "commendable" can be found in a pocket thesaurus you can pick up at the drugstore. You'll find outstanding, praiseworthy, exceptional, unequalled, unparalleled, invaluable, or a combination of others to convey the same meaning. Using a word over and over devalues it.

There are other words and phrases that could be retired from the soldier's vocabulary and replaced by fresh synonyms: commensurate, creditable, admirable, courage and determination, appropriate, guidance, well versed, performance of duty, memorable occasion, extraordinary, insurmountable, reflect the highest credit, and other equally hackneyed offerings.

Stereotyped language in commendations and letters of appreciation has become so general that in many cases the citations have little meaning or value to the earners. One commander I know of "dealt" several letters of commendation to his young officers and noncoms in which, except for the names, the wording was identical. If this man felt that his subordinates had performed in a praiseworthy manner, he might have shown his appreciation by individualizing his thank-yous by wording each a little differently. One of the glories of our language is its flexibility.

Among the greatest abusers of the science of semantics are those raters of efficiency reports who have acquired an uncanny art in using a cut-and-dried series of adjectives. Efficiency reports

have described an officer as "a tall, well proportioned individual who is loyal to his unit and senior officers; he is a competent, friendly, courteous officer who leads a wholesome life." Such a description might fit any number of officers. Why not report what the man did and the degree of efficiency he displayed? The performance of Lieutenant Ducrot, platoon leader, might be described something like this:

"Has served as platoon leader for eight months. During that time has been called upon on several occasions to conduct training problems and, generally, to supervise care and maintenance within his company's area.

"S3 inspectors invariably comment favorably on Lieutenant Ducrot's ability to instruct and control his class. I

rate his platoon as the most outstanding in the company in appearance, performance and discipline.

"Tactically, Lieutenant Ducrot's platoon was rated best in the regiment during the annual Army training test, and further, it received the highest score of the company's four platoons in the company-level Army training test.

"In garrison, Lieutenant Ducrot has proved himself a capable mess officer. Through his efforts his dining hall was renovated and messing conditions for both cooks and troops were improved. Consistently registered high scores in regimental mess competition are evidence of the caliber of his work.

"I rate Lieutenant Ducrot as the best all-around officer, in his grade, that I

DO-IT-YOURSELF CAPTAIN DEVISES HANDY AIDS THAT DEFY WIND, RAIN AND SUN

TEACHING a noncom to be a leader in five weeks is a tight squeeze. A great deal of instruction has to be compressed and every second counts. During outdoor instruction many large paper charts on easels are required to demonstrate the tactics of small units. Exposed to wind, sunshine and rain they don't last long. This slows things up. Captain Eugene Ritzo, a tactics instructor, came up with two answers: a magnetic board and a perforated board.

The magnetic board is made from sheets of salvaged tin fastened onto a wooden framework. Its face is painted to represent an aerial photo of a typical terrain area. (Figure 1.) Masonite figures, cut to the shape of conventional signs for weapons and directional fire, have small magnets attached underneath which cause them to adhere firmly to the tin base. The instructor (or a student) in portraying a situation or

demonstrating a solution, can place a figure anywhere and in any position on the board. There is no limit to the number of combinations possible.

The perforated board, used for classes in mine warfare, has more than 30,000 small holes placed a half inch apart. By using nails as "stakes," fences and tracing tapes are easily laid out to scale. (Figure 2.) Miniature antitank and antipersonnel mines, with nails protruding from underneath, can be placed securely anywhere and in any position. Thus the latest techniques in minelaying are quickly and easily demonstrated.

By offering a limitless number of possible visual situations, and at the same time replacing many charts and drawings formerly required, the magnetic board and the perforated board aid both instructors and students.

SP3 SAM A. LUKIANUK



Figure 1. The magnetic board. Captain Ritzo displays top and bottom (magnet attached) of figures cut to represent conventional signs for directional fire.




Figure 2. The perforated board. Fences and tracing tapes are easily laid out to scale. Miniature mines can be placed anywhere.

have known in my nine years of service."

Variety is the spice of life, and variety can be applied to writing as surely as it can to other aspects of day-to-day living. Because a piece of correspondence or a citation hurdles all military obstacles successfully does not necessarily mean that it should be used as a crutch to lean upon in succeeding literary efforts. Let's shun the commonplace and attempt to be original. We owe it to ourselves and to our colleagues.

LT. JACK E. SCHOONOVER

You are There —and Accountable

GOVERNMENT property has always been a headache. Speaking from a small-unit standpoint, why is property reported missing? It may have been stolen; it may have been lost; it never was there. That last reason sounds absurd, but it's true.

Recognizing that the three problems exist, what can we do about them? At times there are no clearly defined lines for determining whether equipment has been lost or stolen. Government property is stolen for resale in the civilian market, for personal use, or for no reason at all. Selling articles that have serial numbers can cause a thief a lot of trouble, because all police agencies are ever on the lookout for stolen public property. That is why all losses of numbered articles—or any significant losses of unnumbered articles—should be reported to the military police. Needless to say, your property book must accurately record all numbered articles. If you can't prove the recovered property belongs to you, it may not be returned.

The MPs immediately investigate alleged losses and try to establish theft or loss. A recent incident shows why investigations are needed, and illustrates the thin line between loss and theft. A battalion that had been constantly in the field reported two walkie-talkies lost about a week apart, under the same conditions. Each time the user had laid the radio on a parked vehicle without telling the driver. The driver, apparently not knowing about the equipment, drove off. When the user finally caught up with him the radio couldn't be found, so it must have fallen off. Everyone searched for it, but no radio turned up.

This occurrence is not an uncommon one in a unit in the field. Equipment

does get lost in this manner. The oddity here was that the same driver was involved in both incidents. This meant nothing to the unit commander, but it was quickly noted by the trained MP investigator. Under questioning, the driver admitting taking both radios, but gave no logical explanation for the thefts. He hid them, moved his vehicle, then joined in the search. During a leave he took the radios to his home in another state where they were recovered.

Government property that is missing but is neither lost nor stolen is usually borrowed for personal use, without receipting for it. It just vanishes, and Army-wide, amounts to a lot of money each year. What happens is something like this. A noncom or a junior officer (and occasionally a senior officer) drops into the supply room and tells the supply sergeant he wants to borrow a couple of blankets for unexpected overnight guests. Or he has to bone up on the use of the compass for tomorrow's class, or he left his flashlight (which he signed for) at home. But he needs one now—for just a couple of hours. Now the supply sergeant, intimate with the people in his company, doesn't bother to ask one of them to sign for commonplace articles. He *knows* they'll be returned. The borrower intends to return the article, but he honestly forgets to do so. The wife finds the article lying around, and being an orderly soul, puts it away, and on each change of station lugs it with the family's belongings to the next post. Years later the article may turn up in some forgotten crate. Many service families don't even know how much Government property is in their homes.

The solution to this one is easy. Tell your supply personnel that *no* one gets anything without signing for it. This will save you a lot of trouble in accounting for property when there is a change of command.

A surprising thing is that very little Government property is honestly lost. What happens? First, there is scrounging by supply people who, by hook or crook, are fanatic in maintaining overages in accountable items. Maybe these overages are liberated from the next-door neighbor; maybe they are found. Anyway, a survey is forwarded by some unit to cover its shortages, when the articles are still in the Government's possession. You could say that they were lost and then found, but the fact remains that they are not

returned to the unit that really lost them. The result is that the losing unit requisitions articles that are within easy reach. One solution is to stage surprise showdown inspections.

Some commanders insist that equipment has been stolen when it has been lost, and here is another case that again shows the thin line separating lost from stolen property. A young officer reported the theft of a field phone. An investigator determined that the phone was in the unit's possession up to the time it had participated in an FTX. The investigator suggested a search of the areas the unit had occupied. The commander considered this a waste of time; his men were pros and didn't lose equipment in the field. He gave the investigator a detail of three men, and after a short search of the unit's first bivouac area, the telephone was found. Always search your area when you move. If you don't the scroungers will, and come away with property left behind.

The last problem is in property that is missing because it was never issued. This comes about through absence of parts of a larger article, or miscounting, or assuming the count to be correct, or taking someone's word that all articles are there.

It's hard to believe that in the Army's present professional group one would sign for articles he didn't receive. But it is done. You sign for a vehicle from which a windshield wiper is missing, and think nothing of it. Just try to turn in that vehicle with the wiper still missing! Or sign for a mechanic's tool set. You haven't time to check the contents against the appropriate manual. But you can be sure that Ordnance is going to find the time before it accepts the set from you. The MPs can't recover what you never had.

The simplest solution to this last one? Your signature belongs to you, so don't let anyone talk you out of it, and don't put it to paper unless you get exactly what you sign for.

LT. COL. RALPH B. VOTE, JR.

Throw-Away Mess Gear

ATOMIC warfare, with its wide dispersal of troops in combat, brings many problems, one of which is the feeding of troops. The assault or C ration is prescribed, and the problem is considered solved. Unfortunately, the advocates of this type of ration usually don't have to eat it every day.

Combat duty is monotonous enough and one of the few highlights is eating. So anything that improves the type of meal served to fighting troops adds immeasurably to morale and combat effectiveness. The Navy, realizing this, serves its best meal before an engagement.

While progress has been made in developing the combat ration, it can never have the appeal of a prepared hot meal. Most commanders know this, and do everything possible to keep the kitchen close by, if only for one hot meal a day. Usually the obstacles to serving hot meals are the time required to set up the kitchen, the risk in concentrating troops in a vulnerable area where they may eat and clean their mess gear, and cleaning and packing the kitchen afterward.

In analyzing the operation of a field kitchen, it is easy to see that the biggest hurdles are the steps required to maintain sanitation. First, we must haul hundreds of gallons of water each day. Then we must carry around bulky immersion heaters, and cans in which to heat water, to say nothing of fuel, soap and brushes. Troops must be brought to the kitchen site, since they have no means of washing their gear if meals are brought to them. Men must line up, dip their gear in hot water before being served, then line up again to wash it after eating. Mess personnel spend several hours cleaning pots and pans and packing before they are ready to move out. It requires less time and effort to cook a meal than it does for cleaning up after serving it.

A logical solution would be the adoption of disposable mess equipment, which could be issued with the food. Disposable mess gear would present less of a logistical problem than the hauling of water and the washing of equipment. Trays or plates could be made of aluminum foil, paper, or plastic. Eating tools could be made of plastic, and aluminum foil inserts for pots and pans would eliminate tedious and often unsanitary scrubbing.

The field kitchen force could be reduced to four or five men, with a 2½-ton truck and a 1½-ton trailer. If necessary, the meal could be cooked on the way up and served by moving through the unit's position. Such a procedure would be especially desirable in widely deployed armored and AA units. The added expense for disposable mess gear would be offset by the number of man-hours saved.

CAPT. PRESTON H. HIBBARD

NATIONAL POLICY AND THE ARMY

(Continued from page 33)

versives.) The practice of subversion has never been popular with Americans, but has long been practiced by others, particularly by European nations, and most particularly in recent years by Communist countries. In these circumstances it may become an acceptable instrument of U. S. national policy; if so, we must learn a great deal more about it, organize for it, and probably integrate it closely with conventional military operations before it can be relied upon.

THE final possibility—that of using modern but entirely conventional forces in holding actions—appears to be at present the most reliable of all, and is in any case necessary to back up other means of defending our worldwide interests. If these interests are worth defending—and world peace is one of them—the United States must be prepared to make the major effort necessary to maintain ground forces designed to fill the requirements as best we can foresee them. There seems to be no cut-rate price on armies, and history shows that they have a fairly permanent role in the social order.

Military History Stands Firm

Traditional concepts of an army's role can be traced back to 1600 B.C., and it is not entirely strange that the requirements of the nuclear age differ little from those of Roman times, or those of 1775 when the Continental Army was organized, or of 1789 when the Department of War was established. A significant feature, which could be elaborated upon in a more thorough historical discussion, is whether an army—or any military force—should be designed primarily to fight total war as the United States is now designing its military forces. "The present preoccupation with preparations for general war," General Ridgway says in

his letter of 27 June 1955, "has limited the military means available for cold war to those which are essentially by-products or left-overs. . . ." In this context, "cold war" refers to such holding actions as those in Korea, Indochina, Malaya and Greece.

Seldom in history has the primary mission of a major military force been the total destruction of an enemy culture (as it would be, under the present concept of TN warfare). The purpose of military campaigns has been rather to gain control of areas and peoples, and to neutralize enemy forces. The wanton destruction of total war can only lead to chaos—just contrary to the principle of control—and its results cannot be termed historical achievements in any positive sense; they serve only to discredit mankind.

History therefore confirms the important and necessary role of the Army to control peoples and to hold ground.

IN summary of the reasoning leading up to this proposition:

¶ Two-sided thermonuclear capability has reached a point where neither side in an international dispute will dare to use it except in desperation or in retaliation.

¶ The Soviet Union has long practiced probing policies which are admirably suited to the exploitation of such an uneasy "balance of terror."

¶ As a world power, the United States needs a practical instrument of national policy which can be used in altercations not involving destruction of national cultures.

¶ Brief discussion of means to fill this void shows that nothing is likely to replace modern army forces, augmented by economic warfare, psychological warfare and, possibly, unconventional warfare.

Some elaboration of these findings is now needed so that practical conclusions may be drawn about the future role of the U. S. Army.

WARFARE UNDER WRAPS

UNLESS, of course, an unwanted total war sets us back a few thousand years, the specter of TN retaliation will from now on dictate extreme caution

and restraint in all military action by major powers. General Maxwell D. Taylor had this in mind when, as the new Army Chief of Staff, he said to

the Armed Services Secretaries (at Quantico in July 1955): "The United States must develop and maintain . . . ready forces which can punish local aggression without broadening the hostilities into total war."

The awkward thing is that no Marquess of Queensberry rules have yet been devised to govern local wars. However, it is fairly clear that a nuclear attack on any Zi city of any major power would bring immediate nuclear retaliation, whereas border incidents in minor satellite nations would not; somewhere between these extremes each side will have a limit of nuclear provocation. These provocation limits will be heavily disguised by bluff—not even the national leaders will know precisely where they lie—and in any conflict both sides will start feeling out the other's limit in order to take full advantage of effective action up to the provocation limit. In much the same way as peacetime national policies have long been limited by the fear of provoking war, the new wartime strategy and tactics will be limited by the fear of provoking nuclear retaliation.

Under such conditions warfare is likely to be limited to revolutions, border wars and cold war holding actions. These indirect means will take the place of the direct attack that no major power will dare to make. Revolutions and border wars between minor nations will be deliberately incited and used as excuses for moving in the forces of a major power. And it is possible that the mere presence of one major power's occupying forces in an area will generally prevent attack by another major power. On this view, the USSR would never attack West Germany while U. S. ground forces are there; she would more likely incite German revolt.

IF major armies ever do engage, it is likely that they will fight with reduced air interdiction support and possibly without many of the advantages of friendly air superiority as presently conceived. Air forces will in most cases be restrained from striking at enemy air bases (one of the best present tactics to gain air superiority), and will be limited to close support of ground troops and to eliminating beachheads, airheads, naval units, extended lines of communication, and other isolated enemy forces.

This is not to say that we will not need air forces, but rather that the

Army probably will not be given the same kind of air support it received in World War II. The concept of using military forces to hold ground in local wars at many widely scattered points calls for another kind of air effort—the use of air to provide long-range strategic mobility to ground forces—namely, airlift and air supply. Only by such means can army units move to a trouble spot (often over great distances), hold ground, defeat enemy forces locally, and move on, the limited mission accomplished. Without strategic mobility our army forces would soon be scattered and "nibbled to death" all over the globe. Air power will be of great importance in protecting such movement and the air-supply system which must follow it.

The Development of Air Logistics for the Army

THESE are expensive aspects of future warfare, and the Army has scarcely started along the long and tedious years of necessary development. To date it has sheared away from air logistics because of the cost, but if it doesn't soon get down to the brass tacks of planning, redesigning, developing and procuring for air supply, the United States will be caught flat-footed in the nuclear era we have done so much to bring on.

It is held by some that air supply will be easier in the nuclear era because tactical atomic weapons give so much greater fire power per ton hauled than conventional artillery. But this small hope, like other hopes of saving money in warfare, seems likely to evaporate; the Army may even have to fight without using any atomic weapons. This may come about in several ways. First, there may be no worthwhile target. Even the smallest atomic weapons are inappropriate for use against scattered bands of irregulars violating a border. Secondly, if we are holding friendly territory invaded by an enemy, atomic weapons may produce widespread unwanted effects among the local non-combatants. (Both of these, of course, can apply to other forms of military action, also.) The third reason is more basic: the use of an atomic weapon in any really effective way—even though tactical—may start a chain of deeper and deeper retaliatory strikes leading inevitably to total TN warfare.

Whether or not a line can be drawn allowing tactical use of atomic weapons without exceeding the enemy's limit

of nuclear provocation remains to be seen. Last year's announcement by Mr. Dulles that we intend to do so may simply be part of the bluff each side is expected to undertake; no one can be certain until the deed is done. But we can be certain that the Army must be prepared to fight without nuclear weapons; that is, to put up with all the expense and the logistical load of non-atomic artillery.

Other Military Uses of Nuclear Energy

WITH such a prospect we should be looking for other ways of exploiting nuclear energy in warfare. One of the most inviting is its use for propulsion of Army vehicles—probably not by means of a nuclear reactor in each truck and jeep, but by portable nuclear-power plants that can recharge vehicles with engines of more convenient size. There are many reversible chemical reactions which can be used to store energy suitable for such use; for instance, electricity from a nuclear reactor could be used to hydrolize water, the resulting hydrogen being used as fuel in a vehicle's engine.

Another non-weapon use is atomic demolition and the forming of barriers with atomic explosions. A third use, which could scarcely incite retaliation, is in antiaircraft missiles used in air defense. And there are a host of more peaceful uses in everything from medicine to preservation of food. It will become more and more important, militarily, to divert research talent from atomic weaponry to such non-weapon developments.

Although we cannot count on atomic weapons in support of the field army, both sides in any future war will undoubtedly be prepared to use them—if the other does, or if it seems that one can get way with it. This means that each side must take all necessary defensive precautions (such as dispersal, heavy fortifications, and so on) just as if atomic weapons were in use. It means that were the force of either side ever caught in such a posture that a few atomic strikes could eliminate it from the action, the other side would probably risk that use.

IF the logistics requirements of the future army seem difficult, the intelligence requirements are overwhelming. They would be serious if they were only concerned with rapid moves to distant trouble spots, with uncertain-

ties of the reception we would get, and with the enemy's posture to atomic attack. Now there must be added the knotty problem of how far we can push the enemy so as to defeat him locally in an expeditious manner and yet not incite nuclear retaliation. As army commanders and national leaders begin to face these problems they will surely demand vast improvements and expansion of the intelligence services. Fortunately there are numerous technical developments yet to be exploited in intelligence—electronic storage and sorting of data, for example. For purposes of divining enemy intentions, we should exploit probing tactics as the USSR does, using military action as a controlled scientific experiment to determine enemy reactions.

The Need for Allies in Future Wars

The Army will not fight alone. Not only will it need support and cooperation from the other services, but in the complex type of local warfare we now foresee, allies will be of great importance. This has been true in the past, but possibly for different reasons; in the near future the industrial power of allies will add little to ours, and small allied nations may serve far more valuably in local wars as sources of intelligence, as sources of manpower, as bases for mobile forces, and to assist in carrying out economic and psychological warfare. The larger allied nations may have most to offer in research and technological potential—which we should most certainly exploit to boost our military innovation rate. However, it is already apparent that many possible allies are becoming less interested in alliances with either of the principals of the "balance of terror." It is all too clear to them that after an exchange of TN blows it will be the neutrals who will literally inherit the earth. From the point of view of maintaining our alliances, therefore, it is wise to seek ways to shun total war.

It would be futile to extend these inferences from the present state of affairs too far into the future. No one need claim powers of prediction in sketching the concepts of warfare in the nuclear age outlined above—the pattern is showing up daily in current border warfare in the Near East and Far East. The requirements for mobile ground forces exist today, and two major powers now have the capability for

TN destruction. But there is a further change imminent: the development of TN capability by other nations. This will soon come about naturally for Great Britain (and possibly other major Western powers) without much effect on the two-sided nature of the balance of terror. It may also happen that India and other powers not presently aligned with the United States or the USSR develop their own atomic weapons. And finally, as fissionable material becomes more plentiful and more wide-

ly used, numerous small powers may come up with their own stockpiles of nuclear weapons, some possibly handed out by the major powers for political value. One is inclined to hope that "safety in numbers" will apply to such a complex situation, but unfortunately the chance of irresponsible use will most certainly increase. This may augment rather than diminish the already heavy responsibilities of the United States as the keeper of international peace.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE FUTURE

THE conclusions of this discussion, then, concern the size, nature, activities, and support requirements of the future United States Army. They are:

¶ Since limited warfare has become the only practical instrument of national policy, the role of the Army in limited warfare retains its long-standing historical importance.

¶ In order to undertake limited warfare at a variety of points without maintaining large forces overseas continuously, the Army must be able to move elements rapidly to any trouble spot; this implies airlift and air supply, or some other means of avoiding long delays in supply.

¶ The Army should not count on strategic or interdiction air support in local warfare, and should not rely heavily on air reconnaissance or close air support, since it may be impossible to maintain air superiority over the front in a limited war.

¶ The Army must have the capability and means to use atomic weapons tactically, but it must be prepared to fight without such support in case the enemy forces an embargo on atomic weapons by the threat of total TN warfare. For this reason, other uses of atomic energy (for example, for demolitions, air defense, power and so on) should be studied for possible exploitation in limited warfare.

¶ The U. S. atomic stockpile must include sufficient TN weapons to cripple any nation or combination of nations known to have TN stockpiles of their own. Further stockpiling of TN weapons is unnecessary and wasteful; they cannot be used in limited wars, and the fissile material should be used for small, tactical weapons and other practical purposes.

¶ The intelligence service available to the nation and the Army must be adequate for military operations in any

part of the world at the right time, and for avoiding the possibility of inciting TN warfare.

¶ The Army must avoid committing forces so scattered that it can be "nibbled to death," and yet must be able to conduct several small campaigns at once, if required.

¶ The Army's capabilities must not be limited to any one type of terrain, weather condition, or other circumstance. Its most likely theaters of operation are remote from the continental United States, and its limited missions may include anything from occupying an island in the Arctic to cleaning up bandits in a tropical jungle.

¶ The Army should study carefully the possible uses of guerrilla warfare and similar modes of operation that are consistent with our national aims and concepts of morality. Such activities should be closely integrated with conventional Army operations and are therefore appropriate for Army control.

¶ An increasing proportion of the Army's budget (and the budgets of the other services) should be devoted to research and development—on tactics and organization as well as on weapons and equipment—in order to produce military innovations more rapidly than any potential enemy.

¶ The size of the Army (and the Army's budget) capable of filling these broadened requirements must be determined by study of possible local trouble spots on the international scene such as the Far and Middle East.

It is fortunate that our financial ability to maintain a suitable army is still increasing, since it is likely that the requirement for the Army will continue to expand as the United States exercises the influence appropriate to its present position—the influence needed to maintain an orderly world without destroying it.

THE MONTH'S READING

Train and Equip Them Now

COL. GEORGE REINHARDT
Address, Mission, Organization and
Tactics of the Army
Riverside Conference,
Institute of World Affairs
13 December 1955

Accepting the American tradition that manpower is the most costly way to accomplish work, we must not rush headlong to the opposite extreme. Not even "automation" expects equipment to function without men. More accomplished-per-man is the goal—not elimination of man.

Technology's miracles cannot restore the small, professional fighting force that vanished before the nation-in-arms concept as the French Revolution revived tribal modes of warfare. For the past century and a half, technology has continued to whittle away the distinctions between civilian and soldier. The H-bomb puts every inhabitant of a nation "at risk," no less than combat troops.

A similar progression has demanded larger, more costly military establishments with every technological breakthrough. Forty years ago the machine gun replaced the fire power of scores of riflemen, but armies grew larger, not smaller . . . we can expect atomic-age armies to be bigger and more costly.

Gordon Dean warned us: "Production lines do not function under a rain of atomic bombs." We will fight an atomic war—if one be forced upon us—with the equipment and trained men available when it starts. Training these men, providing them the right equipment, is *our job today*.

Success in Battle

GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Soldier
Harper & Brothers, 1956

There is one phrase, I think, that should be engraved on the heart of every soldier and every civilian in a position of control over the military.

That phrase is "Success in Battle."

The sole role of any army, the sole criterion by which it will be judged by history, is embodied in these words. An army is one thing only—a fighting organization. And every element which makes up that organization, from the front-line rifle platoon to the great rear-echelon components, must serve one purpose only—the achievement of victory in war.

But what constitutes a winning army?

It is an army which knows that its leadership, its training, and its weapons, are the best the country can produce. It is an army sure of the confidence of the people from which it comes, sure of its place in the nation's heart, proud of its strength, confident of its ability to meet any warlike

challenge, small or great, wherever that challenge may arise.

It is an army loyal to its own ideals; an army which resents any disparagement of its leaders, and deplores and opposes the continuing trend to strip from the military career those intangible items of which pride and self-respect and tradition and *esprit* are made.

The Atomic Blitz Will Not Deter or Win

ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD
Testimony before House Armed Services Committee
Week of 17 October 1949

I do not believe that the threat of atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent to a war, or that it will win a war. I do not believe that the atomic blitz theory is generally accepted by military men. . . .

Development in the Air Force of planes suitable for tactical and fighter missions has suffered by overemphasis on the heavy bomber. This is apparent by inspecting the proportions for each category—not in terms of numbers of groups and planes—but in terms of money, men and materials. Less than six per cent of Air Force Research and Development funds is earmarked for tactical and fighter types. The lack of adequate fighters may have grave consequences for future security of our bases and our homeland. It is not only wasteful, but may be disastrous to spend our scarce budget dollars on large expensive planes dedicated to an unsound theory of war.

The unusual procedures used to push the B-36 program to its present status were not justified. They undermine all unification; they prevent progress toward mutual trust, understanding and unified planning; they short-cut the vital and proven procedures developed through experience for safeguarding the security of our country.

Any Service must be permitted to bring an experimental weapon through the development, test and evaluation stages. On the other hand, any Service must be prevented from procuring any weapon in quantity until it has passed these stages.

We should develop weapons capable of maximum effectiveness from all land and sea areas which we can control. We should push research and development of weapons to this end. We should not, however, base our war plans on such weapons, nor should we procure them in quantity, until they are proven. Our defense budget should not be used for unproven weapons. . . .

Strategic bombing should be a primary role of the Air Force. However, the United States is not sound in relying on the so-called "strategic bombing concept" to its present extent. This concept is symbolized by the B-36 delivering the atom blitz. In the minds of our citizens this fallacious concept promises a short cut to victory. Our citizens must realize that its military leaders cannot make this promise—

that there is no short cut, no cheap, no easy way to win a war. We must realize that the best way to win a future war is to prevent it. We must realize that the threat of instant atomic retaliation will not prevent it, and may even invite it. We must realize that we cannot gamble that the atom blitz of annihilation will even win a war. We must realize if war is forced upon us, we must win it, and win it in such a way that it can be followed by a stable, livable peace.

Two Kinds of Paper-Shufflers

WILLIAM T. R. FOX
*The Representation of the United States Abroad
The American Assembly, Graduate School
of Business, Columbia University, 1956*

The civilian is sometimes said to be a horizontal paper-shuffler, while the soldier is a vertical paper-shuffler. The soldier gives orders and takes orders; he asks for advice and receives recommendations from his subordinates and he gives advice and makes recommendations to his superiors. The civilian, on the other hand, may be less conscious of hierarchy and lines of authority. In his horizontal consultations he may, in the eyes of his military colleagues, even verge on being indiscreet.

The military man is likely to want to base all his plans on the most serious contingency, while the civilian will want to "keep the future open" and delay as long as possible a choice which involves acceptance of the most serious contingency as the only one for which plans should be made.

Bullets Fly through the Wild Blue

NOW HEAR THIS
*Published by Navy League of the U. S.
April 1956*

For a long time the Army has contended that the mobility of airborne troops has been limited because of the lagging program of procurement of transport type aircraft by the Air Force. However, all such representations by the Army have been met with a solid opposition from the Air Force, which is jealous of its asserted right to conduct all aerial phases of the national defense. The Air Force has countered this Army proposal with a proposal that it be assigned responsibility for training Army helicopter pilots, who are now being trained by the Army itself.

This dog-in-the-manger attitude of the Air Force would seem to reflect a complete lack of understanding as to the essential nature of an aircraft. The airplane is not a weapon, it is merely the platform from which a weapon is launched. The same is true of a tank or of a truck converted to a weapons carrier. It would be just as consistent for the Army to say that because it is primarily responsible for the conduct of warfare on the ground, therefore it has the sole right to operate all trucks and consequently the Air Force should be denied availability to trucks and training of drivers unless furnished by the Army. Likewise, the Army might claim that machine guns are its sole prerogative because they were originally developed for use by

land forces. This specious argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, could lead to an attempt by the Air Force to exclude other services from the guided or ballistic missile field just because they fly through the air. But then, so does a 5-, a 6- or an 8-inch shell. So does a machine-gun bullet. Does the Air Force intend to pre-empt those fields?

Horrors of War

Robert V. Bruce
*Lincoln and the Tools of War
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956*

Throughout the unhappy negotiations which trapped Abraham Lincoln into giving [Simon] Cameron the War Department, the aspirant seems to have regarded his objective less as an opportunity for patriotic service than as the deepest, fattest and fullest pork barrel within his reach at the time. Much of the new Secretary's attention during his first six weeks in office apparently went to rewarding past political services and making sure of future ones. His course, it must be said, had the incidental virtue of clearing out rebel sympathizers. So charitable was the Secretary to fellow Pennsylvanians that by mid-April the War Department had lost its traditional Southern character and resembled an outpost of Harrisburg. But the command of the Ordnance Bureau was not a matter of patronage; and though Cameron mended his political fences with admirable foresight, he had less thought for his duty to the nation.

At length, in the third week of April 1861, with Sumter fallen, Virginia out of the Union and most jobs disposed of, Simon Cameron's attention swung round to the two large facts that a Civil War had begun and that he was Secretary of War. On April 22 the comfort-loving functionaries of the War Department were startled and dismayed by an order from the Secretary: they were to keep the various bureaus open for business till five o'clock in the afternoon. This was war!

Occupational Hazard

BRIG. GEN. HARRY H. SEMMES
*Portrait of Patton
Appleton-Century-Crafts, Inc., 1955*

On his departure from his beloved 2d Armored Division, one of [Patton's] daughters gave a party for him at his quarters. A number of officers of the 2d Armored Division and their wives gathered here after the Easter morning service. Some of his old officers of World War I had found out about the occasion and sent a silver cigarette box upon which their signatures were engraved together with this message: *To a Gallant Soldier whose friendship we cherish. May you go on to further deeds of valor in your country's service.*

When handed the cigarette box, he turned to a window in the room with his back to the crowd. One of the wives didn't understand what the situation was, and approached him to find that there were tears running down his face and he was unable to control himself.

This occurred just about three or four minutes after he had raised his glass of champagne and said: "Here's to the wives. My, what pretty widows you're going to make!"

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Dedicated Battlefield Leader

SOLDIER: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway
By General Matthew B. Ridgway, as told to
Harold H. Martin
Harper & Brothers, 1956
371 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

General Ridgway's *Saturday Evening Post* articles, "My Battles in War and Peace," ran to a total of about 30,000 words and, on the evidence of the resultant letters to the editor, were clearly controversial. His biography of 125,000 words naturally gives a broader picture of an "Army brat" who rose to the Army's highest position. Along the way he had an almost incredible variety of experiences: semi-diplomatic assignments in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, China, and the Philippines; a trip through Central America by bull cart, canoe, mule back, bus and train; a parachute drop into Normandy in the darkness of the night before D-day; personal combat, armed with a Springfield rifle, when he was a corps commander; the sudden assignment to command Eighth Army in Korea; and later the burdens of supreme command, first in the Far East and then in Europe.

Both the articles and the book are written in the first person, but are "as told to" Harold H. Martin. Mr. Martin, an associate editor of *The Saturday Evening Post*, is, of course, an expert at this sort of thing. Presumably the results are smoother texts than General Ridgway could have produced, but one wonders if a little of the general's personality may not have been lost in the process. Some minor errors probably also come from the dual authorship. Second lieutenants didn't wear gold bars in the spring of 1917, for example, and 2200 hours on 5 June 1944 wasn't twelve hours before H-hour.

Undimmed is the picture of a dedicated, competent, battlefield leader. Matthew Ridgway was born at Fort Monroe, the son of Colonel Thomas Ridgway. The general pays high tribute to him: "I recall the infinite patience of my wonderful father. He never seemed to be too tired or too busy to help me, particularly in math, in which he as an artilleryman was necessarily gifted, and in which I was exceptionally ill informed." As a

candidate for West Point, young Ridgway achieved an improvement from being "exceptionally ill informed" to the point where he scored a 96 in math in the competitive examinations for a Presidential appointment.

He also pays tribute to General Frank McCoy. Ridgway was a thirty-three-year-old company commander in the 9th Infantry and also training for the pentathlon squad for the 1928 Olympic games when McCoy asked him to go to Nicaragua. McCoy was to head a mission there to supervise a free election. Ridgway speaks of the calm self-assurance, the absolute honesty and integrity with which General McCoy handled his assignment and adds: "I have, perhaps unconsciously, sought to model myself on him. By any standard, of any people, in any age, he was a great man."

Ridgway had earlier served in China under George Marshall, then a lieutenant colonel, and says that General Marshall's "friendship and faith in me in later years were to have a profound effect on my career." When war came in 1941, Ridgway was a colonel on the War Department General Staff and "had never actually commanded a unit larger than a rifle company, and, for a brief period, an infantry battalion." This pattern of progress to high command by the staff

and school route was typical in the case of many officers who reached high command in the World War II period. It would be unfortunate if the young officers of today were to conclude that that is the route to be followed. In the period between the two world wars, the Army was reduced for a considerable time to not much more than 100,000 men, many employed in overhead and other non-troop duties. The result was little opportunity for duty with troops; and when an outstanding young officer did get troop duty he was often appointed to a staff job. Some of these officers never did learn to command. Those who did will in most cases testify that command in battle would have been easier if they had had experience in handling troops at all levels from the platoon on up.

If lack of command experience handicapped General Ridgway when he became a brigadier in the 82d Division it didn't trouble him for long. Perhaps a vital factor was his desire for command duty. He tells of going to General Walter Bedell Smith, then General Marshall's staff secretary, every day and asking, in reference to his hopes for assignment to troops, "Any word?" and getting the answer one day: "Yes. This morning General Marshall said, and I quote, 'Tell Ridgway I'm tired of seeing him hang-



Ridgway, the Chief of Staff (left), testifying before Congress, and Ridgway, the field soldier (right), in Italy in 1943

ing around every time my door opens. When I have something for him, I'll send for him."

In light of Ridgway's later efforts, when he became Chief of Staff, to instill more of a family feeling and *esprit de corps* in combat units by means of the Gyroscopic and other innovations, it is significant that, after combat experience in North Africa and Sicily, he left behind in England at the time of the Normandy invasion a small, carefully selected cadre from his division to handle replacements for the expected casualties in each regiment and battalion: "My purpose was to indoctrinate each new man, not only with the proud spirit of the division as a whole, but with the spirit of each smaller unit which was then in combat."

He didn't think that toughness was indicated by lack of discipline and took active measures to get the cocky paratroopers of his division back into line when they tended to get out of hand after their Normandy experience. Incidentally he does not pull his punches in his opinion of the Doolittle board's report: "It dangerously undermined that priceless element—the officer-enlisted man relationship based on mutual respect—that had been built up over generations of service together. . . . The purpose of the report, of course, was to create a more 'democratic' Army. Its effect was to undermine discipline."

Talented British Amateur

THE BIG LIE

By Colonel John Baker White
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955
235 Pages; Illustrated; \$4.00

Reviewed by

LT. COL. PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

This delightful book will confuse the American military reader as much as it will entertain him. American soldiers who have themselves dealt with psychological warfare will be astonished at the amateurish, unsystematic mixture of all sorts of unrelated operations—deception, commando work, espionage, counterespionage, military propaganda, and so on—when the book purports to be a study of the Big Lie. As a definition of psychological warfare, "the big lie" represents the strictly teen-age or merit badge approach to the problem of modern war. The book is that of a superb amateur, and it will be a dull war which is composed of all professionals and no amateurs. The author ignores twenty years' development of doctrine in military thinking and produces an autobiographical and anecdotal account of how he and his British friends hot-footed the Nazis.

The story of the faked corpse is told for the tenth time, but other war episodes are told for the first time—including a description of "the burning water." The

chapters are true, thrilling stories, each pretty complete in itself. For first-class bedside reading, or as a present for blood-thirsty maiden aunts, this book is a delight. As military doctrine, it belongs off the shelf of every military school in the country. About two months' intensive tutoring could, in the average case, undo the distorted staff-level thinking with which this book would indoctrinate the intelligent but uncritical American officer who read the book without realizing what it was—the work of the talented British amateur.

German Armor

PANZER BATTLES

By Maj. Gen. F. W. von Mellenthin
University of Oklahoma Press, 1956
383 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT W. GROW

Panzer Battles is written by a German General Staff officer who, a captain on a corps staff at the outbreak of the Polish campaign in 1939, became a major general, chief of staff of an army group in 1944. His assignments led him from Po-

land to France, the Balkans, North Africa, Russia and back to France. He served intimately with many of the top German commanders, and his duty required a general knowledge of the progress of operations in all theaters in addition to the details in his own area. Thus General Mellenthin is well qualified from personal experience to present a close-up picture.

Though the book does not presume to be a comprehensive history of World War II, the campaigns described are among the most decisive. General Mellenthin is a great admirer of Guderian and quotes him frequently. However, he draws background and conclusions from a wide variety of recognized sources, both Allied and German. The action is presented from the German viewpoint and is pertinent to that extent. Major German failures are attributed to Hitler, but subordinates are not absolved.

Panzer Battles is both a readable book for the layman and a source of study for the military man. Sketch maps are clear and inserted to preclude unnecessary page-turning. The illustrations by the German signal corps are mostly close-ups of equipment on the battlefield. In themselves they show the evolution of armor during the war. General Mellenthin's analysis of mobile ground combat seems like an echo from Fort Knox in the thirties, where we had developed the ideas and experimented on a small scale while the Germans were able to build a massive combat-ready force.

Mellenthin repeatedly hammers home the theme that armor must operate in large units and that tanks must be accompanied by equally mobile and properly armored infantry, artillery and engineers, and supported by equally mobile supply and service units. He deplores any tying of armor to infantry. He cites the failure of our Third Army in Lorraine in 1944 to form an armored corps of the armored divisions available to it at that time. He points out the German errors in wasting time and personnel against non-essential isolated fortress areas and calls attention to the American attack on Metz when the troops so employed could have been far more effective in piercing the weak front of German Army Group G. He believes that better Allied application of mobile warfare in the fall of 1944 should have ended the conflict then.

Mellenthin's analyses look to the future and the use of nuclear weapons. The most interesting as well as the most useful comments are those covering the campaign in the east, the Red Army, its composition and tactics. He is careful to point out the great strides made by the Soviets during the war and forecasts continued improvement in tactics and technique. For the American reader these chapters are invaluable.

THE MONTH'S REVIEWERS

Maj. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley, Retired, has contributed many articles and reviews to *ARMY* and its predecessors. During World War II he commanded the 4th Infantry Division.

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow, Retired, has had long service with armored units. During World War II he commanded the 6th Armored Division.

Brig. Gen. William B. Bunker is a regular contributor of articles and book reviews. He is CG of the Transportation Supply and Maintenance Command in St. Louis.

Dr. James D. Atkinson, who wrote "Pearl Harbor: America's Maginot Line?" in the January issue, also contributes "The Single-Idea Fallacy" in this issue.


Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, Retired, a former Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, is contributing editor to *ARMY*.

Col. Charles A. H. Thomson, Infantry, USAR, on the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington, is a member of the Executive Council of AUSA.

Major Orville C. Shirey, Infantry, USAR, served in World War II with the 442d RCT, and is in the advertising business in Washington.

Lt. Col. Paul M. A. Linebarger, MI, USAR, is on the staff of The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and is a consultant on psywar to the Army.

Col. A. A. Gunner is the pseudonym of an artilleryman of long service.



SOLDIER

THE MEMOIRS OF

Matthew B. Ridgway

**"bristles with
integrity,
pugnacity and
bayonet thrusts
of humor."**

—New York Times

"Ridgway during the last five years has occupied more posts of extreme responsibility than any other American. . . . Even in the early years he drew romantic assignments. He has zest for high place and high adventure. Given such a life to write about, it is almost impossible to miss. Anyone who enjoys a tale of high adventure told freely should eat it up."

—N. Y. Times Book Review

"A singularly readable memoir . . . a fascinating account of a great soldier's development."

—N. Y. Herald Tribune Book Review

As told to **HAROLD H. MARTIN**
Foreword by General of the Army
GEORGE C. MARSHALL

Illustrated. \$5.00

HARPER & BROTHERS

The author places undue emphasis on "good tank country." While it is true that some terrain favors armored movement more than others, mobility is a relative term, and well-trained armor can and did fight successfully over difficult terrain. The book includes many examples and American experience confirms it.

For the armor officer his brief comparison of German and Soviet tanks as they developed during the war is of interest, although we may not concur. His analysis of withdrawal problems is worthy of study. Complaining against an order to attack the Kiev bridgehead frontally at its strongest point, he says: "I stress the point because the history of armored warfare—and of cavalry warfare before that—shows that the great prizes can only be won by speed, daring and maneuver. The 'play safe' school of generals was all very well on the Western Front in 1914-18 but it is out of place in this age of the gasoline engine and the airplane." A summary of Soviet doctrine and its probable future application includes: "Today any realistic plan for European defense must visualize that the air fleets and tank armies of the Soviet Union will throw themselves upon us with a velocity and fury far eclipsing any Blitzkrieg of World War II. Europe is threatened by a torrent of steel, controlled by men whose spiritual outlook is not far removed from that of Attila or Genghis Khan."

Panzer Battles is a splendid contribution to the record of World War II. It is a particularly valuable study for potential staff officers and commanders of large units.

A Middle Ground

THE MEANING OF YALTA: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power
By John L. Snell (editor), Forrest C. Pogue, Charles F. Delzell and George A. Lensen
Louisiana State University Press, 1956
239 Pages; \$3.75

Reviewed by

DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON

The authors of this book are distinguished historians who are well known in the field of military history. Forrest C. Pogue, for example, is the author of *The Supreme Command*. They have made use of the page proofs of the State Department's foreign relations volume entitled *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, and have also consulted a wide range of memoirs and secondary works in presenting the story of Yalta.

The authors call attention to President Roosevelt's and the Department of State's interest in postwar planning and the creation of some kind of world organization for keeping the peace. As they state, "great emphasis was also placed on the need for Russian collaboration in the

establishment of the proposed world organization."

It would seem that President Roosevelt was unduly impressed with the idea that Soviet cooperation was imperative and hence was inclined to be more sweetly reasonable with Stalin than would otherwise have been the case. The book also points out that "the State Department's Subcommittee on Political Problems declared in a report of January, 1943, that 'Russian co-operation on the principal international problems was essential and must be obtained.'" It can well be argued that this underscores one of the defects in American national policy—that is, the tendency to consider the armed forces as being important advisors on policy only when a war is in progress. This tendency has subordinated the role of the military in the diplomatic and political maneuvering which often precedes a war, dumps impossible situations in the hands of the military when a war begins, and then ends by blandly concluding that postwar planning should proceed with the military relegated, once more, to a position of minor importance. While all the documents are not yet available for examination by scholars, it may well be that the history of World War II will reveal that the military and naval leaders had a far sounder concept of the nature of future world politics than the diplomats.

In the final chapter, entitled "Yalta in Retrospect," the statement is made that "after 1952 Eisenhower and Dulles faced the same alternatives which confronted Roosevelt and Stettinius in 1945: The Russians must be lived with, or they must be fought." This would seem to present a case for only two alternatives: All-out war or mutual cooperation. The course of world politics from the October Revolution of 1917 shows that the Russians need not be "lived with" nor, on the other hand, need an all-out war be waged against them. Living with the Soviets certainly means living dangerously, for while Stalinism is going out the window, Leninism is coming in through the door, and the current official "line" announced on the anniversary of the Revolution in 1955 and echoed at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, is that "the twentieth century is a century of the triumph of socialism and communism." To prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining an overwhelming power position in the world the United States need not wage an all-out war. Other courses of action, however, may be necessary in the national interest, and these range all the way from various measures of unconventional warfare such as propaganda, economic warfare, and the like, down to various types of limited warfare. Above all, it would seem well to avoid the idea that our courses of action are limited, for noth-

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By Lt. Col. Paul M. A. Linebarger, USAR



The war for men's minds is a good deal more complicated than our friend with the ink-thrower believes. It stretches from the front lines wherever men fight, to the highest levels of government. It is going on right now, with you as one of its targets. This revised edition of **PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE** will help you to understand the techniques and purposes of psychological warfare—how the enemy uses it and how we use it. It will help you as a commander and staff officer at any level to understand the military purposes of psychological warfare and to take advantage of the techniques available to you. Colonel Linebarger is one of the recognized authorities in this field. His book will give you practical, working knowledge of one of the most vital sciences the soldier must understand.

\$6.00

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

By Major Russell A. Gugeler



Here is the war in Korea—at the fighting level. These accounts of outstanding small-unit actions were written by a trained soldier-observer and historian from on-the-spot observations and interviews with the men who did the fighting. From Major Gugeler's vantage point, you can see good leadership and bad, brilliant decisions and stupid ones—as they were made.

Soundly researched and brilliantly written, this is a book that every troop leader of a combat unit owes it to himself to read. Officers and NCOs alike can profit from the lessons it teaches.

\$5.00

COMBAT SUPPORT IN KOREA

By Capt. John G. Westover



Medics, engineers and signalmen; ordnance, quartermaster, chemical and transportation corps troops—all are necessary if the front-line soldier is to accomplish his mission. The Korean war put a severe strain on all combat support units. Installations had to move fast and often; men and machines were taxed to the limit of endurance; it took courage and ingenuity to get supplies through to combat troops.

These post-battle interviews show clearly the hazards combat support units face in modern war—and how ingenious and courageous people went about solving them.

\$5.00

COMBAT FORCES BOOK SERVICE

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Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 72 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

BRAINWASHING: The Story of Men Who Defied it. By Edward Hunter. Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956. 310 pages; \$3.75. A study of a phenomenon that is important to every American soldier, considering the nature of our enemy. Hunter, the author of *Brainwashing in Red China*, tells the secret of resisting—a mind closed to Communism, and occupied with constructive thoughts. Any compromise with the brainwashers, any belief that the Communists can be right in any particular, is fatal. This is *must* reading.

CAPTAIN'S BRIDE, GENERAL'S LADY. By Mrs. Mark Clark. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. 278 Pages; Illustrated; \$5.95. A devoted wife's story of life with a famous soldier. A revealing story of the prewar Army, of dependents in the lower ranks, and of how success need not spoil genuine people. Good reading for any officer's wife.

CIVIL WAR ON WESTERN WATERS. By Fletcher Pratt. Henry Holt & Company, 1956. 255 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$3.50. The naval war on the Mississippi and tributaries, from the conception of the Confederate and Union river navies to the surrender of the ironclad *CSS Missouri*, last to fly the Stars and Bars on western waters.

EISENHOWER THE PRESIDENT. By Merlo J. Pusey. The Macmillan Company, 1956. 300 Pages; Index; \$3.75. A sympathetic review of President Eisenhower's record; almost a campaign document, but with valuable information and provocative estimates.

GESTAPO: Instrument of Tyranny. By Edward Crankshaw. The Viking Press, 1956. 275 Pages; Index; \$5.75. A record for posterity of a police organization that specialized in torture and mass murder. Strong reading, but the subject is worthy of more complete treatment if this is meant to be definitive.

THE GIRL HE LEFT BEHIND [or, All

Quiet in the Third Platoon]. By Marion Hargrove. The Viking Press, 1956. 191 Pages; \$2.95. Hargrove's military humor leaves your quickie reviewer cold, but some might like it. This is about the newest new Army and the newest new soldier, the two-year selectee. A novel, it says on the jacket.

GRAY FOX: Robert E. Lee and the Civil War. By Burke Davis. Rinehart & Company, 1956. 466 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00. Lee's Civil War story with excellent accounts of all the principal battles and a fine character study of the wartime general. Accurate condensed history written by a Southerner with sympathetic understanding but without prejudice.

THE GROWTH OF A NATION: A Pictorial Review of the United States of America from Colonial Days to the Present. By Emerson M. Brooks. E. P. Dutton & Company, 1956. 320 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.95. A grouping of disconnected pictures and well-written text, designed to give the impression of history rather than an understanding of how America grew. This is hitting the high spots, but it is an attractive effort to offer the flavor of history.

GUN DIGEST TREASURY. Edited by John T. Amber. The Gun Digest Company, 1956. 384 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50 in heavy paper binding, \$5.00 in library binding. For those gun bugs who don't save their copies of *Gun Digest*, but would like to refer to the better material in that popular annual. No two fans will agree on the choice of material, but there is enough here for many a winter evening.

THE HOOVER REPORT, 1953-55: What it Means to You as Citizen and Taxpayer. By Neil MacNeil and Harold W. Metz. The Macmillan Company, 1956. 344 Pages; Index; \$6.00. The Research Director and Information Director of the second Hoover Commission give a general account of its work—surveying paper-

work and real estate and business operations of the Department of Defense.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC REASONING. By Marshall A. Robinson and others. The Brookings Institution, 1956. 335 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.00. Not a full review of economics, but a way of thinking about economic issues. Down-to-earth training in how to judge the facts of government, debts, unions and the other phenomena of the age. Objective; simple without being condescending.

NAPOLEON I: A Great Life in Brief. By Albert Guerard. Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. 207 Pages; Index; \$2.50. A very short biography that should be satisfactory for the casual reader but disappointing to the soldier who desires more about a great military leader.

THE RIGHT TO KNOW. By Kent Cooper. Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956. 335 Pages; Index; \$4.00. The former president of the Associated Press continues his fight against censorship of news. He covers the national as well as the international field; the book is a call for vigilance by the people of the world.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS. By Roger Hilsman. The Free Press, 1956. 187 Pages; Index; \$4.00. A fairly technical study of a problem that will affect our national survival, and that is above petty politics. The average layman knows there is a CIA, but there his knowledge stops. Mr. Hilsman offers an attempt at an objective analysis on the level of organization and utilization.

THE USA IN COLOR. By the Editors of *Holiday*. Doubleday & Company, 1956. 192 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50. This is one you can live without, but would be so nice to have. Superb color shots, grouped by regions (and including Hawaii and Alaska), bring back the trips we took—or whet our appetite for the trips we would like to take.

ing could be better calculated to tie America's hands in the arena of world politics.

Foundation for Instruction

A HISTORY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS Since the Eighteenth Century
Edited by Gordon B. Turner
Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1956
738 Pages; \$7.50

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM B. BUNKER

The problems of the military profession today do not lie in the age-old values of tactics and battlefield strategies but rather in the areas of grand strategies, international affairs and politics—military relationships. Seeking a historical background for appreciation of these problems entails a study of military affairs rather than

military operations. With this thought in mind, Professor Gordon B. Turner of Princeton University has now come out with a revised edition of his *History of Military Affairs Since the Eighteenth Century*. This is an excellent foundation volume for the many fine studies of military problems issued from Princeton's Center for International Studies which should be required reading for all those engaged in analyzing our military programs.

Our profession is undergoing more rapid and drastic changes today than at any time during its long history. New weapons and vehicles have appeared which completely alter the order of magnitude of military operations while philosophies of the military art have arisen which alter the basic principles of warfare.

A consequence of the fluid state of military affairs has been the great increase in the number of agencies and individuals who are concerning themselves with war. Throughout its history the philosophy of military art was developed by professionals who spent the greater part of their lives in studying and practicing the calling. Now, however, philosophies of war are pouring out in an ever-increasing stream from individuals and offices often with little real understanding of military history and development. Detailed operational plans are advanced by manufacturers to prove the essentiality of their weapons and equipment, and the current popularity of "operational analysis" finds literally hundreds of groups outlining the scope of a future combat. No one person can possibly keep up with the total output.

While we should hope that this increase in interest in military affairs will lead to a more realistic development of our military program, there is the possibility that the shallowest and most popular answer will receive the most support. With so many diverse persons working on the problem, there is danger that the necessary leavening of experience and knowledge will be lacking. While it is daily more obvious that warfare of the future, be it a limited border clash, a minor battle of attrition or a thermonuclear armageddon, will be drastically different in strategic concept and in tactical details from warfare of the past, it must be equally true that sound development must be based on the political, philosophical and military past. A thorough understanding of the road we have traveled is an essential element in plotting the course ahead.

A History of Military Affairs is a compilation of representative writings covering the period of development of modern warfare. It has been prepared as a source book for undergraduate study in courses of military affairs and international relations. It covers the development of military strategies and their corollary political implications, from the pocket wars of the eighteenth century to the thermonuclear intercontinental extrapolation we see in the future. The authors include military and political leaders, philosophers, economists and historians. In its pages can be found such familiar classics as Upton's discussion of the command problems of the Mexican War and Churchill's apologia for the Dardanelles operation alongside modern discussions of Baldwin, Brodie and Earle on air power, hydrogen bombs and world strategies.

A compilation of this type performs a real service in making available a large slice of representative military thought to the public. Indeed, in view of the nature of our modern army, this anthology is valuable to the professional military man who no longer spends his time in study and thought of military affairs. Such a volume could well serve as the foundation for a course of instruction at our service schools at the advanced branch level. This would give our officers an understanding of military affairs that many lack.

Of course, any anthology reflects the opinions and tastes of its editors. Although much is made of the value of civil control of the military establishment and the effect of the loss of this control in Germany is cited, there is no good discussion in this book on the importance of the civil government recognizing the military requirements and selling them to its people. Indeed, in discussing the poor state of our military establishment in the two interregnums of this century, the authors selected point out the pacifism of the people and the pleas of the military without drawing the obvious refer-

ence to the political apathy of governing administrations.

It also seems an omission not to include any of the excellent analyses which have recently appeared on the many political, international and weapons discussions arising out of the Korean conflict. The problems of limited war, coalitions, power of the civil over the military, and the limitations of air power were all demonstrated in this modern version of the pocket war; studies of this would have added to the volume's completeness as would also some of the post-Korea writings of Dulles, Finletter, Slessor, and others.

Taken as a whole, this is an excellent collection of writings, invaluable as a frame of reference for a collegiate or service school course in military affairs and a valuable reference and source book for the well-read military professional.

Curmudgeon, M61

LINCOLN AND THE TOOLS OF WAR

By Robert V. Bruce

The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956
368 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

Civil War historians and Lincoln biographers have overlooked President Lincoln's interest in weapons and his influence on their development. This book takes a closer look at his personal testing and examination of small arms and other military devices. Its evidence is clear and decisive. President Lincoln was unquestionably responsible for introducing breech-loading small arms and the prototype of the machine gun into the armament of the Union armies.

This is not an addition to Lincoln mythology. Mr. Bruce has searched the records and has come up with much hitherto forgotten documentary evidence to prove his points. He has also discovered that President Lincoln, who was a sort of one-man research and development department, had an obstacle to overcome in the person of the Army Chief of Ordnance, Brigadier General James W. Ripley. Mr. Bruce's vivid portrait of Ripley shows him to have been the Old Curmudgeon, Model 1861. But even Mr. Bruce has to admit that the Ordnance chief had some excuse for disliking new inventions and new models of small arms and artillery. Ripley believed in standardization and after reading Mr. Bruce on the Union artillery it is easy to understand why. Bruce tells us that: "A requisition for field-artillery ammunition during the Civil War was apt to be an exercise in permutations and combinations. Cannon might be rifled or smooth-bore, bronze, steel or iron. They might be Parrott, Napoleon, Wiard, Whitworth, Woodruff, or Ellsworth guns, mountain or prairie howitzers, mortars

or coehorns. They came in nine common calibers, fired solid shot, grape shot, canister, case and seven principal types of shells—Dyer, Parrott, James, Shenkl, Dimmick, Hotchkiss and Whitworth. The varieties of ammunition were not infinite, but by late 1862 they had passed the six-hundred mark.

"The resulting confusion may have been slightly comical, but its effect was not. At the most critical moments in more than one battle, guns fell silent for lack of some freakish type of shot or shell, though great stores of standard ammunition were on hand."

Apparently Ripley accomplished some valuable results from his efforts for standardization as Mr. Bruce notes that the six hundred varieties had been reduced at the battle of Gettysburg to "only a hundred and forty kinds of ammunition."

A motley throng of inventors with a generous sprinkling of cranks and dreamers among them passes in review. We can understand better in reading the details the reasons for General Ripley's "chronic rage" and wonder all the more at Lincoln's patience and benevolence. Mr. Bruce's catalog of some of the wild schemes offered to save the Union is amusing, but on occasion it shows that the inventors were merely ahead of their time and of current technology. It was always Lincoln's policy to give inventors a fair hearing and a chance to prove their claims.

Mr. Bruce's discussion of the breech-loading vs. the muzzle loading infantry weapon is a most illuminating contribution to the military history of the Civil War. The episodes of the mortar boats and the building of the *Monitor* as the answer to the Confederate ironclad are well-fold tales of accomplishment. We learn in this book about early designs of submarines and incendiary shell and rockets. We read about such well-known experts as Admiral Dahlgren, Chief of Naval Ordnance, and about Herman Haupt, the Union Army's chief of military railroads. Haupt had trouble with the generals and was advised by Assistant Secretary Watson: "Be as patient as possible with the generals; some of them will trouble you more than they do the enemy."

I unreservedly recommend this book as extremely valuable background material for the history of the Civil War and the life of Abraham Lincoln.

THE HOOVER REPORT, 1953-1955: What It Means to You as Citizen and Taxpayer
By Neil MacNeil and Harold W. Metz
The Macmillan Company, 1956
352 Pages; Index; \$6.00

Reviewed by

COL. CHARLES A. H. THOMSON

Laboring from 1953 to 1955, nineteen task forces amassed 3.3 million words of facts, findings and recommendations for

Read about **Old Ironsides!**

Battle History of the 1st Armored Division in World War II

By George Howe

Here's a book that you'll want to read if you served in the 1st Armored Division in World War II, or have served in it since. It is a great unit history of a splendid fighting outfit, but that isn't all. The 1st Armored developed in combat many of the armor techniques and tactics that other divisions used in World War II and Korean battles. This book gives you a liberal education in the development of tank combat as the author shows how Old Ironsides learned by its mistakes and gained superiority over the Germans.

\$6.50

Conquer **The Story of 9th Army**

General William Simpson's 9th Army was a late starter in the Battle for Europe, but it finished strong and earned a reputation for competence and endurance. In this book, illustrated by excellent maps, you'll find the full story of 9th Army's campaigns during the bitter winter of 1944-45 and in the final weeks of the war. If you served in 9th Army, or if you have an interest in the European campaign, you'll want this book to refresh your memory of many important battles.

\$4.50

COMBAT FORCES **Book Service**

1529 18th Street NW, Washington 6, D. C.

the consideration of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government—in short, the second Hoover Commission. This commission in turn reduced the input down to some 600,000 words of reports to Congress. Then Neil MacNeil, editor in chief of the Commission, and Harold W. Metz, director of research, boiled these down to a lucid 100,000 words for your information and guidance. MacNeil and Metz between them saw more of what went on in the work of the task forces and of the Commission than anyone else, and they have provided a readable and authoritative, as well as inclusive, account of the whole. And their account faithfully represents the goals, the standards, the spirit, and the methods of work of the task forces and of the Commission itself.

The authors start off with a healthy slap at Ever Present Government. Then they treat the Commission's efforts to sharpen Government's tools (personnel and civil service, budget and accounting, legal services and procedure, paperwork and red tape, and real property). They describe its major playing fields (water resources and power, lending, guaranteeing, and insurance programs, business enterprises, and medical services), and outline its role as Big Spender (defense) and as Kind Neighbor (foreign aid). They finish with an encomium for the Commission for a job "well done."

Main problems of defense get separate chapters: as a big business, food and clothing, transportation, depot utilization, research and development, administration of surplus property, and the business organization of the Department of Defense. The Commission fingered the Department for its essentially unbusinesslike attitude, staffed as it is by people who must be ready to defend the country at a moment's notice, and who are schooled in getting the material needed to discharge their tasks, not in getting along with as little as possible. The Commission feared for the safety of the principle of civilian control, honored in form but jeopardized in practice by the omnipresence of soldiers who insist on getting enough to do their jobs with a margin for risk. The Commission recognized both that the applicability of business methods (the essence of civilian control?) is sharply limited to the supplier-related functions (production, service, and supply), and that the standards of business cannot be applied directly because the Department is far larger than any free enterprise, deals with national survival, and operates through a dual personnel system of military and civilian components. Hence its business problems are unique, and require unique solutions. The Commission called for unification of procurement and supply of clothing and food; a "new look" for defense transportation in the

form of stronger central direction; improved depot management including larger use of commercial storage; more money to be spent for research and development; better property management based on a good inventory system; and a business organization which makes civilian control a reality.

Most of the Commission's recommendations provoke argument, it goes without saying. But MacNeil and Metz have done a heroic job in setting out the Commission's point of view. And most of the controversial recommendations can be better judged in the light of the standards and the philosophy which the Commission applied. These are well described and exemplified here.

Boy into Man

YOUR OWN BELOVED SONS
By Thomas Anderson
Random House, 1956
230 Pages; \$3.50

Reviewed by
MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY

This is a novel about the Korean conflict, and we'll dispose of the combat descriptions right now by saying that they are nearly as well done as many of the narratives in Major Gugeler's *Combat Actions in Korea*. The author is a little hazy on machine-gun and mortar nomenclature—he talks about mortar "implementations" instead of increments, for example—but he went through much of the action he describes, and his memory of it is clear and reasonably accurate.

But we do not buy novels to read battle reports. What else does this one offer?

It concerns six men on a motorized patrol from a cut-off recon company, trying to make contact with a Dutch battalion several miles to the flank and rear. Four of these are familiar types: the dumb Swede, the company 8-ball, the tough corporal, and the sensitive soul. The two we are interested in are Sergeant Stanley and Richard Avery. Stanley is a veteran squad leader. Avery is a twenty-year-old private new to the company.

Stanley is a fine soldier, but has a highly developed "Old Man" complex. He identifies himself with his men and makes it his personal responsibility to see that nothing happens to them. In short, he has to feel needed.

Stanley's patrol has made contact with the Dutch and is on its way back to bring up the company when it is ambushed. Three men are killed, and the sergeant—blinded by a mortar burst—is brought face to face with a situation which even his skilled leadership cannot control. Powerless to lead, feeling himself no longer needed, he kills himself.

In the brief hours of the patrol, Rich-

ard Avery—who leaned on Stanley at the beginning—finds his own self-confidence and the power of leadership. He gets himself and the sensitive soul, the only survivors, back to the company. The author does Avery very well, and it is interesting to see a boy become a man in the stress of combat.

But it is Anderson's portrait of Stanley that illuminates a difficult problem: the sometimes thin line that separates leadership from playing god, and the danger of overstepping it.

Improbable Problems

NOT THIS AUGUST

By C. M. Kornbluth
Doubleday & Company, 1955
190 Pages; \$2.95

Reviewed by

LT. COL. PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

Now and then science-fiction novels really hit the military target. When one does, the effect is almost overwhelming.

Most futuristic or science-fiction novels which deal with warfare have lopsided conceptions of strategy; the views of war which they present would make Clausewitz revolve in his grave at a steady 18 rpm, and their tactical concepts are on a par.

Kornbluth is a new writer who has written a devastatingly good book. He has enough respect for his own intellect—and therewith enough respect for the intellect of his readers—to have done a bang-up job which could be called "Field Problems for Soviet CAMG Units Preparing for the Eventual Liberation of North American Territory by Soviet Armed Forces: Part One."

Some of the problems his book sets forth are:

What should the Soviet military authorities, in the event they conquer the United States, do to maximize cooperation with the local covert, Communist conspiratorial agents? (This one will bang you out of your seat and shoot you through the ceiling.)

If the good humor of American life begins infecting Soviet forces with a relaxed and folksy sort of Americanism, what is the best method for decontaminating Soviet troops who have been infected with the American version of democracy?

What should you, as an ex-soldier and defeated civilian, do if the President himself had to abolish the United States of America just before the Communists shot him and if a "North American Peoples Democratic Republic" announced itself to be your sole and legal government?

Kornbluth is a television writer and an Army veteran. In this book he puts his Army memories to good use, and he sees in a hard, cold way what Communist conquest might mean. The date of his story is 1965. It might be considered

fantasy or speculation, except for the fact that the same general pattern of phenomena has already been imposed by tank treads and gunfire on the peoples of China, Czechoslovakia and many other nations "liberated" from freedom by Soviet power.

Two for Relaxation

FORBIDDEN AREA

By Pat Frank
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1956
252 Pages; \$3.50

TWO RUBLES TO TIMES SQUARE

By Guy Richards
Duell, Sloan & Pearce—Little, Brown & Company, 1956
249 Pages; \$3.50

Reviewed by

COL. A. A. GUNNER


Both of these novels are concerned with the threat of attack from a country across the sea whose capital is Moscow. With this similarity mentioned, there is no further relationship between the two.

Forbidden Area is a spy thriller, written in the best Pat Frank manner, which is a manner replete with excitement, humor, and a knowledge of Washington and the Pentagon. We would have liked it very much if the author had had any idea at all that the Army is interested in national defense. A bumbling general who almost gets us clobbered by a Russian guided-missile attack from submarines, and a brilliant but ineffectual Reserve colonel are the only Army characters mentioned, and you'll read it through without finding any mention of the Army as a fighting force. It's all Air Force, with a slight assist from the Navy and the FBI. We can forget this, more in sorrow than in anger.

Two Rubles to Times Square is something else: a wild story about a Soviet general who invades lower New York City with a corps, and holds it for several days while the world tries to find out what it's all about. Not a shot is fired; visits are exchanged and both sides play a waiting game while Moscow disavows the mysterious General Kctov.

Pressure from veterans groups and other patriotic organizations forces the Army to invade the occupied area. People are killed, and people are hurt in a short and effective campaign, but Kctov escapes. What happens then is the least convincing portion of the book; Guy Richards has a message, but his method of putting it over gets a bit preachy and improbable at this point.

Army readers will wince to learn that the 30th Division fought in the Pacific in World War II, and that we still have artillery regiments. But nevertheless it's good reading, screwy enough to be plausible, and pregnant with thought-provoking ideas. Better this than a full-bosomed mystery.



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Report from your AUSA CP

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The Bayonet, 7th Infantry Division newspaper, is latest to run story on the desirability of ARMY subscriptions in organization dayrooms, and Association memberships (with subscription to ARMY included) for officer and enlisted personnel. Support like this can't be bought; our thanks to Major Noah G. King, 7th Division PIO, and others who had a hand in it.

Demand for lapel buttons exceeds expectations. We knew some of our members had waited a long time for something to wear in their civilian clothes to indicate Association membership, but we had misjudged the numbers desiring this tangible and visible evidence of their interest in the Army and its Association. No, this is no prelude to "Order now before they're all gone" plea. We have plenty for the immediate future, and can get more at any time. We're just proud our members are so enthusiastic. But why don't you order yours now?

Your Secretary was guest of Armor Association at its Annual Meeting, 28-29 April, at Fort Knox. Several hundred Armor enthusiasts gathered to discuss problems of Armor and the Army, renew friendships, lambast "two-mile-an-hour thinkers," and hear Secretary Brucker, General Palmer, and two discussion panels, among others. Spirit of Armor members is something to observe; they believe in the branch or the concept or both, and will work on non-believers at every opportunity. Many at conference flashed Association of the U.S. Army membership cards to prove your representative was among friends.

Armor Association reelected Gen. W. B. Palmer, member of our own Executive Council, President, in short business meeting.

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components and providing for and assuring the Nation's military security." (Statement by the Executive Council, Association of the U. S. Army; adopted 14 December 1953.)

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National Guard officers your Secretary has talked to recently brought home to him the great sacrifices these dedicated citizen soldiers make for national defense. Average senior Guard officer spends two nights a week and one day of weekend on Guard business. One regimental CO, with units scattered over area with 750 miles between most remote groups, spends almost every weekend visiting units. ADC of one division, operating own business, figures he could do with one less salesman if he could put more time on bread-and-butter activity but has no thought of bowing out of Guard.

Recruiting problem is king-size headache for Guard commanders. One, who quoted statistics on turnover, rejected sympathy on number of men lost to Regular Army. "That's one of the reasons we exist," he insisted. "If we train a man, and give him a taste of Army life that makes him ask for more, that's one more contribution to national defense." How can we lose with spirit like this?

Annual Meeting, scheduled for 25, 26, 27 October, is building up to biggest event in Association history. Gen. O'Connell, Chairman, in addition to committee members mentioned in May CP, has working for him (and you) Gens. Gavin, Abendroth, and Ryan, Col. Weyand and Redling, and Lt. Col. Weeks. Other, anonymous pick-and-shovel workers put in evening hours to make this meeting a success--but it won't be an outstanding event unless you can manage to be there. Start making plans.

Long curious about what happens to requisitions after unit commander signs them, your Secretary took 15 days mandatory Reserve training at Atlanta General Depot. General Ranck, commanding, permitted him to cover as much of the depot as he could in 10 training days; everything was covered except medical supply. This was eye-opening experience, and should be available to field-grade line officers, regardless of component. Engineers, quartermasters, signalers, ordnance people, transportation office--all doing the best job they can under regulations and crushing loads of paperwork, all interested in serving the troops and operating efficiently with reference to both time and the dollar. Some of the poor jokes your Secretary has heard (and repeated) lost their point as he watched dedicated men doing their best under many, probably necessary, restrictions. We came away with a healthy respect for the supply services.

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
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THE BIRTH OF THE U. S. ARMY

Congress Selects Washington

NEAR the end of the busy day of 15 June 1775, the Continental Congress turned to the duty of selecting a general to command the Continental Army. As recorded in the JOURNAL of the Congress by Secretary Charles Thomson, the choice was quickly made: "*The Congress then proceeded to the choice of a general when George Washington Esq was unanimously elected.*" On the following day, the Congress enacted rules and regulations for the government of the Army. These in effect were the beginnings of Army Regulations.



From the Collections of the Library of Congress

Washington Assumes Command

SUCH historical prints as this one have been familiar schoolbook illustrations for generations. But the evidence is that there was no ceremony under the elm when General Washington rode into Cambridge on Sunday, July 2, 1775. Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman described the scene in these words: "They found Sunday-afternoon idlers around the college but no committee with an address, and no column to line Harvard Yard. . . . Probably without ceremony, trumpet-flourish or roll of drums Washington was conducted" to his headquarters.